FRANCE IN DEFEAT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES

By SAUL K. PADOVER*

FRANCE'S defeat in 1940 was one of those events that "shook the world."[1] Its swiftness and completeness amazed even the Germans. But the mere fact of the defeat is, in long range terms, perhaps less important than the factors that caused it and the reactions that followed it.[2]

At the outset, it should be remarked that this whole subject, involving as it does the field of socio-psycho-politics, is still wide open, at least so far as France is concerned. Except for tendentious tracts, some technical military monographs, and the expected autobiographic apologias,[3] there is little to go on. French scholars have not done much objective research on the causes and consequences of the tragedy of 1940.

The reasons for that neglect are in themselves significant, for they shed light on the total picture of the culture with which we are dealing here. At least five reasons account for the failure of French scholarship to investigate deeply what the martyred Sorbonne professor Marc Bloch, in a book published posthumously, called *L'Étrange Défaite*.[4]

(1) Academic traditionalism, especially in historiography. Contemporary history is not a favored theme among the established academicians. A professor writing about 1789 is consid-

* This paper is part of a larger study, "The World Revolution of Our Time," now in progress at the Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University. Much of the material was collected by the author in Paris.

[1] Paul Reynaud called it "la plus humiliante défaite de notre histoire."

[2] On August 29, 1946 the National Assembly voted unanimously to set up a commission to inquire into "l'ensemble des événements politiques, économiques, diplomatiques et militaires qui, de 1933 à 1945, ont précédé, accompagné et suivi l'armistice, afin de déterminer les responsabilités encourues et de proposer, s'il y a lieu, les sanctions politiques et judiciaires."—*Journal Officiel*, Aug. 30, 1946, pp. 3389-3402. The commission consists of sixty members of the Assembly and eighteen representatives of the *Résistance*. It began its inquiry on Feb. 11, 1947, but no findings have as yet been made public.

[3] An example is General M. G. Gamelin's *Servir*, Tome III: "La Guerre, septembre 1939-mai 1940" (Paris, 1947), which one reviewer described as "habilement calculé pour décourager dès l'abord toute critique malveillante."—*Revue de Dénse Nationale*, May 1948.

[4] Paris, 1946; English translation, 1949. Professor Bloch was shot by the Germans as a Resistant in June 1944.

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ered a scholar,[5] but one devoting himself to 1940 would expose himself to the danger of being regarded as a mere journalist. Younger scholars in particular, hoping for jobs or advancement, dare not run such a risk.

(2) Lack of funds. To sift through the tons of contemporary documents and papers requires money and a research staff. French scholars, unfortunately, are supplied with neither.

(3) Subjective attitude. The war experience is still too close to the French. Their painful memories do not permit the kind of detachment required for scrupulously objective investigation.

(4) Fear of consequences. A scholarly and comprehensive study of the "Strange Defeat" would, almost certainly, stir up political passions and result in further national disunity. Nor must one forget that the incompetents, semitraitors, and collaborationists of 1940 are either back in influential positions or have influential friends.

(5) Absence of the spirit of sociological inquiry. Although France has a few sociological scholars, the essence of her culture is individualistic-intellectual and out of sympathy with modern social science techniques. Intimate surveys and quantitative methods are, as a general rule, frowned upon and probably misunderstood. One of the reasons for that is, of course, lack of funds and the nonexistence of great private foundations which have done so much for scholarship and science in the United States.

The writer had an illustration of this when he sent his French research assistant to one of the Paris archives to collect simple biographic data on the French generals from 1900 to 1940, since France has no *Who's Who*. After some negotiations and careful explanation of the quantitative method, as well as the purpose of the Hoover Institute's project (a cooperative scholarly survey of the "World Revolution of Our Time"), permission to use the archives was refused in the following words, expressed by an eminent French general:

> This project is not only pretentious but almost inconceivable for us; it shows a total ignorance of military problems not only in regard to France but also in general. . . . That [project] is a typical American

[5] By now there must be a million books on the French revolutionary period, and they still keep coming. Tourneaux' *Bibliographie de l'histoire de Paris pendant la Révolution française* fills five volumes.

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idea. The United States is a young country, for which the military problem is relatively recent. From the point of view of combined historical and statistical research, the United States could start at point zero, from the foundation and colonization of the country. But we, in France, cannot go back to the origins of our army, even to please our best American friends. We have a very heavy military past, let us not forget it. France was once the most important and the most mighty land force in Europe, which is no longer the case today. . . . It would be much more important to study, for example, the reasons for the rivalry between the cavalry and the other services. . . . A scientific interpretation [of the statistical material wanted by the project] is not merely a danger but a heresy, the more so since it would involve interpretation by men who are uninformed about and foreign to our Western military conception. It is an interesting research project that you propose, but one that is extremely dangerous.

I

A brief historic recapitulation of the war is in order. On September 1, 1939 the Germans invaded Poland, which fell within four weeks. On September 3 France and Great Britain declared war on Germany. But nothing much happened immediately on the Western front. Until the spring of 1940 there were merely feints, skirmishes, and alerts. This was the period that came to be known as *"la drôle de guerre"*—the Phoney War.

Sitting behind their Maginot Line, the French were confident. On the face of it, they had every reason to be. One of their greatest generals, Maxime Weygand, had assured them publicly in a speech which he delivered at Lille on July 5, 1939:

> You ask my opinion of the French army and I will tell you frankly and in all truth. . . . I believe the French army has a greater value than at any other time in its history: it possesses matériel of first quality, fortifications of the first order, an excellent morale and a remarkable High Command. No one among us desires war, but I affirm that if we are forced to win a new victory, we will win it.

France's military assets were, indeed, seemingly great and a good part of the non-French world shared this confidence in her armed strength. France's navy, under Admiral Darlan, was the fourth most powerful in the world, consisting of 175 warships.[6] The army, about one million strong at the front and perhaps

[6] These included: 7 capital ships, 2 aircraft carriers, 19 cruisers, 70 destroyers, and 77 submarines. Much of this fleet was to be sunk later by the French themselves to keep it out of British and, later, German hands.

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four million in reserve, had been expensively maintained[7] and was believed to be well trained and expertly led. It lived on the victorious reputation of 1918, and even the idea of total war was not alien to its tradition, for were not the French the first to organize it?[8]

The generals also enjoyed great renown. Chief of Staff Gamelin, for example, had collaborated in the victory of the Marne—a victory immortalized in the famous message from Foch to Joffre: "My right is rolled up; my left is driven back; my center is smashed. I have ordered an advance from all directions." That kind of offensive spirit was supposed to be typical of French arms.

If the French army was not as well equipped as was the *Wehrmacht,* it was told that it did not really matter, since clearly the individual *esprit* of the Frenchman was superior to the collective obedience of the German.[9] Above all, the French had morale, and that, the troops were assured, was bound to win in the end. The *Règlement d'Infanterie de l'Armée française* explained it thus:

> The number and training of the combatants, the power and abundance of the weapons, are not all that count in war. Combat is in the last resort a battle of morale. Whatever may be the material forces employed by one side or the other, they never succeed in the total destruction of the adversary. Among the survivors it is the moral forces that decide victory. The vanquished party is not the one that suffers the most losses in men and matériel, but the one whose morale is the first to bend.

On May 10, 1940 the German blitz struck at the Low Countries; on the 14th the Netherlands Army capitulated. On

[7] See R. Jacomet (Contrôleur Général de l'Armée), *L'Armement de la France, 1936-39,* Paris, 1945.

[8] In the *levée en masse* decreed by the Revolutionary government on August 23, 1792: "The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing, and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves to the public places in order to rouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic."

[9] "C'est ce sentiment de la superiorité morale qui, précisément, donne à l'Armée française la certitude de la victoire. . . . L'instinct collectif chez l'Allemand est ressenti comme l'oppression d'une masse immense, force obscure qui s'impose à chacun et lui enlève toute volonté propre. . . . Le Français, au contraire, ne se sent vraiment à l'aise collectivement que dans des réunions d'hommes restreintes, dont les individus lui sont connus, il supporte la discipline collective, non comme une force de coercition mais comme une limitation consentie."—*La France Militaire,* Centre d'Informations Documentaires, Paris, 1940, p. 240.

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May 12 the Panzer divisions cut across the Meuse at Sedan, inundated the Belgian plain, turned the French Ninth Army and raced to the English Channel. Boulogne fell on May 23, Calais on the 25th; two days later, King Leopold, with his army of half a million,[10] surrendered unconditionally and the Allied forces, particularly the British, began their memorable evacuation at Dunkirk, which was completed by June 3.[11]

Having conquered the Low Countries, the Germans cut across the Somme, flanked the Maginot Line and rushed, virtually unchecked, toward Normandy and Paris. They took Rouen on the 9th, Villers-Cotterets on the 10th. General Weygand, appointed Commander-in-Chief after the fall of Holland, was overwhelmed by a sense of defeatism. "Les Allemands," he repeated to his staff, "passeront où et quand ils voudront." On June 10 the government quit Paris; on the 12th Weygand ordered a general retreat, and the evacuation of the Maginot Line.[12] Each corps commander was left to his own resources.[13] On June 14 the Germans entered Paris and, with the French armies in retreat and in chaos, that was the end.

At ten o'clock on the night of June 16, the French Cabinet in Bordeaux, now infiltrated by defeatists, *capitulards*, and perhaps outright traitors, voted thirteen to ten to ask for an armistice. Premier Reynaud resigned and, with other patriots, soon escaped;[14] General Pétain became the head of the gov-

[10] Lt. Col. F. Vandaele, "L'Armée belge au Canal Albert," *Revue de Défense Nationale*, June 1948. The Belgian forces consisted of 18 infantry divisions, 2 chasseur divisions, 1 corps of cavalry with 2 motorized divisions, 2 regiments of cyclists, 2 regiments of fort artillery, 1 brigade of field artillery, 2 antiaircraft regiments, 3 aviation regiments.

[11] But on June 4, in the ruins of Dunkirk, the Germans captured 80,000 French. See A. Zevaès, *Histoire de Six Ans 1938-1944*, Paris, 1944, p. 82.

[12] See R. Céré, *La seconde guerre mondiale*, Paris, 1947; A. Schwob, *L'Affaire Pétain*, edition de la Maison Française, 1944.

[13] Many of these individual units, though cut off from any central command, continued to fight heroically but without hope. See, for example, the story of Pierre Keller (Général de division), *La division de Metz, 42 D. I., pendant la bataille de France* (Paris, 1947); Commandant N. Bourin, *Le second drame de Maubeuge* (Paris, 1947); General de la Laurencie, *Les opérations du IIIe Corps d'Armée* (Paris, 1947). See also Col. de Bardies, *La campagne 1939-1940*, and General Doumenc, *Dunkerque et la campagne de Flandre* (Paris, 1947). All these are, of course, written by interested parties and should be read with caution.

[14] Among the patriots who were prevented from escaping and who paid with their lives was the Minister of Interior Georges Mandel. For studies of this remarkable man, see P. Coblentz, *Georges Mandel* (Paris, 1946); G. Suarez, *Nos seigneurs et maîtres* (Paris, 1937); P. Carrère, *Profils* (Paris, 1937); P. Morel, *Les grands hommes de l'Union Nationale*. Mandel did manage to go to North Africa to organize a resistance there, but the Pétainists

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ernment, assisted by men like Laval, Darlan, and the notorious Ybarnegaray, who, when Winston Churchill pleaded for continued resistance and a union with Britain, cried: "We do not want to become a British dominion." At noon of June 17, less than five weeks after the German blitz started, Pétain told the French people to stop fighting. In a radio address he said: "It is with a heavy heart that I tell you that it is necessary to cease the combat."[15]

The armistice was signed on June 25, President of the Republic Lebrun was forced to resign, and helpless France was carved up between the German conquerors who kept the northern half, and the French fascists and collaborationists who preserved the southern portion. From 1,500,000 to 1,900,000 French soldiers were taken prisoner by the Germans, which constituted perhaps the largest military disaster in history.

Thus the German lightning struck France and brought her crashing to the ground. It took the Germans a mere forty days of military operations—at a minimum cost to themselves[16]—to annihilate the proudest army in Europe, to make a mockery of the most elaborate fortifications, to reduce to nullity the most pretentious General Staff. In forty days France, the world's second largest empire and for centuries one of the masters of Europe, ceased to exist as a power. It was all so swift and overwhelming that the French people were left dazed, crushed in spirit, tearful and unbelieving. They did not know what hit them, and to this day it is not certain that they know.

Who was responsible for the national catastrophe? If blame for the debacle is to be allocated, one cannot absolve the whole people. Obviously everybody was to a certain extent morally responsible: the Left for its pacifism, the Right for its defeatism,

brought him back and delivered him to the Germans who, in turn, handed him over to the French fascist *miliciens* who murdered him on July 7, 1944.

[15] A day later another French general, Charles de Gaulle, whose book on mechanized warfare, *Vers l'Armée de Métier* (Paris, 1934), was ignored by the French High Command but not by the Germans, spoke different words. Addressing the French people from London, whither he had escaped, he said: "Has the last word been said? No! The same means which have vanquished us can some day bring us victory. Struck today by a mechanical force, we can in the future win with a superior mechanical force. The destiny of the world lies there."

[16] Of all the major fronts on which the Germans fought in World War II, the one of France in 1940 was the least costly in casualties. See Saul K. Padover: *Experiment in Germany*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946, pp. 266-69; "Was Germany Beaten?" *Toronto Star Weekly*, April 6, 1946; "Is Germany Really Kaput?" *Science Digest*, May 1946.

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the rest of the nation for its *je m'en foutisme*.[17] But moral judgments apart, one discerns three main causes behind France's disaster. They can be described as the three M's—*Men, Materials,* and *Mind*. In other words, the defeat was caused by bad leadership, especially military; by insufficient matériel, poorly organized; and by a low state of public opinion, including that of the troops.

II

Men. It is now universally known that the French High Command was pitifully, one might say totally, inept. Coming from a society that was, in most fields, virtually a gerontocracy, the top military men were old in 1940—Gamelin, for example, was 61, Weygand 73, Pétain 84. They lived in the past and possessed, no doubt, fine nineteenth-century minds. Their military training and experience made them feel at home in cavalry and horse-drawn cannon; modern machines, the coordination of swift and mechanized weapons with striking manpower was beyond their conception. Theirs was a strategy of passivity, dominated by "le fétichisme de la ligne Maginot."[18] The immediate responsibility for the debacle must, thus, be placed squarely on the French High Command with its rigidity and lack of imagination.[19] As General Joffre once remarked: "I do not know whether it was I who won the battle of the Marne, but one thing I do know well—if it had been lost, it would have been by me."

An additional factor was pro-fascist sympathy on the part of many of France's top figures, in the army, navy, and government. The blunt truth is that a number of influential Frenchmen in key positions hated the Republic, and others turned out to be downright traitors. At best, the leading generals were politically conservative and limited in outlook, like General Giraud,[20] or inclined to a bumbling kind of patriarchal fascism

[17] In a French public opinion poll concerning the weakness of France in 1939, 31% held the people responsible, 18% the politicians, 13% politics, 8% treason, 8% national disunity, 8% low birth rate. See *Sondage de l'Opinion Publique française*, June 15, 1945.

[18] See General de Cugnac, *Les quarante jours*, Paris, 1947. For a critique of the "*extrême faiblesse du commandement*," see Col. de Bardies, *La campagne 1939-1940* (Paris, 1947).

[19] "La défaite de 1940 a son origine moins dans notre infériorité du moment en moyens matériels que dans une éclipse de la pensée militaire française durant les vingt années qui se sont écoulées entre les deux conflits mondiaux."—T. Albord, "Appel à l'Imagination," *Revue de défense nationale*, August-September 1949.

[20] See Giraud's memoirs, *Un seul but: la Victoire* (Paris, 1949). The *New York Herald Tribune* (Paris ed., July 6, 1949) reviewer wrote of Giraud: "At heart he agreed with Pétain in many things, notably in maining a firm, disciplined, patriarchal society in France."

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like General Pétain.[21] At worst, they were men like Generals Dentz and Bridoux, whom French courts later condemned to death. In the army, the spirit that had led to the Dreyfus case was still alive. Indeed, Weygand, an anti-republican, had, as a young captain, contributed ten francs for a monument to Colonel Henry,[22] a French General Staff officer whose forged letter had helped to condemn Dreyfus.[23] As Generalissimo in 1940, Weygand was a defeatist from the moment he took over command;[24] his political convictions being what they were, he could hardly have been expected to put his heart into the war against the Nazi-fascists. He helped further to depress the spirit of the French cabinet, which had fled to the provinces, by repeating the canard that a Communist uprising was about to take place at Paris. Minister of Interior Mandel challenged the statement and, while not calling the General a liar, proved that he was not telling the truth.[25]

A fundamental reason for the behavior of many French leaders was the fear of Communism. Right-wing circles were easily persuaded that the real enemy of France was Communism and not Hitlerism—a cardinal theme in Nazi propaganda. Their definition of Communism included everything on the Left, from anti-Communist Socialists to anti-Socialist liberals. It is not certain that many could or cared to tell the difference between

[21] For a sympathetic biography of Pétain, see the book by his Directeur du Cabinet, Jean Tracou: *Le Maréchal aux Liens* (Paris, 1949).

[22] Listed in the anti-Semitic sheet *La Libre Parole*, Dec. 19, 1898.

[23] Colonel Henry confessed the forgery, was arrested, and committed suicide. See F. Goguel. *La Politique des Partis sous la IIIe République*, Paris, 1946, p. 92.

[24] On May 25, 1940, a month before Pétain asked for an armistice and while France still had her main forces intact, Weygand complained: "La France a commis l'immense erreur d'entrer en guerre n'ayant ni le matériel qu'il fallait, ni la doctrine militaire qu'il fallait."—*Les Documents secrets de l'État-Général Français*, p. 140; Bloch, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[25] This incident took place at Cangey, on June 11, during a Cabinet meeting at which Weygand was present. He said: "Je suis en mesure d'apprendre au Conseil qu'une émeute communiste va éclater à Paris. M. Thorez est arrivé, et, ce soir, monsieur le Président, il couchera à l'Elysée." Mandel, in charge of police and security, replied promptly: "Je suis obligé de répondre au généralissime que les renseignements qu'il vient de nous fournir sont absolument inexacts." Weygand: "Douteriez-vous de ma parole?" Mandel: "Il ne s'agit point de votre parole; mais ma source de renseignements est supérieure à la votre. J'ai eu, il y a à peine quelques minutes, une conversation téléphonique avec M. le préfet de police Langeron, et celui-ci m'a dit qu'en dépit de la gravité de l'heure, la population parisienne fait preuve d'un calme admirable. Au reste, il est aisé d'en avoir la confirmation immédiate: il suffit d'appeler au téléphone M. Langeron et M. Le Président de la République tiendra la recepteur afin qu'on ne puisse pas douter de la parole d'un civil." This was done, and, while Weygand sat in silence, the Police Prefect of Paris confirmed by telephone that the capital was calm and that there was no sign of Communist activity.

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a democratic Socialist and a totalitarian Communist. To the Right, everybody more or less on the Left was a "Red." The claims of democracy were considered and labeled "Communist."

The Rightist generals were not alone in their antipathy to democracy. High naval officers were, if anything, more hostile to the democratic Third Republic, which they despised. A restricted caste recruited from the old families, clerical and reactionary as a rule, they lived in a never-never political world. On top of everything, they hated the British ally, whom they considered a more deadly rival than the Germans whose fleet had never been sufficiently important for rivalry. In spirit they were not at war with Germany but with Britain.[26] One of the few pro-Republican French admirals (in private conversation he insisted he was the only one) told this writer that during the 1936 maneuvers in the Mediterranean he became so fed up with the conversation of his officers about preferring "Hitler to Blum" that he finally ordered them to leave the table.[27]

Among civilians, the number of pro-Germans and sympathizers with Nazi-fascism was, of course, legion. Although it is an exaggeration to say, as did Pierre Cot,[28] that the French *bourgeoisie* as a whole was converted to fascism, it is certainly true that large numbers of leading figures in government, in industry, and in the professions were in sympathy with the Hitler-Mussolini ideology. Their motivations varied from the careerism (plus hatred of Britain) of a Laval, through the fascist convictions of a Deat, to the gangsterism of a Darnand.[29]

Whatever their motives, it is certain that numerous Frenchmen were ready to deliver their country to Hitler and, later, to collaborate with the Germans in the transformation of France into a second-rate fascist dependency. Their eagerness to serve

[26] Anti-British feeling existed also among the generals. When Giraud, for example, was spirited out of France in a submarine, the first question he asked was whether it was British or American; if British, he said, he would not care to set foot in it. (Personal conversation with the submarine commander.)

[27] At least three admirals were later condemned by French courts: Admiral Platon was executed in 1944; Admiral de Laborde was condemned to death but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment; Admiral Esteva is now in perpetual detention.

[28] Cot, *Triumph of Treason*, Chicago, Ziff-Davis, 1944.

[29] Darnand was a professional criminal who, under Vichy, became chief of the fascist militia. "Darnand . . . est un ancien cagoulard, mais il est surtout un bandit. Compromis dans des affaires d'assassinat, entrepeneur louche de transport, il avait à la préfecture de Police un dossier spécialement chargé."—Raymond Aron, *De L'Armistice à l'Insurrection Nationale*, Paris, 1945, p. 337.

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the enslavers of their country sometimes embarrassed the more sensitive Germans, as can be seen in the remarkable diary of Ernst Juenger, the German novelist who served as a staff officer during the occupation in Paris. Juenger comments with dry irony in his diary[30] that no matter what dirty work the Germans needed done, they always found Frenchmen willing to do it for them.

After the Liberation, the French who had fought in the Resistance set up tribunals to try the traitors and collaborationists—exactly as Pétain and his collaborationist generals had done in 1940.[31] There were three kinds of courts: local F.F.I.[32] courts martial; special justice courts to hear cases of collaboration; and the High Court of Justice in Paris for prominent figures. These courts were organized in tacit agreement between the Communists and the Gaullists; each group apparently agreed to defend its class and spare the other's.[33] Thus neither workers nor big industrialists were tried. Nor was a single general shot. Those executed were civilians, mostly intellectuals.[34]

In a period of about five years the various courts rendered verdicts on 129,000 cases of collaboration. Of these, 791 were executed;[35] 38,000 were given prison sentences;[36] and 48,000

[30] Juenger's diary, in German, was serialized in a Swiss journal in 1949.

[31] On July 30, 1940, Pétain set up a *Cour Suprème de Justice* to try men like Blum, Daladier, Gamelin, etc., in order to discredit the Republic. This led to the famous Riom trial, which boomeranged against the Pétainists. As the Nazi *Pariser Zeitung* (April 3, 1942) remarked ironically: "The French Generals have been no more successful in the court than in the field."

[32] *Forces Françaises Intérieures*, the group name of the French army of Resistance.

[33] "En fait, la France entière avait commercé avec l'ennemi et la classe ouvrière n'avait pu subsister qu'en se mettant à la solde de l'ennemi. À ce sujet une sorte de compromis fut tacitement conclu entre gaullistes et communistes, chacun défendant sa clientèle. Les uns ne reprocheraient pas aux ouvriers d'avoir consciencieusement fignolé pendant quatre ans des camions et des tanks pour les 'boches'; les autres ne poursuivraient pas à boulets rouges les grands industriels qui avaient gagné des milliards, grâce au travail des ouvriers." J. Galtier-Boissière, *Histoire de la Guerre 1939-1945*, Vol. V, p. 391.

[34] *Ibid.* "De tous les hauts militaires poursuivis, aucun n'a été fusillé. . . . Ni un gros industriel, ni un général, ni un magistrat ne serait envoyé au poteau."

[35] This number does not include the "Reign of Terror" instituted by the Communists in the summer and autumn of 1944. How many people were murdered by them and by the criminals who infiltrated the ranks of the Resistance, is not certain. The figures given vary from 80,000 to 100,000, but this is probably an exaggeration. See *American Mercury*, April 1946; a letter in *Aux Écoutes*, February 28, 1947; *La Révolution Proletarienne*, August 1947. All that can be said for sure is that several thousand people were killed without trial.

[36] Of these, 2,777 were condemned to perpetual forced labor; 10,434 to a specified period of forced labor; 2,713 to confinement.

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were attainted with "national indignity."[37] Any way one looks at it, this is an exceedingly high number for a "Nation of Patriots."[38]

In terms of the personalities judged, the most important of the tribunals was the *Haute Cour de Justice,* created on November 13, 1944, to try collaborators of high rank. The court sat until the end of June 1949 when it was officially closed. In the course of almost four and a half years of its existence it handed down eighteen death sentences, ten of them *in absentia.* Of these, only three have been carried out; five, including Pétain, were commuted to life imprisonment; three committed suicide in prison. Thirty were condemned to national degradation and perpetual forced labor; ten were acquitted; three died before trial.

A partial list of the 108 prominent collaborators accused before the High Court is shown in Table 1.[39]

All this adds up to a kind of revolution, incomplete and aimless to be sure, but deep-reaching and with incalculable potentialities for further explosion. In terms of larger politics, the defeat of 1940, followed by the repressions of Vichy and

[37] See *Figaro,* April 29, 1949.

[38] Carlton J. H. Hayes, *France A Nation of Patriots,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1930. There is now a need for a clarifying analysis between patriotism and class identification. Numerous Frenchmen who collaborated with the Nazis unquestionably did so for reasons that seemed to them to be sincerely patriotic; the same can be said for those who killed their compatriots because they collaborated with the enemy. Under these circumstances the whole concept of "patriotism" obviously requires investigation.

[39] One must mention a number of other leading individuals sentenced by various courts: Henri Beraud, writer; Bernard Faÿ, historian and former curator of the Bibliothèque, who denounced fellow-Frenchmen to the Nazis as Freemasons; Stephane Lauzanne, former editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Matin;* Charles Maurras, director of *Action Française* and member of the French Academy; Robert Brasillach, editor of *Je Suis Partout* and a poet, shot on Feb. 6, 1945; Gaston Bergery, former ambassador to Turkey; Louis Auphan, an editor of *Action Française,* condemned by the Cour de Justice of Lyon to twenty years of hard labor; Jean Lousteau, speaker on Radio Paris, condemned to death on Nov. 30, 1945; Abel Hermant, author, condemned to life imprisonment on Dec. 15, 1945; Comte Armand de Chastenet de Puysegur, condemned to death in Oct. 1944, sentence commuted to life imprisonment on Dec. 19, 1945; Guy Bunau-Varilla, political editor of *Matin,* condemned for life in 1946; Jean Luchaire, editor, condemned to death in 1946; Michel Detroyat, aviator, condemned to national degradation for life in 1946; Robert Peyronnet, radio producer, condemned to twenty years hard labor in 1946; Jean Berthelot, minister under Laval, condemned to two years and national degradation; Hubert Lagardelle, another Laval minister, condemned to forced labor for life; Cayla, former governor of Madagascar, condemned to five years; Amédée Bussiere, prefect of police of Paris, condemned to forced labor for life; Admiral Auphan, for his rôle in the scuttling of the fleet at Toulon on Nov. 27, 1942, condemned to forced labor for life, but *in absentia.*

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succeeded by the severe purges of the Liberation, revealed the extent of national disunity. It showed the depth of disaffection

TABLE 1

Name	*Position*	*Sentence*	*Present status*
Pétain, Philippe	Chief of State	Death	Commuted to life[1]
Laval, Pierre	Chief of Government	Death	Executed[2]
Darnand, Joseph	Chief of Militia	Death	Executed[3]
Brinon, Fernand de	Secretary of State	Death	Executed
Dentz, General	Resident General in Syria	Death	Died at Fresnes[4]
Dayras, Georges	Secretary General in Ministry of Justice	Death	Commuted to life[5]
de Laborde, Admiral	Commander of Mediterranean fleet	Death	Commuted to life[6]
Benoist-Mechin	Secretary of State	Death	Commuted to life[7]
Deat, Marcel	Minister of Labor	Death	Disappeared[8]
Bonnard, Abel	Minister of Education	Death	In Madrid[9]
Gabolde, Maurice	Keeper of the Seals	Death	In Spain[10]
Bonnefoy, Réné	Secretary General of Information	Death	Disappeared
Rochat, Louis	Secretary General in Foreign Office	Death	In Switzerland[11]
Alibert, Raphael	Keeper of the Seals	Death	Disappeared
Guerard, Jacques	Secretary General of Chief of Government	Death	In Spain[12]

[1] Nov. 15, 1945, Pétain was transferred to the fort on the Ile d'Yeu in the Atlantic.

[2] After taking poison, Laval was executed in Fresnes prison on Oct. 15, 1945.

[3] Executed on Oct. 10, 1945, in the fort of Chatillon; one day later, in the same place, Jean-Herold Paquis, the military commentator on Radio Paris from 1941 to 1944, was also executed.

[4] Condemned to death on Aug. 20, 1945, he was *"gracié"* to life by General de Gaulle on Oct. 25, but died in Fresnes.

[5] Held at Clairvaux.

[6] It was Admiral de Laborde who scuttled the fleet at Toulon; he is now at Clairvaux.

[7] Now at the Ile de Ré.

[8] Condemned *in absentia*. Believed either to have found death during his flight in the Alps, or to live in Brazil.

[9] Condemned *in absentia*. In Madrid he makes a living as a journalist and lecturer.

[10] Condemned *in absentia*. Lives in poverty in Spain.

[11] Lives as a translator.

[12] Some believe he is head of an insurance company there; others think he is in Argentina.

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TABLE 1 (*concluded*)

Name	*Position*	*Sentence*	*Present status*
Darquier de Pellepoix	Commissioner of Jewish Questions	Death	In Madrid[13]
Masson, André	Minister of Prisoners	Death	Disappeared
Bridoux, General	Under Secretary of State for Air in War Ministry	Death	Escaped[14]
Esteva, Admiral	Governor General of Tunis	Life	At Clairvaux
Vallat, Xavier	Commissioner of Jewish Questions, later of Information	10 yrs.	At Clairvaux
Chasseigne, François	Secretary of State for Food, later Labor	10 yrs.	At Clairvaux
Marion, Paul	Secretary of State for Information	10 yrs.	At Clairvaux
Chevallier, Jacques	Minister of Education	20 yrs.	Reduced to 4
Abrial, Jean	Admiral	10 yrs.	Reduced to 4
Marquis	Admiral	5 yrs.	Reduced to 4
Baudouin, Paul	Minister of Foreign Affairs	20 yrs.	Reduced to 4
Laure	General		Acquitted
Peyrouton, Marcel	Minister of Interior, then Ambassador		Acquitted[15]
Martin, Olivier			Acquitted

[13] He may be somewhere in South America now.

[14] Before his trial, he escaped from the Val-de-Grâce to Madrid, where he is now writing his memoirs.

[15] Acquitted on Dec. 22, 1948, largely because of the rôle he played in the arrest and banishment of Pierre Laval from Vichy. It was also counted in his favor that General Giraud had persuaded General Eisenhower to bring him to North Africa and make him Governor of Algeria. General Eisenhower writes in his *Crusade in Europe*: "In the search for satisfactory individuals we decided to bring Marcel Peyrouton to Algiers. It was reported to me that Peyrouton was then a virtual exile in Argentina, unable to go back to France because of the enmity of Laval, Hitler's most evil puppet. It was also reported that he had previously established a reputation in North Africa as a skillful colonial administrator. Nevertheless, he had been, for a considerable time, a member of the Vichy Government and was therefore regarded in the democratic world as a Fascist. Bringing Peyrouton to Algeria as Governor was a mistake, even though he was a vast improvement over his soft and vacillating predecessor."

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toward the Republic and the existing institutions on the part of important segments of the French population, both on the Right and on the Left. So fragile have been the foundations of national unity—the Third Republic, it will be recalled, was saved in 1875 by the margin of one vote—that the harsh blow of a crisis, instead of consolidating the nation, only splintered it further. Great numbers of Frenchmen have had, as they still have, other loyalties than to fellow Frenchmen or to the Republic (Third or Fourth).

III

Materials. Next to the inept generalship and collaborationism as direct factors in the defeat of 1940, there was the question of the inadequacy of military matériel. In the last analysis, of course, the difficulty here may be ascribed to the fact that France is, and has been, an underindustrialized country. The 1921 census, for example, listed around eight and a half million persons engaged in agricultural work and about six million in industrial occupations. Although there has been a steady growth of industrialization since then, nevertheless France was not, on the eve of World War II, an industrial state. As André Siegfried wrote: "The base of French society always remains peasant." Most of France's industry, moreover, was small-scale, insufficiently powered,[40] and, consequently, ill-prepared to produce material and parts in the mass that modern warfare requires. In the matter of steel-producing capacity alone, for instance, the Germans exceeded them at least sixfold. It has been estimated that if France had been properly industrialized and economically organized, she could have equipped and maintained no less than 110 divisions.[41]

But even the inadequate matériel that did exist was not well used, and in certain instances not at all. Here we must touch upon an essential point, that of organization for use. A crated tank in storage is obviously of no value to men in the field; and in the case of France in 1940 much of the materials of war never reached the troops. This was not necessarily sabotage, as

[40] "Le mouvement de concentration technique industrielle ne s'est pas poursuivi en France à un rythme aussi rapide qu'à l'étranger. . . . Ce faible dégré de concentration se traduit par l'usage réduit de la force motrice puisque 74.5% des établissements français ne sont pas dotés de la force motrice." J. Hardy, *La Crise Française*, Paris, 1945, p. 198.

[41] See General Dejussieu-Pontcarral, *La Nation armée de la République Française*, Paris, 1948.

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has been charged often, but, to use the inelegant but precisely descriptive American Army slang, just plain snafu. The snafu that prevailed in high French circles, military as well as civilian, can be judged from the fact that neither the Prime Minister nor the generals were informed, at the most critical moments, about the planes that the French Army had at its disposal. Worse than that, they could not get the exact information even when they tried.

The French were warned about the *Luftwaffe* and its preparations. They had shocking evidence of the power and the coordinated use of Goering's bombers and fighters after the Polish campaign. The Prime Minister and his General Staff knew, in the autumn of 1939, that the Germans disposed of 4,000 warplanes poised for action, 5,000 planes in reserve, and 3,000 training and supply planes.[42] What did the French have, and how did they prepare to meet this situation?

On February 13, 1940, a few weeks before the German attack on the Low Countries, Prime Minister Daladier called a conference of his war chiefs, including Generals Gamelin and Georges and the heads of the Ministries of War and Air. General Georges reported that the First French *Armée aérienne*, held in preparation for operations in the Northeast, consisted of 936 planes, 288 old ones and 648 recent ones. But, added the General, of the 648, only 453 were "ready for action," and none was a bomber—350 were pursuit planes, and 81 reconnaissance and observation craft.

General Georges was obviously perturbed at his own revelation. The Prime Minister pointed out that in 1939 France had produced 2,400 planes (1,450 of them fighters), and asked: "Où sont ces avions?" Nobody could tell him.

A few days later, on February 22, Minister of Air Guy la Chambre sent a note to Daladier challenging General Georges' figures. Instead of 648 modern planes, the note stated, the First Air Army had 703, of which 520 were *disponible*. It added that there existed also one bombardment group and three fighter groups in the Southeast.

On the following day the bedeviled Daladier received a report

[42] A French intelligence report of Jan. 26, 1940 listed the *Luftwaffe* as having 5,150 planes of the line, of which 1,250 were fighters and about 2,500 bombers. Another 6,900 were in stock or in use by the aviation schools.

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informing him that in the month of January France produced a total of 326 planes (*sortis d'usine*) but only 209 were, in effect, listed as effective (*pris en compte*). He could not understand it, and scribbled on the margin: "Qu'on m'explique la différence!" In three days he was given an explanation by the National Defense Department of the Cabinet—that when a plane leaves the factory it has to be tested, and only after it meets the test is it *pris en compte*.[43]

The documents show that in the weeks preceding the German blitz, Daladier was worried about aviation. From the Air Ministry, the Air Generals, and the Chief of Staff he tried to get *la vérité* about the situation, but all he obtained was either assurances of false optimism[44] or contradictory accounts. On March 18 a report reached his desk that, as of January 30, France possessed a total of 2,449 planes, of which less than half (1,221) were assigned to the armies at the front. But even then the truth was not explained to him. He was not informed that of the total available to the troops, 700 or 800 were pursuit planes, and that of these, one-third were *indisponible,* that is, not ready for action. In different words, only 450 to 500 planes were ready to take to the air as fighters. In addition, there were perhaps 60 bombers and about 150 observation and reconnaissance planes.

This situation remained more or less unchanged at the time when the Germans struck in their brilliantly combined tank and infantry offensive whose path was cleared by the massive sweep of the hundreds of *Luftwaffe* bombers. On May 14, four days after the start of the German blitz, a report was put on Daladier's desk containing the following information about the state of French fighter craft:

[43] "Lorsq'un avion *sort d'usine,* il est soumis à des essais de réception en vol. Tant que cet avion n'a pas été receptionné, il appartient au constructeur. Au contraire, après réception, il appartient à l'État. C'est alors un avion *pris en compte.*" For the whole account, see P. Lyet and Lt. Col. de Cossé-Brissac, "Combien d'Avions Allemands contre combien d'Avions Français le mai 1940?" *Revue de défense nationale,* June 1948.

[44] General Gamelin reported to him that, though German superiority in bombers was in proportion of 2.3 to 1, nevertheless the French and British aviation together were "en mesure, toute-fois, d'infliger des pertes telles à l'ennemi que celui-ci soit amené à renoncer en partie aux attaques de jour." There was no ground whatever, either in the known tactics or in the known figures, for such an assumption.

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Date	No. Pilots	CRAFT Existing	Available
May 10, A.M.	428	579	429
May 12, 9:00 P.M.	467	518	323

On that day seven German armored divisions, preceded by a *Luftwaffe* which had absolute control of the skies, crossed the Ardennes without firing a shot. They rolled, unhindered, at night with lights blazing. The French, with their few tardily and hastily (in 1939) organized tanks[45] and no aviation to speak of, stood helplessly by as German armor roared into their country. In the air, the few hundred French planes made pathetic attempts to stem the German avalanche. But all the courage and gallantry of the French pilots were a vain sacrifice.[46] The odds, in numbers and speed, were overwhelmingly against them. They were simply blown out of the skies.[47]

IV

Mind. Perhaps more fatal than the incompetence of the leaders and the shortage of military matériel was the lack of fighting spirit. In 1939-40 France's morale, both civilian and military, had hit bottom. The soul of the nation was corroded by fear and doubt, and upon this state of demoralization Nazi propaganda played unceasingly.

The country was splintered politically and morally. On the extreme Right, the influential fascist movement, a wing of which was directly connected with the Nazis and another of which was a native product, operated under the slogan, "Why Die for Danzig?" Clever fascist agitators like Deat and Doriot ridiculed the whole system of alliances so laboriously built up since 1919 and, thereby, helped to undermine the country's foreign policy and its self-confidence. On the extreme Left, the powerful Communist party, especially after the Russo-

[45] See Colonel Ferré, *Le défaut de l'Armure*, Paris, 1949.

[46] The bravery and skill of the French pilots were beyond question. In about forty days of combat they made 10,000 sorties and carried off 814 victories; but in the first three days of the blitz they lost 179 machines, almost half of the available craft. A total of 166 pilots, more than one-third of the total, were killed in action. See Lt. Col. Salesse, *L'Aviation de chasse française en 1939-1940*, Paris, 1949; P. Paquier (ed.), *Les forces aériennes françaises de 1939 à 1945*, Paris, 1949.

[47] The French craft had a speed of 450 km per hour, as against 550 km of the German planes; in addition, 429 of them (and two days later, only 323) had to face 1,500 German machines. In bombers the French were outnumbered thirty-five to one.

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German Pact of 1939, poisoned large sections of the working class with the notion that the struggle against Hitler was an "imperialist war." This was remarkably effective propaganda, although for sheer shortsightedness and stark cynicism it has rarely been excelled. Caught between these extremes was the bewildered middle class and peasantry, torn by uncertainty and dubious whether the war against Hitler made any sense. In other words, France had neither war aims nor convictions; she went into battle with heavy heart and no purpose. The general feeling was the weary *"Il faut en finir."*

The lack of moral preparation for war reflected itself most acutely in the army. Not only was there no political indoctrination of the troops, but, on the contrary, outright scepticism, defeatism and antimilitarism.

Partly, this was due to class feeling and resentment of the officers who were usually of bourgeois or well-to-do peasant origin. They did not always treat the lower ranks with respect or accord them proper dignity.[48]

Partly, the defeatism of the army was a matter of Communist, as well as Nazi, propaganda, which was most corrosive among the soldiers who came from the working class. A man who served in the Foreign Legion in 1939-40, and was later gravely wounded, told this writer that the French sergeant who drilled them gave them daily sneering "pep talks" to the effect that the whole bunch of them must be "really stupid types to volunteer to fight for those imperialist *cochons*." Later when his Foreign Legion company went into action (their casualties were 90 per cent), he recalled bitterly how the native French

[48] In this respect there have been some changes since the Liberation. Not only were a number of underground leaders, whose record was heroic, incorporated into the regular French Army as officers (despite the strong protest of the professionals), but there is now evidence of the realization that a democratic society has certain moral obligation to its soldiers. On May 27, 1949 *Le Monde Militaire* published a remarkable statement to this effect by X. Louis, Chaplain of the Invalides. He wrote: "Mon expérience de quatre années d'aumonier militaire m'amène à certifier que la cause la plus profonde de l'antimilitarisme d'une notable fraction de la nation réside dans l'irrespect de la dignité humaine. Le plus souvent, de la part des cadres de carrière, ce manque de respect est inconscient et non coupable: ce qui est d'autant plus grave. . . . Un chef doit avoir le souci du bien-être, de la santé, du moral de tous ceux dont il a la charge. Mais il doit avoir le souci majeur de leur dignité. . . . Le devoir le plus essentiel du chef vis-à-vis de ses subordonnés est, dans l'exercice même du commandement, de reconnaitre leur valeur d'hommes. . . . Un mot maladroit, un manque d'égards, une expression dure ou méprisante peuvent sèmer aujourd'hui une rancune qui levera demain en clore. . . . Une injure dans la bouche d'un chef le déshonore et ouvre dans l'âme de l'inférieur une blessure inguerissable."

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troops watched them mockingly and jeered: "Go to it, *gars!*" The implication was—Boys, it's your war!

This is not, it goes without saying, a reflection on the courage of the French. For centuries they had been one of the great warrior peoples, and they had proven their bravery in thousands of battles in the past.[49] In 1940, too, there were instances of French soldiers and officers who fought heroically against crushing odds, who resisted to the bitter end even after everything was lost, even after the Command had given orders to retire or surrender. This writer knows of one machine gun unit which, cut off from its own division and command, continued to retreat and resist and fire at the advancing Germans from behind every cover until the last round of ammunition was expended. There were men and officers whose hearts broke when they were ordered to give up and who burst into tears of rage and humiliation when the news of the armistice was announced. The fine old French spirit was by no means dead in 1940. And later, after 1941 and 1942, when the underground was organized, tens of thousands of Frenchmen knew how to fight and die with a courage that was beyond praise. The record of the Free French, too, is by no means the least heroic episode of World War II.[50] For as General Eisenhower observed, when the French feel they have something to fight for they are "soldiers of the first order."

But the army as a whole in 1940 was not permeated with fighting spirit, any more than was the nation. Where morale is absent, individual bravery becomes merely futile; and morale is the result of pride in belonging, trust in leadership, and confidence in victory. None of these elements existed in the French Army of 1940.

[49] To remind oneself of this, one only has to look at some of the great monuments, such as the Arc de Triomphe and the Vendome column, in Paris. The Latin inscription on the latter, a monument to Napoleon's *Bella Germanica* in 1805, has a magnificent sound of old-Roman triumph: TRIMESTRI SPATIO DUCTU SUO PROFLIGATI EX AERE CAPTO GLORIAE EXERCITUS MAXIMI DICAVIT. As a comment on the vanity of all such efforts, one may remark that 135 years later it took Hitler considerably less than a *trimestri* to achieve his triumph in France.

[50] At Bir-Hakeim in North Africa, May-June 1942, the French showed what they could really achieve when their fighting spirit was aroused. There the First Brigade of the Free French, commanded by General Koenig, dug in and held off the combined attacks of Italian tanks, Rommel's Panzers, and concentrated Stuka bombers. At a loss of 900 of their own men, they inflicted heavy damage on the Axis, and finally retired with two-thirds of their effectives, including the wounded, part of their matériel and 300 German and Italian prisoners.

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Recently there has come to light a story that illuminates, like a sudden flash in the dark, the state of terror and panic and demoralization of the French troops in the face of the advancing enemy.

On June 20, 1940, in the hamlet of Tantimont near Germonville (Meurthe-et-Moselle), elements of the 23d and 153d artillery regiments found themselves encircled by the Germans. For days they had been retreating, destroying much of their matériel as they fell back. Colonel de Peninou of the 23d had been wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel Charly of the 153d took over command of the two artillery remnants.

Charly was a superior officer, kindly toward his men and concerned with their welfare. But on that June 20 he was bitter at the constant retreats and determined to fight. His batteries were placed in an orchard along the highway at the outskirts of the village. The men, lying on the ground near their field pieces, were worn out and disgusted with everything. They wanted to surrender at all costs, and their officers shared their mood.

Charly assembled his officers and told them of his determination to continue fighting. He said that he was aware that "all was lost" but that they were duty-bound to fight in order "to save honor." His order was: "Pierce the German lines."

The officers were rebellious. Since all was admittedly lost, they argued that they did not see any reason for sacrificing themselves and their men. Colonel Charly was so angry at what he considered cowardice and lack of military honor that at one point he made a gesture as if to reach for his pistol. He thought the better of it and, instead, threatened some of his subordinates with court-martial for disobedience. Then, accompanied by his adjutant Leroux, he walked away toward his command post in the village.

As the *auboutiste* Colonel passed by his troops, who knew all about the fight between him and the officers, a shot was fired from the dark into his back. Charly dropped dead.

A few minutes later, to the relief of the French, the Germans arrived. They ordered the Colonel to be buried in the village with military honors and then they took all the troops prisoner. While men and officers were being rounded up, a German noncom remarked casually that Charly was not killed by a

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German bullet. His troops, he said, had not fired a single shot that evening.

For eight years the tragic fate of Colonel Charly was enshrouded in silence. But certain rumors would not die. Finally French Military Intelligence started a hush-hush investigation. Witnesses were found to testify that the bullet that killed Charly came from the direction of the orchard where the French artillerists were lounging. By a process of gradual elimination, the search was narrowed down to one man—the Master Gunner, Fernand Buret.

They found Buret in his native village of Jaulnes, near Bray-sur-Seine, where he followed the trade of mason. He was a simple man, father of two children, a respected citizen in his village. He had spent five years as prisoner of war in Germany.

Arrested, Buret confessed without hesitation. He did, to be sure, fire the shot that killed the Colonel, but he did not consider himself either morally or actually guilty—at least no more guilty and no less than his companions, his *sous-officiers* and his officers. Any one of the hundreds of men could or would have pulled the trigger, he felt. It happened that he did, but he was merely an instrument. All the men shared his feelings and opinion. That was why his act, although witnessed by dozens of his companions, was covered by an acquiescent silence.

Thus Master Gunner Buret, with his close-cropped head and ordinary, honest face stood before the military tribunal at Metz, in April 1949, and told his story. His voice a little *désolé,* his manner disarming, his shoulder-shrugs unemphatic and casual, he said to the judge: "For several days we have been falling back. Many times we asked why weren't we fighting. . . . We never once fired our cannon. . . . [On June 20] Some of the officers said to the Colonel: 'If we now fire a single cannon we'll all be massacred.' He answered: 'The first who refuses to obey, I'll blow his brains out.' . . . I don't know exactly what happened inside myself. My *sous-officier* Penzer gave me an order to go and find a munitions truck abandoned three or four miles away. . . . Somebody handed me a rifle, saying: 'Kill him! He's going to have us all massacred!' I fired in the direction of the Colonel."

The judge: "Did you aim?"

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Buret, shrugging: "I don't recall."

The judge: "Did you see the Colonel fall?"

Buret was dubious: "I think I went away in the truck. . . . I am not sure. . . . Soon we were taken prisoner by a few German cyclists. And nobody asked me how it went. No, I hadn't ever before fired a musket. What made me lose my head was listening to certain officers saying that if we fired our cannon we would all be massacred."

In the court there were some thirty visitors, former companions-in-arms of Buret. To all of them the death of Charly was welcome. It had saved their lives. And the tribunal did not in all honesty consider Buret a murderer. He was the creature of the terrible spiritual disorder that reigned in France in June 1940; he was but one of millions caught in the national tragedy. The prosecutor did not even ask the court to impose a severe punishment on Buret, for if the Master Gunner was guilty, then so was his whole company, and if his company was, so was the whole army and its command. The implications of condemning a man in Buret's position were too frightening. In the minds of many he could have been a kind of tragic hero who did what the group of which he was part felt needed doing.[51]

V

How did the people react to the collapse? When the shock of the catastrophe began to wear off, individuals started to take stock of the situation. While opinion concerning the events before and subsequent to 1940 has not yet crystallized, and perhaps never will, certain tendencies have emerged. They show a groping, if hesitant,[52] attempt to find out the truth.

The French mind after the defeat has been mirrored in a number of publications, mostly personal and generally tendentious. Among the most penetrating is Marcel Bloch's *L'Étrange Défaite,* written as an eyewitness account in 1940 and not published until six years later. The observations of Professor Bloch, an officer in the French Army and a distinguished historian, have a sharp relevancy. As a primary cause of the debacle

[51] See *Le Monde,* April 27 and 28, 1949; *France-Soir,* April 28, 1949.

[52] See *L'Armistice 12-16 juin 1940* (*Témoignages et textes*), ed. by Vexin (Édition de Minuit: Paris, 1944), which raises the question of the absence of self-criticism in France and asks why, four years after the armistice, so many French still ignore the causes of the defeat.

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he gives "the incapacity of the High Command." The "mental sclerosis," he writes, also affected the lower order of officers, all the way down the line. He discusses the lack of liaison, the miserably organized mobilization, the disorders in the various staffs, the bitter spirit of service rivalry, the poor information system in the army, the inability of the officers to command, the bureaucratic conflicts among the officers, the low morale of the troops, and the general demoralization of the nation. The impression created by Bloch is that, even before the Germans fired a shot, France—long misruled by a *gouvernement de vieillards*—was beaten.[53]

Another thoughtful observer is ex-Ambassador Albert Kammerer who, in 1940, published the clandestine *Le Crime de l'Armistice* and later a voluminous *Vérité sur l'Armistice*. His thesis is that in 1940 it was not necessary for France to lay down her arms. A more psychological approach is that of Max Beer who, in *La Guerre n'a pas eu lieu*,[54] develops the point that French public opinion, lulled by pacifism, was not ready for war. There was also the false sense of security from the existence of the Maginot Line. When the news of the armistice was announced, he writes, "everybody was stupefied" and people began to look for scapegoats.[55] Similarly, Jacques de Launay, in *Le Monde en Guerre*,[56] seeks the causes of the defeat in the spirit of men: the antimilitarist feeling of French women (in which connection he discusses the influence of Reynaud's friend, Countess Hélène de Portes); the weakness in combat; the outmoded ideas of the General Staff; and the errors of Gamelin's defensive strategy.[57]

[53] Professor Bloch's conclusion is that France's regeneration must come through the youth. "La France d'un nouveau printemps devra être la chose des jeunes. . . . Je n'aurai pas l'outrecuidance de leur tracer un programme. Ils en tireront eux-mêmes les lois du fond de leur cerveau et de leur cœur."—*Op. cit.*, p. 191.

[54] New York, Éditions de la Maison Française, 1941.

[55] "C'était d'ailleurs les femmes qui paraissaient éprouver la douleur la plus profonde en face de la capitulation. . . . Les hommes cherchaient un dérivatif. Ils le trouvaient dans de méchantes accusations: c'est la faute à Blum. . . . La faute aux chefs de l'Armée. . . ."—*Ibid.*, p. 276.

"Les prêtres disposant de l'unique tribune en France accusaient la vie facile d'avant guerre; le rélachement des moeurs, voir le divorce, d'être les causes de la catastrophe, penitence infligée par Dieu."—*Ibid.*, p. 281.

[56] Paris, 1945.

[57] "Les responsabilités de toutes ces erreurs doivent certainement être imputées à l'esprit théorique et peu réaliste des principaux chefs de l'Armée, toujours bornés aux méthodes de 1914."—*Ibid.*, p. 135.

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The Rightists blame everybody but themselves. Pierre Taittinger, a Paris deputy and member of the Chamber's Army Committee, in his *Ce que le pays doit savoir,*[58] argues that responsibility for the catastrophe rests with the military chiefs, the politicians, the ministers ("old door-mats"), the Communistic trade-unions, the diplomatic service, and the President of the Republic.[59] Similar arguments are marshalled by the anonymous GYR, in *Avant, Pendant, Aprés le Dèsastre,*[60] where just about everybody, but particularly the politicians from 1919 to 1939, is charged with guilt. Next to the politicians, according to GYR, were the "political scourges"—Jews and Freemasons. This line of thought is pursued in another collaborationist book, that of the deputy Jean Montigny, *Toute la Vérité sur un Mois Dramatique de notre Histoire,* citing speeches and arguments from Pétain and Laval and others wherein the whole French democratic system is burdened with the responsibility for the defeat.[61]

There is also the Catholic argument. This consists to a great extent of attacks on Marxist materialism with its emphasis on luxury and denial of human dignity and morality. France, according to Catholic thinking, was enfeebled by materialism and in a crisis did not have enough spirit to resist. Hence the Church rallied to Pétain who preached "spiritual" values, such as Honor, Home and Family.[62]

Anti-fascist circles follow the line of their particular grouping. The Socialists are curiously defensive and feeble in their thinking about 1940 and after. In essence, they insist that Blum is a nice fellow and Pétain is not.[63] The Communists are more

[58] Angoulême, 1941.

[59] "Le grand coupable, nous le designons du doigt, c'est M. Albert Lebrun" [the man whom Laval and the collaborationists forced to resign!].—*Ibid.*, p. 52.

[60] Published at Avignon (Aubanel Père), undated.

[61] Published at Clermont-Ferrand, 1940. Typical extracts: "Les institutions ont corrompu les hommes; il faut changer les institutions. Mais les hommes ont aussi corrompu les institutions; il faut changer les hommes" (Xavier Vallat). "Le plus grand crime qui ait été commis dans notre pays depuis longtemps, est certainement celui d'avoir déclaré la guerre" (Laval). "Si ce pays est descendu au point où il est tombé . . . il le doit à une décadence généralisée et il faut attribuer la responsabilité à cette éducation affreuse de l'opinion publique qui lui a été faite par la presse, par la radio et par le système d'information. . . . C'est l'argent qui a tout corrompu" (Flandin).

[62] For a *plaidoyer* of the French episcopate, see Msgr. Guerry (Archbishop of Cambrai and Secretary of the Assembly of Cardinals and Archbishops of France), *L'Église Catholique en France sous l'Occupation* (Paris, 1947).

[63] See Henri Noguères, *La République Accuse,* Paris, 1945; François and Georges Bourgin,

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vigorous. Theirs is the usual argument that the capitalists and their assistants, the Socialist politicians, brought France to disaster.[64] Patriotic Resistants, like Robert Aron and Maurice Schumann, stress psychological causes. Aron discusses the prevailing antis in 1940—antimilitarism, anti-Semitism, and anticlericalism—and points out that the whole nation had, in effect, morally abdicated.[65]

VI

The armistice and defeat brought out a bewildering variety of reactions among individuals. They are glimpses into national tragedy.

A Foreign Legion officer: The message of Marshal Pétain announcing the demand for an armistice fell among us with the effect of a bomb. We refused to believe it.[66]

A general already in captivity: Sadness and consternation on all our faces. . . . A sentiment of infinite distress.[67]

A colonel in command of a fortified sector at Haguenau: We will not lay down our arms. . . . Let us sing the Marseillaise.[68]

A Paris surgeon: I cannot bear it, *and committed suicide.*[69]

A sergeant: We were without news of our families, ignorant of what was happening to them, tormented by the fear of the worst.[70]

Les Démocraties Contre le Fascisme, Paris, 1946; and Léon Blum, *L'Histoire Jugera,* Montreal and Paris, 1945, which contains articles and utterances by him from 1932 to 1942, the most important of which are his statements before the Riom court in February and March 1942, during which, in effect, the Socialist leader turned tables on his Vichyite accusers. In general, Socialist defensiveness is due to the fact that many important members of their party held ministerial posts in the government up to 1939, and hence they bear a share of the total responsibility.

[64] See the typical Communist line in Florimond Bonté, *Le Chemin de l'Honneur,* Paris, 1948. "Notre pays connait les terribles conséquences de la politique criminelle suivie par des gouvernements indignes, responsables de la défaite et de l'occupation. . . . Situons les responsabilités: la clique des dirigeants"—a tract written by Thorez and Duclos, cited on p. 388.

[65] Aron, *Précis de l'Unité Française,* Paris, 1945. In 1939, he writes, there was a kind of general decay; words took the place of action; everyone was concerned only with himself, his own career: "plus de culture, plus d'initiative, plus d'audace, plus de souci de l'État, ni de sens de la continuité du régime ou de la permanence française."—p. 31. See also Schumann, *Honneur et Patri,* Paris, 1946.

[66] C. L. Flavian, *De la Nuit vers la Lumière,* Paris, 1946, p. 17.

[67] Gen. Prioux, *Souvenirs de Guerre 1939-1943,* Paris, 1947, p. 156.

[68] Pierre Lyet, *La Bataille de France Mai-Juin 1940,* Paris, 1947, p. 149. In connection with the Maginot Line troops, Lyet writes: "Des milliers d'hommes dont les chefs refusent de se rendre le 26 juin ne s'inclinent que devant l'ordre formel du Général Huntziger, chef de la délégation française d'armistice, mais d'énergiques protestations accompagnent cette reddition d'ouvrages fortifiés invaincus, contraire à toute tradition militaire."

[69] Pierre Audiat, *Paris pendant la Guerre,* Paris, 1946, p. 17.

[70] Francis Ambrière, *Les Grandes Vacances 1939-1945,* Paris, 1946, p. 63.

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A man who later became a Resistant: Some burst into tears, others sighed with relief.[71]

François Mauriac, of the French Academy, replying to the question as to the principal causes of France's debility: The blood-letting of 1914-18, the pro-German and anti-French policy of the British after 1918, the withdrawal of the United States from the League of Nations, and the defeat of Briand's policy in regard to Germany.[72]

Madame Leo Lagrange, replying to the same question: In 1939 fascism existed inside as well as outside France. That was the main cause, to which must be added the exhaustion from World War I and the uncertainty of our foreign policy.[73]

A Communist worker: I never hated Germany or the Germans. My first reaction upon the announcement of the armistice was fear. Everybody around me was afraid. In the shop where I worked we all agreed there was no reason to continue the war. Did the troops fight well? Don't make me laugh, Comrade! What did they have to fight for?[74]

A librarian, veteran of World Wars I and II: I never hated the Germans. Our fighting value? Zero. All the soldiers I was with had only one care—to escape danger. We all asked: What are we waiting for? Why don't they conclude an armistice? When the armistice was announced, I remember I was in a church at Clamecy, and one of our companions, a Communist, said: "The capitalist war is over, now we must hold out our hands and rejoin our German comrades." In the prisoner of war camp where I was nobody ever talked about the armistice or the defeat.[75]

A Paris lawyer, of Algerian-Jewish descent: Frankly, I did not hate the Germans; even my reading of *Mein Kampf* didn't change my opinion. I suspended judgment. At the moment of the armistice, the troops in my unit were totally demoralized, although personally I was ready to fight to the last drop of blood. Maybe that was because I had no family to worry about. When the armistice came I had no particular emotion one way or another. You ask who was responsible for it all? I think it was the extreme Right and the extreme Left, as well as the régime of ministerial irresponsibility of the Third Republic.

[71] Marc Leproux, *Nous les Terroristes,* Monte Carlo, 1947, p. 5. Describing the general confusion, he writes: "Les gens répètent: 'Il faut faire quelque chose,' sans savoir quoi faire. . . . La foule se porte aux concerts ou aux parades données sur les places publiques. Mais il est vrai qu'un bon nombre de personnes se rendent la comme on va au cirque."

[72] *Sondage de l'Opinion Publique Française.*

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] This and the subsequent statements are based upon prolonged interviews carried on by my assistant, Fleury Peyrachon, in the summer of 1949 in Paris.

[75] This respondent claimed that he was completely unpolitical and that he had never belonged to any political party.

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A government official, who had taught history in a Normandy college: My interest in regard to Germany related to literature and music. I read Goethe, and also Rosenberg. But as a Catholic, I was hostile both to Hitlerism and war. Only after the Austrian *Anschluss* did I become anti-German. When the armistice was announced, my first reaction was one of helplessness. But I was not critical. Being a Cartesian, I suspended judgment, assuming that the French could not do otherwise than they did. Who is responsible for it all? I think that there exists such a thing as individual responsibility, but one must always keep in mind that to a certain degree everybody is. I believe that every Frenchman ought to examine his conscience.

A college teacher, describing himself as a Left-wing Socialist: An anti-fascist, I also believed in the possibility of international understanding. When the war broke out in 1939 I had the premonition that we would lose it. So the defeat did not come as a surprise; I thought it a historic necessity. Who was responsible? Why, the whole nation. The French had a régime that represented them. The only thing that annoyed me when the armistice was announced was the fact that it was unconditional; that I considered treason. But I must say that I never thought the General Staff had betrayed us. The High Command made mistakes. As for the causes of France's debility, one of them may be alcoholism; another, the inadaptability of the government. But the whole historic process was such that one cannot consider anybody in particular guilty. But these are questions which should be debated, and I must admit that we French lack the spirit of self-criticism.

A retired policeman, Catholic and pacifist: I always said to myself: Why make war? I was always against it. I tell you frankly if my son weren't dead, and if war came, I wouldn't let him join. And I'm no Communist. No, the French didn't fight in 1940, but they did later, when they had something to fight for. Responsibility for the defeat? The politicians! The people had nothing to do with it. Sure, they voted, but they had no say in the government. I was in Paris when the radio said they were going to fight for the city; so I took my family and moved away 500 kilometers. When the armistice was declared, I tell you truly I sighed with relief. So did most people.

VII

Today France is still suffering not only from the consequences of the defeat but also from the basic causes that led to it.

The fundamental elements of national weakness revealed by the catastrophe of 1940 have not been cured, although more or less successful attempts are being made in some fields. This is notable in the matters of social welfare and demography. Since 1945 an extensive social security system has been put into

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operation to strengthen France's impoverished society. Every Frenchman who works for his living now has certain benefits and protections—medical, disability, unemployment insurance, retirement pay, and, finally, free coffins. Large families are being encouraged through substantial financial awards per child, higher wages for the parents, and various maternity benefits such as free hospital and delivery services. The number of births in 1948 was 845,000, or 345,000 more than the annual average of the last 75 years. For the first time in history France today has 42 million people; for the first time the birth decline has been halted.

The French are also making efforts to trace the causes of their biologic debility and to apply remedial measures. In 1945 they set up a *Secrétariat Général à la Famille et à la Population* which a few months later was incorporated into the Ministry of Public Health and Population. Subsequently they created an *Institut d'Études Démographiques* in that Ministry, to study the whole range of subjects connected with population.[76] This Institute is doing excellent scientific and informational work. It is now trying to inform the public, first, that excessive alcoholism is a major factor in producing certain diseases (such as tuberculosis and cirrhosis of the liver), and, second, that France is the greatest alcohol-consuming country in Europe.[77]

But psychologically and politically, in the realms of mind and behavior, changes have not been conspicuous. There are still the same politics and politicians, the same musical-chair game of changing ministers, the same parliamentary intrigues, the same public fatalism, the same lack of authority in the central government, and the same seemingly unbridgeable national cleavages. On the Right are the anti-Communist (and, many

[76] Organized on Oct. 24, 1945, the Institute is charged with "étudier les problèmes de population sous le double aspect du nombre et de la qualité. Son champ d'action ne se limite pas au rassemblement et à la comparaison des données statistiques; aucune des sciences humaines ne lui est étrangère et, dans ses différentes sections, il fait appel alternativement ou simultanement à l'histoire, à la géographie, à l'ethnographie, à l'économie, à la biologie, à la psychologie et au droit comparé." See *Familles dans le Monde*, January-March 1949.

[77] The annual per capita consumption of wine and alcoholic beverages in France is around 25 quarts, as compared to 11 for Italy, 9 for Belgium, and 4 for Germany. See "Le problème de l'alcoolisme en France," Ministry of Information, *Notes documentaires et Études*, No. 51, April 19, 1945; "Éléments d'un bilan national de l'alcoolisme," *Population*, April-June, 1946; also *New York Herald Tribune*, Paris ed., June 16, 1949.

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think, antidemocratic) Gaullists who advocate a powerful central government and abolition of political parties; they operate in an environment that is beginning to demand amnesties for the jailed collaborationists.[78] On the Left are the Communists, whose disciplined organization and dedicated leadership have a strangle hold on the majority of the trade-unions; their aim is a "popular democracy" à la Poland and Czechoslovakia, allied to Moscow. These two extremist parties may account for anywhere from sixty-five to seventy-five per cent of the total national vote.

In the center is the buffeted "Third Force," an unhappy coalition of Socialists, MRP Catholics, and moderate Radical Socialists. The Socialists have lost most of their working-class following. The Catholic MRP's dislike the Marxist materialism of their Socialist allies. The Radical Socialists have little use either for the pro-laborism of the Socialists or the social progressivism of the MRP. What holds these strange allies together is fear—fear of the Reds on the Left and the Gaullists on the Right. National unity on any level seems as unrealizable as in 1939-40.

Class feelings are deep and hatreds bitter; they seem to be historically rooted, perhaps fatally, in the whole social structure of France. Followers of Pétain, still numerous, look upon those who imprisoned him as traitors and criminals. Enemies of Vichy, not necessarily radicals, consider that whole régime a disgrace to France and its supporters unworthy of the name of Frenchmen. Bourgeois and proletariat have been clashing in France for a long time, and the chasm between them is as wide as ever. With age, however, the conflict becomes more stubborn, blind, and uncompromising. Both of these major elements in French life, roughly the radical and Republican Left, and the conservative (capitalist) and Catholic Right, are frustrated in their demands and blocked in their expectations. Neither has won much in the war; both fear to lose more. The

[78] There is more and more discussion of a general amnesty. But here, too, opinion is divided. The conservative writer Raymond Aron says: "The rancors and hates are too deeply rooted to disappear in one coup. But one does not suppress either Maurrassism or Anglophobia by keeping Maurras and Béraud in jail." Socialist deputy André le Troquer argues: "Too early to speak of indulgence." Marc Sangnier, MRP leader, writes: "An amnesty is an act of political wisdom." For other statements, see *Carrefour*, March 2, 1949.

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bourgeoisie has political power without stability; the workers have democracy without opportunity.

Objective conditions re-enforce the animosities. Although there has been a steady material improvement since the war, the standard of living is low. Wages are frozen and prices are high. There is little venture capital and not much new business enterprise, mainly because investors fear intervention by the politicians. There is practically no housing construction (the average house in the cities is over one hundred years old and most of the urban structures are now crumbling) and little new private industrial undertaking. The economy as a whole is suspended in a kind of limbo, part socialist, part capitalist, part nihilist. Some of the most important industries—power and transportation, for example—are nationalized, but the total economy is neither planned nor integrated. The state spends billions of francs on social security, but fails to collect taxes from many merchants and peasants. The over-all consequence is administrative bungling on the one hand, and business timidity on the other.

Labor is no less disaffected than it was in 1939-40. In the cities the prevailing feeling among workers is one of hopelessness. What they earn does not buy enough to support them decently. Politicians make promises but seem unable to do anything. Workers feel abandoned and pessimistic. They see no necessity for exerting themselves unduly on their jobs—hence the low output per capita, the high prices, the augmenting bitterness.

Workers generally live in slums, in one or two substandard rooms, usually without bath or toilet and often without electricity. They know that they can hardly rise in the economic-social scale and, as a rule, their children cannot either. Education, to be sure, is free, but few workers can afford to keep their offspring in school after the fourteenth year. Only two or three per cent of France's professional people, those with a college education, are of working-class origin. The promises of democracy, therefore, taste like wormwood. From the dreariness of working-class life there seems to be no escape, except to the *bistro* or to Communism. Most workers choose one or the other. They rarely choose the Church.

Partly as a consequence of the defeat of 1940 and partly as a

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result of the realization of France's inherent weakness, the general spirit today is antimilitarist and pacifist. The armed services no longer attract many young Frenchmen. Even the graduates of the Polytechnique, the great school established by Napoleon to train technical officers, largely avoid choosing the army as a career. The memories of 1940 are still fresh, and perhaps at no time has the army been held in so little esteem. This is further aggravated by poor pay. Just as France can no longer afford to maintain an effective modern force, so individual Frenchmen cannot afford to serve their country in uniform.[79]

There is a growing and gnawing realization of military helplessness, and a feeling that no matter how much money France might spend on armies and armaments, she could not possibly resist any major military power. Hence, the question is sometimes asked openly: What is the use of having armed forces at all? Why not declare France neutral as between East and West? This opinion has been voiced recently by France's cardinals and echoed in the press and among leaders. A front-page article in the respected and influential daily, *Le Monde,* compared Western Europe's (*i.e.*, France's) possible neutrality within the American orbit to that of Yugoslavia's within Russia's, and concluded that the difference was that in the West France is a "Yugoslavia that has not yet found its Tito."[80] France's conservative Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, made it even more specific when he said in a public speech: "If France refuses to set her clocks on Moscow time, this does not mean she has to keep them on the American hour."[81]

The deeper question is whether a nation situated as France is today has any military future—whether she can hope again to be master of her destiny. One answer is that for France to play once more a major rôle in world politics she must undergo fundamental changes, particularly in technology and national discipline. She must catch up with the twentieth-century power-world as quickly as possible or permanently lose her position.

[79] Today France's army consists of some three armored (more or less) divisions, virtually no air force, and practically no war industry. Mechanized equipment is foreign, American or British. There are some 707,000 men under arms, but most of them are neither equipped nor trained as a modern army. As for the navy, there are more admirals than ships—that is, 22 vice admirals and 49 rear admirals, plus an additional 1,286 navy captains.

[80] M. Duverger, in *Le Monde,* Oct. 27, 1949.

[81] Speech at Montigny-les-Metz: *New York Times,* Nov. 14, 1949.

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In 1914-18 the French could resist a German assault largely because the two countries were more or less evenly matched in military technology. If Germany had superiority in manpower, France more than made up for it through her allies. In other ways the belligerents had no decisive edge on one another. It was German *Pferde* against French *chevaux*, German horse-drawn cannon against French horse-drawn cannon, German bayonets against French bayonets. The conflict then degenerated into a trench-war stalemate until America's fresh power broke the deadlock. In 1940, however, the Germans had what the French lacked—a modern technology; and they struck where the French were most vulnerable—in their lack of mobility.

To a high degree, the French still lack technology and, even more, mobility. France is actually one of the most rigid countries in Europe, rigid in her ways, habits, and thinking. And it is now clear that unless she transforms herself technologically and achieves flexibility in her whole social-intellectual structure, she will not be able to compete on any basis of equality with the world's modern powers.

The heart of the matter is the educational system which, particularly in its upper levels, is exclusive, classical, and rigid. A severe and savage[82] system of examinations excludes all but a select minority from the benefits of technical and higher education. As Professor Henri Peyre of Yale pointed out in a series of brilliant and courageous articles, the French system trains many able scholars and scientists, but frustrates them by failing or refusing to provide them with opportunities for jobs or self-expression.[83] This not only impoverishes the whole society

[82] Only about 65% of those who take it pass the rigorous *bachot* exam which progressive educators have attacked as a "savage rite of French bourgeois snobbism." The philosopher Étienne Gilson has called the *bachot* together with alcoholism the "twin scourges of the French people"; see *Time*, Oct. 17, 1949.

[83] Peyre, "Le Rayonnement de la Culture Française," *Le Monde*, May 13, 1949: "Notre agrégation produit chaque année un demi-millier de jeunes gens des deux sexes dont la distinction d'esprit est probablement inégalée ailleurs dans le monde. Beaucoup d'entre eux sont en vérité trop bons pour un enseignement secondaire où ils végètent. . . . D'autres sont lassés par le dur effort qu'a exigé leur concours et n'auront pas trop de leur vie entière pour se remettre. Nous devrions orienter beaucoup plus d'agrégés vers l'enseignement supérieur, et pour cela créer libéralement des postes qu'ils auraient intêret a briguer." See also, "L'Université française: une pépinière de Gendres," *Carrefour*, June 29, 1949; and "Les docteurs de Sorbonne n'animent plus de grand débats idéologiques," *Carrefour*, June 6, 1949. Also P. Boyance, "L'impression des thèses de doctorat," *Le Monde*, April 8, 1949.

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but also breeds intellectual revolt. Many educated Frenchmen become Communist or fascist. It is significant that, while all countries under the Nazi occupation had their quota of Quislings, nowhere were there as many collaborators and antidemocrats as among French intellectuals (and nowhere, also, were there as many anti-fascist Resistants).

Even more serious for the future of the nation is the emphasis, on all educational levels, on the classics, literature, rhetoric, and logic. In a nontechnological age, French humanism was both fruitful and imitable. It gave France a leading intellectual position and set cultural standards for a large part of the civilized world. Over the years the French came to put an exceedingly high value on literary style, intellectual wit, and verbal expression. Writers, if they had style and felicity of phrase, were admired above everything. The French were inclined to ignore the fact that literary style does not necessarily endow a man with knowledge or wisdom. Since *esprit* was all, they tolerated—even applauded—the ignorant because they had style and the insolent because they had wit. Thus it happened that men like Léon Daudet and Charles Maurras, despite their persistent antidemocratic poison and ignorance of social problems, could be admired as thinkers and intellectuals.

Today France is paying a heavy price for the rich heritage of her literary culture and for her neglect of other disciplines and needs. She will probably continue to pay the price (in instability and material weakness) until she changes her fundamental outlook, her educational system, and her individualism. She will have to bridge the social lag between purely humanist-individualist values and technological-scientific requirements. A modern nation, though it cannot forego the things of the spirit, needs more than the things of the spirit. It needs also the fruit of natural science and engineering. It needs the disciplined insight provided by the social sciences. It needs self-criticism.

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A PROTEST AGAINST A DILEMMA'S TWO HORNS

By REINHOLD NIEBUHR

BOTH our idealists and our realists conceive patterns which are too logical for the tortuous course of human history. They both persist in confronting us with two horns of a dilemma and beg us to choose between them. All idealistic schemes of world peace insist that we must either achieve world government or resign ourselves to an inevitable war; we must find some way of reaching an understanding with the Russians or face the consequences of a world war. Our realists are convinced that neither world government nor a pragmatic understanding with the Russians is an attainable goal. They are therefore tempted to grasp the second horn of the dilemma. They accept the fact of an inevitable war. From the idea of an inevitable war it is only a short logical step to the concept of a preventive war. For if we must inevitably fight the Russians, why should we not have the right to choose the most opportune time for joining the issue?

Now it may be that dilemmas, like horned cattle, have only two horns. But there is no reason to assume that history is always impaled on these two horns. Perhaps the real mark of statesmanship is to avoid the horns of a dilemma; or to find a third path at the traditional "fork in the road" where our anxious guides bid us make a choice between the two obvious forks.

A statesmanlike wisdom must certainly reject the "horn" or the "fork" which moves from the idea of an inevitable war to preparations for a preventive one. Even when the historic situation is as tragic as our contemporary one, and when a careful estimate of historic probabilities is bound to lead to more pessimistic than optimistic conclusions, we have no right to speak of "inevitabilities" in history. Men are always agents, and not merely the stuff, in the historical process. If modern culture has been inclined, at times, to overestimate the power of the

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human will over historical destiny, there is yet no reason why we should abdicate the responsibility of that will in this tragic hour. It is foolish to substitute the pretensions of omniscience for the pretensions of omnipotence. We neither fully know nor fully control all the forces operative in a given historical situation; nor can we gauge all the possible consequences of a course of action which we might initiate. We must therefore be slow to bow before any so-called "inevitability" or reluctant to ride any "wave of the future."

We must admit however that most of the apostles of an inevitable war have been driven to hold to their "horn" because they found the other horn implausible. They do not believe that it is possible to "come to terms" with the Russians. There are some rather well-known leaders of public opinion who have embraced the "realist" horn because they had actually tried the other horn and could not keep a grip upon it. There is in fact little plausibility in the various schemes for coming to terms with the Russians. Thus we are told that the Russians might accept world government if only the scheme were sufficiently just to beguile them from their apprehensions. Yet a just government would have to be a democratic one; and the Russians, even if they were not Communists, would be loathe to become a prospective minority in such a democratic arrangement. Since no way has yet been invented to run a democracy without requiring a minority to submit to the will of the majority, we cannot expect to solve our problems with the Russians that way. This is particularly obvious when we deal with a minority which believes that it has revolutionary possibilities of becoming a majority in the world community, if only the revolutionary logic of history is allowed to run its course.

Some idealists think we could come to terms with the Russians if only we convinced them that we had no martial designs against them. There is a modicum of virtue in this theory, since it is true that in all international tensions a vicious circle of mutual fear develops. Justified military precautions against all eventualities always seem like prospective aggression from the viewpoint of the other. This is why we should not place undue emphasis upon military strategy alone. The decision to proceed with the manufacture of hydrogen bombs may easily

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lead to undue emphasis upon military defense. But it is idle to hope that the Russian oligarchy could be moved to trust us by any approximation of defenselessness on our part. It is the prisoner of its own conception of the "logic" of history; and according to that conception a war between capitalism and communism is inevitable. Its faith in this logic is so great that it could interpret any undue gesture of trust on our part as proof of the decadence which in its opinion is the consequence of our "inner contradictions."

Other idealists think we could beguile the Russian fears and hatreds by more adequate proof of the sincerity of our desire for both greater liberty and greater equality in the so-called free world. There is every reason to work incessantly for the moral and political health of the free world, not only because it is a self-justifying end but also because there are millions in both Europe and Asia, not yet under the Russian yoke, who must be convinced that they can achieve justice and security in a free society so that, in their desperation, they will not be tempted to risk slavery for the sake of security. But there is no reason to believe that the Russian oligarchy could be impressed by these achievements. (We are not speaking of the Russian people, for they cannot be reached.) The oligarchy hates socialism more than capitalism. In pre-fascist Germany it supported Hitler surreptitiously, even as it now prefers De Gaulle to the "third force" in France. It prefers reaction to the democratic middle ground because that supports its thesis about the logic of history and actually contributes to the social convulsions out of which it hopes to achieve power. All proponents of social justice are "social fascists" in its estimation because they allegedly confuse the "masses" by dishonest pretensions of achieving justice by other means than their own revolution. The Communist dogma is absolutely clear upon all these points. Is there any reason to believe that any virtue on our part could penetrate through this dogma?

Sometimes the idealist hope of coming to terms with the Russians takes the form of a semantic project. Thus in the "Quaker Proposals for World Peace" as well as in deliberations of a UNESCO committee on "Basic Concepts" a careful semantic study is proposed of the way we and the Russians use the

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word "democracy." From such a study the truth is supposed to emerge that they have a rather too equalitarian, and we a too libertarian definition of this basic concept. The assumption seems to underlie these studies that either we will become more tolerant of each other's divergent conceptions of justice or, perhaps, that each side will learn sufficiently from the other to arrive, gradually, at a more inclusive conception. If this is the hope, it is bound to be disappointed. For obviously the Communist faith is not in a mood to have a semantic, a moral, a spiritual, or a political debate with any form of liberal democracy.

Here in fact lies the whole difficulty of all these idealistic approaches. They cannot bring themselves to believe in the reality of the evil which we face in a fanatic creed of this kind. They cannot imagine a political religion so consistent in its dogmatism that it is able to discount in advance any approach which varies from its dogmas. It is tragic that the yearnings of a whole world for peace should be thwarted by such intransigence. But there it is. We serve no useful purpose by obscuring this cruel fact in sentimentalities and illusions.

Yet, though these facts are very discouraging, they must not persuade us that a conflict with Russia is inevitable. While it is not possible to change the minds of these fanatic priest-kings of a secular religion it is possible to provide historical facts which will refute their logic. We need not convince them. We need only convince that part of the world in Europe and Asia which is "halting between two opinions." If we succeed in that enterprise we will preserve a sufficient preponderance of power to prevent Russian aggression. The Russian dogmatism will not necessarily be consciously changed by such a moral defeat. But it will gradually be robbed of its virulence.

Let us consider a historical analogy which supports this hope. The invasion of Europe by Mohammedanism offers the best historical parallel to our present situation. Its fierce equalitarianism and its readiness to use any means to achieve its ends sharpen the analogy. It may be worth observing that it would not have had the chance to conquer Spain in the early Middle Ages or to capture Constantinople in a later period, if political rivalries in Spain had not opened the doors to it and if the

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jealousies between Western and Eastern Rome had not left Constantinople isolated. These are warnings from the past which we must still heed. But at any rate Islam did conquer large parts of Europe, including some of the Balkan countries now under the Communist heel. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the gradual recession of the Moslem tide from Europe and the First World War finally achieved Islam's expulsion from Europe. Meanwhile Mohammedanism has not changed. It still believes in a holy war, that is, in the right and in the duty to propagate its faith by the sword. The Koran still declares: "Kill those who join the worship of other gods with God wherever you find them; besiege them and lay wait for them in every kind of ambush. But if they shall convert and observe prayer and pay obligatory alms then let them go their way for God is gracious and merciful." Yet Mohammedanism is no longer a peril to the world's peace. It does not believe in itself sufficiently to challenge the whole world.

In the heyday of the Ottoman Empire the Sultan of Turkey combined in his person the political power of a secular ruler and the religious pretensions of the high priest of the Mohammedan faith. He was both Sultan and Caliph; just as Stalin is both priest and king, both the authoritative expounder of the religious dogma and the wielder of absolute political power. Today there is neither Sultan nor Caliph in Turkey. There is in fact no unified authority in the Moslem world, though there is still a strong sense of religious community beyond national boundaries.

Is not Tito's rebellion against both the religious and the political authority of the Kremlin the harbinger of similar possible developments in the Communist world? Is it not plausible to suppose that the rigor with which Kremlin orthodoxy deals with satellite leaders who are one hundred per cent Communist but also ten per cent patriots reveals both the moral and religious embarrassment of the Kremlin and the inevitable internal opposition to its pretensions? The Sultan could not finally hide the fact that his Turkish interests corrupted his counsels as the high priest of Allah. Nor will Stalin be able to hide the mixture of a Russian will-to-power in the pretended universalism of orthodox Marxism. Thus all political religions, seek-

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ing universal dominion, are finally confined to their own particular locus by the "logic" of history. The processes by which this logic is worked out are not as neat as the maps which the logicians of history conceive for them. But this logic can be more successfully verified empirically than the neat logic by which either Communist or Western realists would plunge us into war.

There is however an element in this analogy which will not seem to be reassuring. The Mohammedan tide in Europe did not ebb until after many military defeats in sanguinary conflicts. Charles Martel prevented the early expansion of Moslem power in Europe by his victory at Tours. The defeat which checked the second wave of expansion was administered by the fortuitous intervention of a Polish king in the battle of Vienna. The whole story is one of victories and subsequent defeats in war. Must we draw the conclusion from the analogy that the Communist tide will not turn until we have joined the issue in military terms? What a terrible prospect, since the war which would join the issue would be an atomic conflict!

Let us, however, be wary in the use of historical analogies. Nothing in history is ever exactly analogous. We must be careful to note both the similarities and the differences in historical recurrences. Mohammedanism was a religious-political creed which rejoiced in martial conflict for the glory of Allah. Communism has no natural desire for martial adventure. It will use any means to achieve its ends. But it is also convinced that it has a completely different weapon of world dominion and world redemption than military war. It will certainly use military weapons to maintain its positions. But its primary instruments are always political revolution and conspiracy. Its successes, particularly its recent triumphs in China, are such that it can afford to abide by these weapons for some time to come. No one could guarantee that it might not make a military venture if it became sufficiently strong; or that it might not stumble into one in the desperation of its weakness. It withdraws no armies from satellite nations until it is certain of its political instruments of dominion. But all this cannot change the basic fact that its primary instrument of expansion is political penetration. For this reason the primary instrument of defense

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against its expansion must be moral, economic, and political. One is almost tempted to prophesy that we will not have to meet Communism in overt military conflict unless we have first succumbed politically to such a degree that our cause is hopeless or unless it has succumbed to such a degree that it may be tempted by desperation to join the issue.

Communism must be contained; but the strategy of containment cannot be primarily military. That is why it is important to resist the counsels of desperation on our side which would tempt us to confront Communism in Asia primarily in military terms and thus play into the hands of the Communist political propaganda by which it would expand still further into Asia. If we do not understand that the colored people of the world have grievances and resentments against the white world which Communism exploits and if we do not seek to mitigate these resentments by justice and forebearance, we will lose the battle in Asia. If we do not understand that, however orthodox the Communist leadership in China, its rank and file consists of Chinese patriots and peasants yearning for security, we will be too clumsy ever to encourage a tension between the masses and the Communist leadership or between the Chinese Communist leadership and the Russian oligarchy.

So much wisdom, imagination, and will to do justice is required to contain Communism that we may well feel uncertain about our capacity to accomplish that end. But we ought at least to put our resources where they will be effective and not be beguiled by either sentimental or cynical policies. The idealists must learn that nothing but a preponderance of power in the non-Communist world can preserve the peace. And the realists must learn that the power, of which we require preponderance, consists of the unity and the moral and economic health of our world. We must not relax our military defenses. But they must remain subordinate to our main purpose.

Such a course cannot be guaranteed to preserve the peace of the world. No guarantee for any policy can be given in our present predicament. But a policy is possible which saves us from both illusion and despair.

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THE STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST INFILTRATION: CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1944-48

By IVO DUCHACEK

BETWEEN 1944 and 1948, six European countries experienced Communist seizures of power. Three were enemies and three friends and allies of Soviet Russia during the war; four were Slav countries; five were predominantly peasant with some remnants of feudalism; with the exception of industrial Czechoslovakia, their prewar record in democratic government was far from exemplary. In all of them, however, the Communists were successful.

What were the components of Communist success and democratic defeat? The case of Czechoslovakia shows clearly that the active interest and impressive display of Soviet power in contrast to the West's hesitant policy not only formed the background but were the chief bases for Communist successes in Eastern Europe. Careful, professional infiltration of democratic institutions and the wishful thinking of the democrats did the rest.

Until the coup in Czechoslovakia there was a tendency to ascribe Communist success in Eastern countries to lack of democratic traditions and to social backwardness. The presence of Soviet troops at the time of the Communist coups was said to explain the passivity of the democrats. The Czech coup of February 1948 seemed to be of a different variety. Czechoslovakia was widely known for her democratic traditions and minimum of social friction. Her highly developed industry was nationalized in 1945 and a new and thoroughgoing land reform introduced, all without a revolution. And there were no Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory when the Communists seized power. But the basic factor, the immediate influence of Soviet power, was as present in Czechoslovakia as in the other five cases. The democrats felt and were internationally isolated, while the Czech Communists received direct and indirect support from the Communist super-power close at hand.

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I

This isolation of the democrats, or at least their feeling of it, was created in most European countries by three circumstances: a constant and genuine fear of Germany usually accompanied by an unceasing search for protection—shared by both eastern and western neighbors of Germany; the impressive advance of Soviet Communism to the Oder-Vienna-Trieste line; and the lack of an active Western concern for Central and Eastern Europe. The French withdrawal from Central Europe at the time of the Munich default to Hitler and the Western withdrawal from the same area after Yalta seemed to many Europeans two expressions of the same lack of interest and support. These three factors crystallized in the specific geographical and political context of the Czechoslovak Republic in a rather eloquent way.

Czech fear of Germany and her aggressions has been traditional since the tenth century. It is basic to Czech emotions, whatever regime rules in Berlin: Kaisers, Weimar Socialists, Nazis, Wilhelm Pieck, or Kurt Schumacher. When in 1945 the Sudeten German minority was transferred to the American and Soviet zones of Germany, Czech anxiety increased in spite of Germany's crushing defeat. The possibility of a Sudeten German revisionism, which might add new motives to the traditional "Drang nach Osten," created new fears and insecurity.[1] The fact that some Czechs had acquired former Sudeten German property in a rather unorthodox way added economic motivation to their national anxiety.

Red Army advances in 1944-45, and Soviet or local Communist propaganda which pictured the U.S.S.R. as the only geographically close protection against any renewal of German aggression created the desired impression that the security of Germany's neighbors was in direct proportion to Soviet strength and interest in Central Europe.

The weakening of French prestige, at Munich in 1938 and at Bordeaux in 1940, greatly contributed to the democratic forces' feeling of isolation in areas east of Germany. This feel-

[1] A similar fear of German revisionism developed in Poland in connection with their western boundaries, and may develop in France over the Saar question.

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ing only increased in 1945 when it became apparent that France would not regain her former position as the most influential continental power. In Czechoslovakia the lesson of Munich was certain always to be remembered.

The Soviets' entry into World War II, their impressive victories and advances, and later their propaganda condemning the absence of a Second Front, shifted Czech hopes and admiration from Great Britain to Russia. Furthermore, the symbols of the West's fighting spirit, Churchill and De Gaulle, could hardly counterbalance the reality of the British insular position, British avoidance of all commitments in areas east of Germany, and the defeat and weakening of France. In any case, these two fighters were replaced soon after the war by other statesmen.

One may ask whether the strong American interest in Europe, as demonstrated by the U.S. Zone of Germany, did not more than replace the old French power and influence. Before 1948 this question could hardly be answered in the affirmative. Because of the United States' withdrawal from Europe after 1919, many Europeans did not consider the American presence in Europe after 1945 as permanent. Furthermore, since Europe was remote from the main sources of American strength, the United States was not considered a match for the Soviet Union, always close at hand. This of course applies to the period prior to the North Atlantic Pact.

In Czechoslovakia, these rather common European doubts about American intentions were sharpened by the Czech experience with the U.S. Army. American troops were ordered to stop their speedy and unopposed advance through western Bohemia at a point eighteen miles west of Prague (and two miles south of the Jachymov uranium mines), even though Prague, in revolt and despair, was begging for American help. Marshal Konev's Russian armies finally saved Prague, giving the Czechoslovak Communists an impressive anti-West and pro-East argument for years to come. Many Czechoslovak democrats took it for more than a hint that Russia, with American consent, was supposed to be predominant in Central Europe. When the U.S. Army in Bavaria was later replaced by a minimum constabulary force, U.S. stature in Europe compared even less favorably with visible Soviet strength.

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The disparity between the democrats' feeling of isolation and the Communists' self-confidence was greatly increased in Europe by the Soviet sweep westward, far beyond the former boundaries of Czarist Russia. For the first time in Czech history Russia and Czechoslovakia were contiguous.

The Communists did not fail to exploit the difference between the Czech liberations in 1918 and 1945. Klement Gottwald expressed the importance and effects of the Soviet liberation in the following terms:

> There is a basic difference between 1920 and 1948. In 1918 the liberation came seemingly from the West. . . . The Soviet Union was engaged in a war for its own survival . . . it had to fight foreign intervention . . . and *could not therefore be a visible support for us.* In 1945 it was just the opposite. Our freedom came clearly from the East. In spite of capitalist hopes, the U.S.S.R. did not come out of the war weakened. On the contrary, as Joseph Stalin foretold in 1939, at the end of the war the capitalists could not find the governments they formerly had on their side. *The international disposition of respective strength was totally different in February 1948* from that of 1920. . . .[2]

The changed disposition of power in Europe made the Czech and Slovak attitudes toward their liberator and neighbor rather complex. There were the old sentimental ties to the only Slav empire, ties which had developed under the Germanizing rule of the nineteenth century. These sentimental pro-Russian tendencies were revived between 1917 and 1945. Both workers and intellectuals admired Soviet socialism during the 'twenties. The whole nation was grateful for their liberation by the Red Army in 1945; and there was a feeling of security because the Red Army would remain close at hand as a bulwark against any new German aggression.

But the proximity of the Red Army also became a source of insecurity and fear. Communists' efforts to identify themselves with the victorious Soviet armies, the display of red flags and other Soviet insignia used by the local Communist Party, and the obvious Soviet partiality for the Communists were all disturbing to Czechoslovak democrats.

[2] Speech of November 17, 1948, made at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Hradcany Castle. It was distributed by the Czechoslovak Press Agency in New York, December 29.

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Their anxiety did not develop into a clear-cut opposition for two reasons: the West insisted on continuing general cooperation with Russia; and when the West did oppose the Soviets on a specific issue, the results were discouraging. "The Soviet Union had established a reputation for meaning business, whereas the West was believed to be in much the same psychological state of ineffectiveness as it was at the time Hitler's troops went into the Ruhr."[3] Both factors had a strong influence on the practical and cautious Czech people, who tend to consider their own astonishing national survival more a result of clever compromising with aggressive neighbors than a victory achieved on the battlefields. Dr. Benes felt this strongly. His acceptance of the Munich dictate in 1938 was a compromise which was of course preceded by careful analysis of chances and odds, as was his second big compromise of February 1948. In the first, a serious threat of invasion, and in the second, danger of civil war and foreign intervention sufficed to deprive Czechoslovakia of its freedom without bloodshed. Although the Czechs saw in Benes their leader and the spiritual son of T. G. Masaryk, they perhaps realized too late that Benes was an outstanding diplomat but not a leader in the same sense as the elder Masaryk.

The presence of the Red Army in Poland and most Eastern European countries demonstrated eloquently the impressive shift of power in Europe. Western withdrawal and Soviet advance could not have been made more plain to the broad masses in Eastern Europe. The effect of this display of Soviet power is more responsible for Communist successes both in infiltration drives and final seizures of power, than the attractions of Marxist-Leninist doctrines. The nations of Eastern Europe were more frightened into Communism than seduced by it.

The violent conduct of the Soviet liberating armies might have turned a great many from Communism. Often, it achieved the opposite: many, exhausted by six years of Nazi oppression, preferred this time to be on the winning side, regardless of its extra-legal behavior, for siding with the democrats meant not peace and well-being, but more fighting and suffering.

[3] *Economist*, Feb. 12, 1949, p. 287.

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II

Soviet forces reached the boundaries of Czechoslovakia on April 9, 1944, but did not cross them at that time. A month later, the Soviet and Czechoslovak governments concluded a treaty concerning the administration of territory liberated by the Red Army. The treaty was put into practical application for the first time in November 1944, when the Red Army finally crossed the Carpathian mountains into Czechoslovakia and liberated the easternmost province of the country, Carpathian Ruthenia.

The treaty provided for the creation of two zones: the "Operational Zone," where the Soviet High Command would have the decisive power in all matters; and the "Rear Zone," where the Soviet High Command would transfer civil administration to an "Administrative Delegation," to be appointed by the Czechoslovak Government in London. The Delegation was to have representatives from all government departments. The treaty foresaw some limitations of Czechoslovakia's sovereign rights, even in the Rear Zone. These limitations were justified by military reasons, and by the necessity for Soviet military personnel to remain under Soviet jurisdiction, though on Czechoslovak territory. Militarily and politically the treaty seemed as reasonable as a government-in-exile could expect from a friendly army command engaged in military operations on its territory.

The application of this treaty by the political service of the High Command of the Ukrainian Front under General Mechlis is a classic example of how a legal text can be not only emptied of its contents, but changed into an instrument which defeats its intended purpose.

In Ruthenia, the treaty was nullified by a direct annexation of the whole province by the Soviet Union. In Slovakia, Moravia, and Bohemia, the application of the treaty amounted to a transfer of the local administration to the Communist Party instead of to the Administrative Delegation of the Czechoslovak Government. A new and popular administrative reform made it possible for the Red Army to strengthen the Communists. It provided for a more equal division of power between the

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central government in Prague and the National Committees (that is, the local governments). The National Committees were supposed to be executive bodies of local administration, freely elected on the village, town, district, and province levels. These nuclei of future local governments were to be formed by agreement among the active resistance leaders during the occupation period. Together with partisan units, they were to be the main centers of national resistance. Before the liberation took place, the National Committees formed underground were to assist the advance of the liberating armies by partisan and espionage activities in the German rear. The Soviet High Command therefore quite naturally established early contacts with these Committees through parachutists and other agents. While President Benes and his intelligence staff in London directed the work of their parachutists and resistance network in such a way as to help the Allied war effort, the Soviet High Command and Czechoslovak Communist leaders in Moscow concentrated on preparing for their victories in time of peace. The Soviet spy network in the German rear was formed so that it represented the basic framework of the future Communist Party organization. Local Communist agents were to be spies for the Soviet High Command; and Soviet spies were to become local Communist leaders. Thus, before liberation, the underground National Committees were already infiltrated by the Communists.

When the Red Army liberated the territory, the National Committees were able to come out in the open. The Red Army assisted them publicly in re-establishing order, that is, in arresting those whom the Communist resistance leaders considered to be collaborators. The link between local Communists and the NKVD became very evident, and produced the desired effect on the population. Furthermore, the plunder and rape committed by the Soviet troops increased the general feeling of helplessness. Fear and opportunism were in many cases sufficient reasons for the democratic majority to yield direction of National Committees to the Communists, even in cases where the Communists were not successful in their pre-liberation infiltration.

Some direct help was offered by the Red Army to the Com-

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munist Party itself. German property confiscated as war booty was handed over to the local Communists if the Russians had no use for it. Reichsmark deposits in Czech or German banks were practically valueless for immediate use by Soviet troops; the Communists could convert them into Czech crowns. Linotype machines, office furniture, newsprint, and typewriters (with Latin alphabets) were also worthless to the Red Army, but priceless for the Communists, on the eve of a great propaganda campaign.

The above was the usual pattern in the Operational Zone, where the Soviet High Command had the decisive power—the Administrative Delegation of the Czechoslovak Government was temporarily barred. When the Administrative Delegation and the democratic leaders were finally allowed to enter areas which had been declared part of the Rear Zone, they were unable to counterbalance the weight of the Soviet presence—even though the bulk of the people had been looking forward hopefully to the coming of Dr. Benes' government.

The delegation usually found the basic organization of the Communist Party well established in the center of the city, in the best building, well supplied with money, newsprint, and typewriters. All this gave an appearance of strength which at that time was certainly not to be found behind this impressive but still Potemkinist façade.

A secret dispatch of January 21, 1945, sent from the liberated territory to the Czechoslovak Government in London, gives a good picture of the sort of situation the Delegation faced:[4]

> In Michalovce, Slovakia, the Communist Party has just published the first issues of their newspaper, *Pravda*, under the auspices of General Mechlis, chief of the Red Army's political service. The Communists have instructions to concentrate on gaining complete control of the National Committees.

Another dispatch from the same source a month later describes the situation in liberated Slovakia:

[4] The Soviet High Command never allowed the Czechoslovak Administrative Delegation to send direct radio-messages to London. Dr. F. Krucky volunteered to use a secret transmitter and send ciphered messages from behind the Soviet lines, risking his life daily. Most of the dispatches quoted in this and the following chapters are from that source. They were filed at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London. Dr. Krucky, Czech Minister Plenipotentiary in Cairo since 1946, resigned recently.

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From parts of Slovakia which are still under the complete jurisdiction of the Red Army, there is a daily arrival of several members of the Communist Party, mostly educated persons and students. When they reach the Rear Zone, Communist Headquarters immediately send them all over the area. Thus, the Communists do not lack agitators. They organize National Committees wherever they had not already been formed, or change their composition if it does not correspond to the Communist pattern. *The presence of the NKVD increases the self-confidence of these agitators and backs up their threats,* which are plentiful. *The people are confused.* The Slovak Democratic Party has no such aid coming in from the Operational Zone. They have so far been unable to issue a newspaper of their own. Communist activity plus the great number of Communist agitators concentrated on one area creates an impression of strength *which does not exist.*

The right of Red Army commanders to decide which Czechoslovak citizens could enter or leave the Operational Zone gave the Red Army another opportunity to help the Communist Party directly. While the Communists were free to move forward almost without restrictions, the usual Soviet bureaucratic methods were used to prevent democratic leaders from traveling and organizing their activities.

The incorporation of the easternmost Czechoslovak province into the Soviet Union in January 1945 demonstrated more than anything else the effectiveness of Soviet power and the helplessness of the democratic forces, which had the law on their side but insufficient strength to uphold it. The sharp contrast between the ruthless display of Soviet power in favor of an illegal issue and the democrats' hopeless defense of lawful government led to a general fear that the Ruthenian coup might be repeated in other parts of Czechoslovakia. The first democratic retreat took place in the face of extreme pressure exercised from within by local Communists and from outside by Stalin and Molotov themselves. The Czechoslovak leaders abandoned Ruthenia hoping to save Slovakia and Bohemia from the Soviets and Teschen from the Polish Communists, who were great favorites in Moscow at that time. The retreat from Ruthenia was the beginning of a chain of withdrawals made for the sake of issues which seemed more vital than the ones immediately at stake—a chain which ended in the loss of the whole country. There is a direct line from the January 1945 coup in Ruthenia to the Prague putsch of February 1948. Even

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at the time of the Ruthenian annexation there was certainly some justification for anxiety over the safety of other Czechoslovak areas. For example, Minister-Delegate Frantisek Nemec a representative of the government-in-exile in the area liberated by the Red Army, sent President Benes a long dispatch on December 30, 1944, after his conversation with Stalin and Molotov. He dared to show some concern about the future of the whole country, even though his dispatch was to be transmitted by Ambassador Fierlinger:

> Although the movement in Ruthenia came into being step by step, it is now recognized as a spontaneous popular expression. This recognition determines the Soviet attitude toward the Ruthenian issue. If we tried to break the movement now, it would mean ruling with the aid of bayonets and would create unfriendly relations with the U.S.S.R. Had I expressed doubts about the spontaneity of the movement during my decisive discussion with Molotov and Vishinsky, the "spontaneous movement," in my opinion *would have been repeated in Slovakia*. . . . I also believe that postponement of an otherwise foregone conclusion could have led to an *isolation* of our Government from its country. I believe that there was danger that the Soviets would use the same methods on the Czechoslovak Government in London, which had earlier isolated the Polish Government-in-exile. . . . I was afraid that volunteers for the Red Army would be recruited *in Slovakia* too, that the Delegation would be stripped of all influence in the liberated territory, and finally, that the Slovak National Council [a Central National Committee and the directing resistance body in Slovakia, composed of Communists and democrats alike] might be persuaded to espouse a "spontaneous movement." . . . I know that I did not follow your instructions. I take the entire personal and political responsibility . . . but I acted so only for the sake of the *territorial integrity of Slovakia and Bohemia.*

III

A justified popular demand for a reform, administrative, social, or economic, is usually a welcome tool for Communist methods of infiltration.[5] After careful preparation, the Communist propaganda apparatus tries to focus the whole issue on a short, appealing slogan which seems acceptable to everyone, and at the same time cleverly conceals the Communist drive

[5] In *Foundations of Leninism*, Stalin says: "in revolutionary tactics under a bourgeois regime, reform naturally becomes an instrument for disintegrating this regime, an instrument for strengthening revolution." Translated by Historicus, "Stalin on Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 197.

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or power. The administrative reform in Czechoslovakia was specially useful to the Communists. With the slogan "Government of the People, by the People, and for the People," it became a most effective instrument of infiltration.

Before the war Czechoslovakia had a mixed form of local government, partly elected and partly nominated by the central government. It bore some marks of the bureaucratic and centralistic Austrian past. The idea of limiting the power of the central government had long been popular. As early as 1943 President Benes and his government were considering the democratization and decentralization of the government, especially with regard to Slovakia, whose ambition was to govern herself independently of Prague, though within the framework of Czechoslovakia. The new units of local government, called "National Committees," were to be entirely elected.

The democratic leaders thought in terms of democracy and decentralization, and assumed that the National Committees would be formed *after* liberation. The Communists, on the other hand, had in mind a Westernized form of the 1917 "soviets," composed of revolutionary workers, soldiers, and sailors. They wanted these new "soviets" to be composed mainly of Communist resistance leaders, and made every effort during the resistance period to influence the composition of National Committees beforehand.

The "administrative decentralization" fitted almost perfectly the plans for Communist infiltration in a country which military operations had split into a number of temporarily isolated districts, difficult to control. With direct and indirect help from the Red Army, both before and during the establishment of the National Committees, the Czechoslovak Communists obtained many more positions than they were entitled to according to the five-party agreement.[6]

In the autumn of 1945, a month before the withdrawal of the Red Army, nearly all chairmanships of National Committees were in Communist or pro-Communist hands. So was the lead-

[6] This agreement was reached in Moscow on March 27, and proclaimed in Kosice on April 5, 1945. It gave equal representation on National Committees to all parties, wherever they were active. The Communists could thus claim 25 per cent in Bohemia, and 50 per cent in Slovakia.

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ership of most police and agriculture departments in local or district National Committees. The police and agriculture departments were of the utmost importance in a country where it was the duty of the local police to arrest collaborators and fascists according to the judgment of the local government, and where the Ministry of Agriculture and its local agencies were authorized to confiscate and *distribute* property which had formerly belonged either to fascists or to Sudeten Germans.

Even before the war, local governments in Czechoslovakia exerted great influence at the polls. During the war their authority over food-rationing and the system of delivery duties imposed on the peasants increased their power to interfere in the life of the community. And because of Communist infiltration, their influence was even greater in the immediate postwar period. The infiltration, accomplished in the special atmosphere created by the presence of Soviet troops and with their direct or indirect aid to the Communists, was the chief reason that in the general elections of May 26, 1946 so many non-Communists voted for the Communist Party, which obtained almost thirty-eight per cent of the vote.

It is interesting to note that since the February coup the Communist Ministry of Interior has never allowed free elections for National Committees. At first, excuses were given for not holding local elections. Postwar disorganization and large-scale population shifts made them impossible to administrate. Then, the general elections interfered. Finally, in March 1949 a new administrative change was proclaimed in Prague: "district secretaries" would be *nominated* by the central government to supervise local and district National and Action committees.

The "democratization and decentralization" was a useful weapon for infiltration and disorganization of the government. But once the Communists seized power, the party dictatorship required strict centralization and party control. Hence the new institution of "district secretaries." The same pattern is seen in the Communists' exploiting of difficulties between Czechs and Slovaks. As long as faction could contribute to the scheme of weakening its adversary by limiting the coalition government's power, the Communist Party was a great defender of

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Slovak autonomy. The Communists even had an independent *Slovak* Communist Party, with its own executive committee. But as soon as control was safely in Communist hands, the Party became an enthusiastic advocate of Czechoslovak unity and centralization and the Czech and Slovak Communist parties quickly merged.

IV

Control of the National Committee in an area is not enough to assure the success of a coup. One of the physical prerequisites of a Communist revolution is that Communist workers and agents be well armed. A war usually gives everyone easy access to weapons. War therefore serves the Communists well from the technical point of view, as well as for economic and psychological reasons. During the Second World War, partisan fighting offered an exceptional opportunity to distribute weapons among Communists, with the almost enthusiastic consent of the non-Communist world. Few realized then that Communist partisans might use these weapons not only to win the war but to win the peace as well.

Czechoslovak partisan warfare cannot bear comparison with Yugoslav or Russian activities. Flat and densely populated Czechoslovakia was hardly suited for an imitation of Tito's warfare and President Benes felt the futility of attempting to develop any such resistance. The Communists attacked his point of view violently all through 1944. This conflict between Benes' rational and cautious standpoint and Communist and Russian disdain for human losses was more important than any simple clash between two concepts of warfare. The Czechoslovak Communists were most interested in the opportunities which Benes' appeal to the Czech and Slovak peoples to form partisan units would create for the postwar period.

In May 1945, after the war in Europe ended, "revolutionary guards" made their appearance in towns and villages. Most claimed to be partisans who were at last able to come from the mountains and forests out into the open. In most cases, they came as a complete surprise to the people, who had never before heard of partisan activities in their neighborhood. The appearance of the revolutionary guards added to a general atmosphere

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of lawlessness. Their activities attracted many young people who had long dreamt of handling German weapons and were tempted by the chance to rob, plunder, and bully. They fitted in well with the Communist scheme of terror.

In the factories, workers' militia were formed. Their official function was to protect the factories against possible Sudeten-German sabotage. Their real function was to supply the Communist Party with armed units until the police and the army could be sufficiently infiltrated. Under the pressure of democratic groups, the workers' militia were later mostly abolished in 1946 and 1947. Their reappearance during the February putsch demonstrates that they had only gone underground, and were ready when needed by the Communists.

In autumn 1945, Czechoslovakia was almost completely in Communist hands, through the work of the National Committees, the guards, and the militia. The strength of the Red Army was everywhere present. The democrats felt that real freedom was but half-awakened after six years of Nazi oppression. The Communists were the only organized force certain of foreign help in a disorganized and confused country.

Complete seizure of power seemed to present a minor task. The assumption therefore is that only the international situation and the requirements of Soviet foreign policy made the Kremlin *postpone* the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia to a later date.

V

The feeling of national unity which usually occurs in times of war or foreign oppression is another fertile ground on which Communism can develop its attack against democratic institutions. Patriotic fervor facilitates the formation of nonpolitical, national mass organizations and even creates a demand for them, which the Communists are eager to fill. For the spirit of unity provides a new weapon against parliamentary democracy and its factious political parties.

In Czechoslovakia, before the war, there were eight to fifteen political parties, based on class, ideology, and nationality. Under the indiscriminate German terror, party differences vanished to a great extent. And because of disbandment of the

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Comintern in 1943, the remaining differences between Communists and non-Communists became blurred. The slogan of National Unity was on the lips of all the resistance leaders, whatever their politics. The feeling of unity was strengthened daily as Communists and non-Communists faced the Nazi firing squads side by side. For the Czechs the only distinction was between a patriot and a quisling.

During the resistance period, the Communists were already making every attempt to transform the positive attitude toward National Unity into a negative one toward political parties as such. Later, they directed their criticism against representative government as typified by the pre-Munich "bourgeois" republic of Masaryk and Benes. Denigration of parliamentary democracy went hand in hand with glorification of the new form of a unified People's Democracy.

The chief argument against parliamentary democracy was repeated and repeated: "The people in a parliamentary democracy have only the right to vote and then to keep silent for six years. The elected representatives have no reason to follow the opinion of the people. For six years, they are independent of the people. The Communists cannot agree to that."[7]

Infiltration of nonpolitical mass organizations is one activity on which the Communist Party is willing to expend an almost endless supply of "infiltrators," funds, and energy. Communist concentration on labor unions is well known. The Czechoslovak example shows that the party was applying the same effort to other nonpolitical organizations—peasant unions, youth clubs, student associations, intellectual groups, and purely professional associations.

The Communists made good use of the old trade-unionist tradition of unifying all labor unions and keeping them free from any connection with political parties. The watchwords of labor unity and national unity were identified as closely as possible. The Nazi occupation had prepared the ground for this unification. Under the Germans, political differences between

[7] This quotation is taken from President Benes' record of his conversation with Klement Gottwald on May 4, 1948 at Sezimivo Usti. The conversation concerned the new Constitution of Communist Czechoslovakia, Benes' refusal to sign it, and his decision to resign. The record of this dramatic conversation was smuggled abroad in the summer of 1948.

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unions (Socialist, Communist, Christian, and Agrarian) were obliterated, and replaced by the Nazi form of unified labor front. Under Nazi orders, this procedure was followed with other mass organizations too. After the war the Nazi Labor Front was taken over almost without change by the Communist labor leaders, and in 1945 became the only unified Central Labor Union (URO). Not only the organization but in some cases even the personnel of the Nazi labor front were taken over by the Communist-sponsored Central Labor Union. These labor quislings were promised immunity by the Communist Ministry of Interior if they would stand ready—whatever their past—to cooperate with the party. They complied.

The Communists' unification and centralization of mass organizations, which attempted to divide the country into *professional* categories on a supposedly nonpolitical basis, reminded many an observer more of the fascist corporative pattern than of a democratic structure.[8] The only differentiation between groups was to be according to profession. The common, "national" (Communist) ideology was always in the background. The Communists made several attempts to place these mass organizations on a level with the political parties, or even above them, if possible. The democratic parties did not give in on this issue until February 1948, since they rightly felt that the existence of the political parties themselves was at stake.

Why did the democrats fail to make a similar effort, or at least to check the sweeping Communist infiltration of the important mass organizations? The answer to this justified question lies partly in the professionality of Communist agents and agitators. While non-Communists could participate in the activities of their clubs and unions only in their spare time, certain selected Communists were able to give all their time to such activities *because they were paid for it*. Thus, these Communists could acquire first a detailed knowledge of the machinery of these organizations and later the determining power in them. From the very beginning, competition between democratic amateurs and Communist professionals was on unequal terms. For instance, according to the figures of the National

[8] Some new mass organizations were founded, such as The Union of Czech and Slovak Women, the National Congress of Partisans, a union of former inmates of concentration camps, and a unified youth and sport movement.

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Socialist Party Headquarters in Brno, the Communist Party was maintaining twelve full-time agents and secretaries to one for the National Socialists. And this evaluation was limited to professional agents concentrating on political activities in the narrow sense of the word.[9]

Financial support for Communist activities came from various sources. The Red Army was of course an important one. And the Communist hold on the Ministry of Interior proved invaluable, for a good income was derived from the well-paid managers of nationalized industry, who were appointed on the basis of their political records. Also, the owners of private industries were sometimes ready to contribute to the party fund if they could thereby avoid either nationalization or persecution because of dubious war records. Control over the Ministry of Agriculture gave the Communists another source of funds. That department had the power to confiscate and distribute property which had belonged to collaborators or Germans. Finally, very tight party discipline and constant control assured the Communists a continuous flow of regular contributions from members. While the democratic parties were always in financial difficulties, with contributions coming in slowly, enforced taxation of every Communist according to his monthly or weekly income yielded regular and important sums to the party funds.

VI

In a modern democratic and industrial country, the most important prerequisites for a Communist coup seem to be infiltration of the Ministry of Interior and its police, and direction of the primary labor organizations. Without the Ministry of Interior (if it is this ministry which directs the police and investigation services) and without the labor unions, the success of a Communist coup would be more than doubtful. The importance of other key positions may vary from country to

[9] In *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin stated: "In order to be fully prepared, the working class revolutionist must become a professional revolutionist . . . our duty [is] to assist every capable worker to become a *professional* agitator, organizer, propagandist, literature distributor." A workingman who is at all talented and "promising must not be left to work eleven hours a day in a factory. We must arrange that he be maintained by the Party." Lenin, *Collected Works,* New York, International Publishers, 1929, Vol. IV, pp. 205, 206. Although Lenin's pattern corresponds to specific needs as they existed in Russia around 1900, his lesson was not lost to Czech and other European Communists.

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country. In Bulgaria, the Communists' second goal in the government was the Ministry of Justice, which might give them influence over the war trials. Other Eastern European Communists put more stress on the Ministry of Information. In Czechoslovakia, the Communists were anxious for the Ministry of Agriculture. They were ready to compromise on everything except the ministries of Interior and Agriculture. In all countries the Ministry of Interior, with its police, was the Communists' first objective in the government.

The second immediate objective was domination of the labor unions. The industrial concentration of population on small areas offers great opportunities for Communist strategy. A successful general strike is a powerful means of intimidation and at the same time an efficient weapon in the fight itself. The countermeasures of the adversary may be frustrated by a strike which affects transportation, telephones, and electricity. And those who control these facilities can distribute arms quickly and easily.

In Czechoslovakia, the most industrialized state of Eastern Europe, the importance of labor was increased by the nationalization of all heavy industry and most other industry. The Central Labor Union thus became one of the most important economic organizations in the country, for it combined the support of a tremendous number of wage earners with the power formerly held by private industrialists and managers. In the hands of the Communists, the Central Labor Union became almost a state within a state, an administration with the support of the workers, both white-collar and manual, which did not hesitate to compete with the legal government, "supported by a few deputies." The head of the Central Labor Union was a former inmate of Buchenwald, Antonin Zapotocky, who became Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia after the coup.

The Ministry of Interior was by far the most important instrument of Communist domination in Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948. Without it, the Communist vote in the general elections of May 1946 would not have been thirty-eight per cent; the number of opportunists and cowards would have been smaller; the February putsch would have been much more difficult, if not impossible.

Some reorganization of the police was necessary, since there

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was collaboration between Czech and German police from 1939 to 1945. The Communist Ministry of Interior took full advantage of the opportunity to make sweeping changes which put both police and investigation services into the hands of the Communist Party. Like the administrative reform of government, the need for changes in the police service provided an excellent pretext for gaining control.

Postwar hostility toward collaborators and Germans was fully exploited by the Communists, with their tactics of threats, blackmail, and conditional pardons. Authority to open or close collaboration cases belonged to the Ministry of Interior and to the police departments of the National Committees. They could forget about the offenses of those in custody, or about the tortures and other crimes of those who were conducting the investigation. Their arbitrary decisions created an atmosphere of insecurity. People almost felt guilty for having survived the Nazi occupation without spending time in concentration camps or in exile. In 1945 a special Retribution Act created a separate system of People's Courts, which were entirely devoted to war-guilt cases prepared by the Ministry of Interior's investigation service. Confiscation of offenders' property was the mildest form of punishment. Opportunities to exert pressure by threats of confiscation and for corruption in the distribution of confiscated property were limitless for a party engaged in a ruthless drive for power.

The Ministry of Interior's control over the details of the transfer of Sudeten Germans gave the Communists another fertile field for their activities.[10] The Communist Party, which before the war was the only party in Czechoslovakia containing both Czechs and Germans, became in 1945 a most enthusiastic supporter of the transfer scheme, regardless or perhaps because of its Czech-German past. The Communists profited well by this period of patriotic fervor and postwar excitement, often expressed by a thirst for revenge and for easy acquisition of other people's property. The atmosphere of violence and lawlessness terrorized not only the Sudeten Germans but the majority of Czechs as well.

A hold on the Ministry of Agriculture served the Communists

[10] The deserted Sudeten German factories supplied another argument for nationalization.

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nearly as well as their control of the Ministry of Interior, despite the peasants' anti-collectivist persuasion. But though the non-Communist parties systematically warned Czech peasants of the ultimate aims of Communist-sponsored land reforms and Communist agricultural policy in general, the Communist Party scored a substantial electoral success with the Czech peasantry in May 1946. This success would have been impossible without control of the Ministry of Agriculture. Before World War II, the Czech peasants were dominated largely by the Agrarian Party. Its aims were materialistic. Price control of wheat and pork to protect the farmers, and distribution of tractors and fertilizers to aid their production seemed to be its chief "ideological" tenets. After several decades of political education by the Agrarian Party, the Czech peasants were rather easy prey for the new incumbents of the Ministry of Agriculture. Peasants who did not vote for the Communists out of fear of the Ministry of Interior, voted for them because of the Ministry of Agriculture's promises. The Communists scored their biggest successes in former Agrarian Party strongholds. Mr. J. Firt, National Socialist M.P., commented on the democratic defeat: "We have asked our peasants to vote for the philosophical heritage of Thomas Masaryk. They have voted for fertilizers instead."

The postwar situation in Czechoslovakia added other opportunities for Communist penetration of the peasantry. The Ministry of Agriculture had the very important function of distributing a great amount of land left at its disposal by the transfer of Sudeten Germans. It is easy to imagine how the Communist Party could use this power to bribe the hesitant and reward the faithful. The actual distribution of parcels of land and promises of new reforms made the farmers forget that splitting up land in many small non-self-supporting units would pave the way for collectivization. It should be remembered that before the war Czechoslovakia had had its first land reform, which satisfied the most compelling claims and abolished the large feudal estates. Many rich peasants whose consciences were not altogether clear concerning black market activities during the war (activities which could hardly be called acts of resistance), became members of the Communist Party, hoping to save their property or prevent a reopening of

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their war-guilt cases. Finally, UNRRA and the Czech Ministry of Industry allowed the Ministry of Agriculture to fulfill some of its promises to deliver new tractors, machinery, and fertilizers. The Communist Ministry of Information took care to publicize these deliveries as a Communist contribution to the farmers.

VII

As in other cases, postwar insecurity facilitated Communist infiltration of the Civil Service and the Army.[11] The purge of higher officials who had held their positions during the Nazi occupation was very thorough. There was, however, a chance to be forgiven for those who entered the Communist Party quickly enough. Officials who joined with the hope that their membership would be purely a formality found later to their astonishment what tight control the Communists had over new members. Special envoys of the Communist Control Commission[12] made sure that new Communists not only paid their regular dues to the party funds, but suited their behavior to party needs as well.

The unification of the labor unions brought the white-collar workers (including state and city employees) into the Central Labor Union. Government workers were thus put on the same level with manual workers. In practice, the former were under a *de facto* rule by the politically and numerically superior Communist workers.

The "democratization" of the civil service, and especially of the army, opened the door for further Communist infiltration. Before the war, the Czechoslovak Army was "apolitical"; soldiers could not vote while on active duty. When they were given the vote in 1945, the Communists took the occasion to demand

[11] Gottwald, in his speech of November 17, 1948, said: ". . . February has shown the importance of the state apparatus. . . . Before the February events . . . the state apparatus ceased to serve the former ruling class. In February the state apparatus in a sense played a very important role, and thus offered an illuminating example to the working class, that it should—as the new ruling class—take good care of its state apparatus."

[12] Every Communist Party has a Control Commission which operates at every level of the party organization. It supervises not only the political activity of the leaders and the rank and file, but also their private lives. It settles ideological and other disagreements. There seems to be an international link between the Control Commissions which may constitute the basis for the international Communist intelligence. The Head of the Central Control Commission in Czechoslovakia was Jindrich Vesely, former inmate of Buchenwald and head of the investigation service of the Ministry of Interior. Thus, the party and the state police were directed from one center.

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political education for the soldiers, presumably so that they could understand politics and vote intelligently. With the help of the pro-Soviet though non-Communist Minister of National Defense, General L. Svoboda, the army was to be remodeled on the pattern of the glorified Red Army. "Commissars" were included, but were called "educational officers." Thus began the infiltration of the army, along with an extensive purge of the officers' corps.[13]

Justifications for the many promotions of Communists to high positions in the police, the army, and the civil service were of two kinds. First, a "moral" qualification for office was to replace the old bourgeois demands for schooling or training. A fighting or resistance record, as vouched for by the Communist-sponsored Union of Partisans, was considered a higher qualification than a university degree or military academy training. And fighting experience with the Red Army was the highest qualification of all. Secondly, the Communists claimed that twenty years of bourgeois and agrarian government had excluded them completely from government positions and that they were therefore entitled to a generous share of the postwar administration. The above arguments were usually stressed for penetration of government departments which were headed by non-Communists. In those directed by Communist ministers, very little trouble was taken to justify the "blitz promotions" of Communist officials.

VIII

For a short period after the war, the "soft" element in the Czech Communist Party was ascendant. This group was led by Communists who had faith in the new nationalistic line which followed disbandment of the Comintern and led to the "coalition" line on both national and international levels. In Czechoslovakia, enthusiasm for the new policy took on an almost missionary character. Czech Communists hoped that communization of their modern industrial country by democratic methods might prove an example worthy to be followed for France and Italy. But as democratic opposition to Communism mounted, in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, these "soft"

[13] Unlike the police, the army was not completely in Communist hands by February 1948. It is therefore impossible to say what the majority of officers and their corps would have done if Benes, as commander-in-chief, had asked them to restore order.

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Communists had to return to the old dogmas of international class warfare, soon reinstated by the rebirth of the Comintern, with its strict international discipline, in the Cominform of 1947.

The return to the international line brought the "radical" Communists to the fore. Most of the leaders of this group had spent the war in German concentration camps where there was no reason for deviations from the original Communist doctrine. On the contrary, in Buchenwald or Oranienburg could be found thriving models of ideological cooperation which ignored national boundaries. Czech and other European Communists brought into German concentration camps were often saved from the "death commandos" by fellow German party members. These, with six years' service behind them, often had responsibilities as block leaders and clerks in the somewhat autonomous prison administration. They were in a position to help a foreign comrade by keeping him off the lists for the "death commandos" or getting him the job of "blockleiter" for his national group. The German Communists preferred to send German liberals, socialists, or Catholics on the commandos, rather than their European brothers. Besides preserving the Communist leaders, this international cooperation was a constant danger to non-Communist prisoners.

Returning from the concentration camps where the Comintern spirit had survived, the Czech Communist group could not understand the disbandment of the Comintern in 1943 and the adoption of the nationalistic line which led to the coalition governments in France, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. These "radical" Communists, isolated from the war evolution of Soviet policy, had remained faithful to the tenets of the Communist Manifesto, and were much surprised to find their chiefs returning from Moscow in a racial or nationalistic ecstasy which was partly sincere and partly for tactical reasons. And they could not share the enthusiasm with which their comrade, Vaclav Nosek, Minister of Interior in a coalition with bourgeois ministers, was carrying out the transfer of Sudeten Germans, with the visible help of Soviet authorities and in obvious contradiction of the class-conscious and international past of Communism.

The international needs of Moscow policy in 1945 had re-

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duced these faithful Cominternists to temporary silence. It is, however, interesting to note that the members of the Czech radical group began to come into grace again after 1947, when the Cominform was established. Their criticism of the new line seemed to be confirmed on both national and international levels. The difficult relations between East and West, especially concerning the German question, were exposing the limitations of tactics which admitted that coexistence of the capitalist and Communist worlds was possible. And the more and more courageous opposition of the democratic forces in Czechoslovakia to the communization drive were revealing the limitations of the coalition tactics in the National Front Government.

It can be safely assumed that it was mainly to this group that Gottwald addressed his curious defense of the decision to postpone the putsch from 1945 to 1948. The radicals and some of the rank and file obviously failed to understand why they had been assured by their leaders between 1945 and 1948 that Czechoslovakia would become Communist through democratic methods, when in February 1948 a coup which the radicals had favored in 1945 finally proved necessary. Gottwald's admission of two conflicting ways of thinking within the Communist Party is worth consideration:

> From May 1945 until February 1948 our way was very complicated. There were not always and everywhere clear and definite results. There were shortcomings and drawbacks. It is therefore not astonishing that here and there in our ranks some impatience was shown—and not only impatience, but *doubt that we had chosen the right way in May 1945*. This impatience appeared mainly in months preceding February, when reaction was beginning to raise its head with insolence.
>
> When February was a success, some comrades voiced the opinion that we had unnecessarily lost all the time between 1945 and 1948. Some expressed it in the following terms: "What we did in February 1948 we could have done in May 1945, and everything would be fine by now." There would be no greater mistake than to leave even a shadow of such thinking in our ranks. Our party and our people inevitably had to go through this school of three years in order to make what happened in February possible. . . . In 1945, we would not have been up to those tasks. The period from May 1945 to February 1948 was of absolute necessity.[14]

[14] Speech of Nov. 17, 1948. It is interesting to note that Gottwald often speaks of "February" without daring to say what it was. He just calls it "February," or "February events."

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IX

Fellow travelers, whether consciously or unconsciously, are of great importance to the Communist strategy of infiltration. Their first task—often assigned to them without their knowledge—is to help spread Communist ideas to quarters otherwise inaccessible to Communist penetration, such as intellectual circles, and university groups. More specific tasks, of which the fellow travelers were usually aware, were to neutralize, corrupt, or even bring into the Communist camp the organizations or parties in which they held key positions.

There are several categories of fellow travelers, and in Europe the largest of these by far is *opportunists*. It is mainly fear of the display of Soviet power and the absence of a balancing Western strength which transforms Europeans into fellow travelers. Usually, their motive for cooperation with the Communists is to get on the winning side. Among the opportunists are many persons with professional or managerial skills, who believe that their services will be of use whatever regime may come. In postwar Europe, there was a special class of opportunists who hoped to whitewash their collaboration with the Nazis by cooperation with the Communists, or at least by large contributions to the party funds.

The *idealists* among fellow travelers include university professors, artists, and writers whose cultivation gives them a keen awareness of existing social injustices. They are looking for a remedy and hope to find it in a benevolent form of communism. The idealists are usually despised by professional Communists. Idealists tend to add unnecessary utopian encumbrances to the highly professional, cool, and ruthless Communist drive for power. Students formerly were looked on as good material for the Communists. But in a reasonably stable democracy which the Communist Party is trying to undermine with slogans stressing social and economic issues more than freedom, the student body seems much less reliable. In spite of all Communist efforts, threats and bribery, Czechoslovakian students constituted the most trustworthy anti-Communist corps in the nation.

Comrades-in-arms are a special product of the European resistance and concentration camp period. The fact that Communist and non-Communist leaders found themselves side by

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side between 1941 and 1945 in a common fight against a common enemy created a network of friendly personal relations.[15] Although postwar politics separated these comrades-in-arms into different political groups, their "Association of Partisans" or "Union of Former Inmates of Buchenwald" were still their meeting grounds, both nationally and internationally.[16]

A classic example of the important role a fellow traveler occupying a key position can play is provided by Zdenek Fierlinger, the ambitious, opportunist leader of the Social Democratic Party. In 1945 his leadership changed his party into a docile tool of Communism, and in 1948 his work was crowned by the merging of the Social Democratic Party with the Communists.

The Communists knew their man. Klement Gottwald himself proposed Fierlinger for the Premiership of the first Czechoslovak Government in the liberated territory. Jan Masaryk made a record of his conversation with Gottwald on this subject on March 21, 1945:

> Gottwald reproached me with the campaign launched by the Czechoslovak Government in London against Fierlinger, and especially with their decision to call Fierlinger back to London. I said that Fierlinger might be a subject for discussion but that I was not prepared to start it . . . all negotiations between Moscow and the Czech Government in London, between the Government and Fierlinger, have gone through Beneš hands; Beneš has always tried to help maintain Fierlinger in his post. I make one complaint about Fierlinger—since the day he became Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow he has never uttered a critical word about Soviet Russia. The impression was thus created that he was more papist than the Pope. . . . For me, Fierlinger's chapter is closed. To this, Gottwald replied that Fierlinger was *their candidate* for the Premiership. He stressed once more that they wanted him and that they hoped I would have no objection. I repeated once more that I would not discuss Fierlinger, that this was a domestic policy issue on which I would not like to express my opinion, since I have never been a member of any political party.

[15] Concentration camp friendships often began with a non-Communist's fear of tight Communist cooperation in the camp.

[16] During the coup in Czechoslovakia Communist leaders relied most heavily on these "comrades-in-arms," who were not only loyal, but had the further advantage that Communist propaganda could present them as "martyrs of Nazism" in comparison to the non-Communist leaders who had just resigned from the government, the ones who had "spent the war against Nazism in the lobbies of the Savoy in London." The two most important quislings of February 1948 were Father Plojhar from the Christian Democratic People's Party and Mr. Najman from the National Socialist Party, both former inmates of Buchenwald.

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Communist support of this fellow-traveler socialist proved to be a very shrewd maneuver indeed. The Communist Party was able to claim other key positions in the government—Interior, Agriculture, and Information—because they left the Premiership to another party. As the strongest party, the Communists were entitled to claim it for themselves, according to Czechoslovak parliamentary tradition. Actually, they lost nothing by this move, since the new Premier was completely dependent and, as was later revealed, subservient to them. Along with Fierlinger, the Communists gained the whole Social Democratic Party, which could hardly avoid electing him their chairman when he had already obtained the highest position in the state. Even then, the Communists found it possible to explain their support of Fierlinger as a self-restraining gesture. Several Communist leaders explained that "we did not want to present the West with a Communist Premier. Fierlinger will not have the effect of a red flag on Western capitalists as Gottwald would."

In Czechoslovakia the Communists destroyed the independent influence of the Social Democratic Party by corrupting the leaders rather than by persuading the rank and file. For example, they offered the Premiership to Fierlinger and the Ministry of Industry to another Social Democrat, Bohumil Lausman. The Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia became completely subservient to the Communist Party. When the May 1946 elections made the Communist Party the strongest and the Social Democratic Party the weakest, Socialist subservience to the Communists was even more pronounced. The Communists (114) and Socialists (39) together had 153 seats in parliament while the democratic parties held 147. The two Marxist parties were therefore capable of forming a purely Marxist government, having a composite majority in the parliament.

The Communists were as aware of this advantage as the democrats were of their weakness. Thus, it happened that the weakest Czechoslovak party, the Social Democrats, became the focal point of Czech politics from May 1946 until February 1948. Even the Western Socialist parties concentrated on the Social Democrats. So did the Czechoslovak democratic parties. And so did the Communists. Thus after its defeat at the polls the weakest party of Czechoslovakia was not only able to retain

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two important ministries, Industry and Food, but was being bribed and seduced from all sides. While the Communists tried to help the left wing, the non-Marxist parties hoped either to split the party or assure victory for its right wing. The democrats nearly succeeded in their efforts. At the Socialist Congress in Brno in November 1947, Fierlinger was replaced by a middle-of-the-road man, Minister of Industry Lausman. It was not a complete victory for the right wing, as this would have split the party in two, but a compromise with a very clear indication of a shift toward the right. The Communists were no longer sure of Social Democratic support, except in purely economic socialist measures. The possibility of a Communist isolation in *political issues* became a real threat.

The above described shift among the Social Democrats, who were until November 1947 considered as reliable fellow travelers generally, was one of the reasons for the Communist decision to carry out a coup. In his speech of November 17, 1948, Klement Gottwald rather frankly admitted this:

> . . . the reaction attempted to prepare a shift in the existing balance of respective power before the elections in 1948 took place . . . they attempted to *isolate* the Communists. There was mainly the well-known campaign against the *left wing of the Social Democratic Party*, against *Comrade Fierlinger*. The reaction thought that they would succeed in this way . . . by *isolating* the Communists and confronting them with a unified phalanx of all other parties, and that the Communists would capitulate.

The time was past when Czechoslovak democracy could have been saved simply by clever parliamentary maneuvering by the anti-Communist parties. The events of February 1948 were to prove that the infiltration had gone too far.[17] The foes of Communist rule were unable to save the Czechoslovak republic by any other means; besides they did not seem quite aware that the internal balance of forces was bound to reflect the dominant power position of the Soviet Union in Central Europe. The Soviet overlords by the end of 1947 had come to feel that the international situation had worsened to such an extent that no possibility of an unfavorable shift in the internal position of their followers in Czechoslovakia could be tolerated.

[17] The July 1950 issue of *World Politics* will contain a second article by Dr. Duchacek, "The February Coup in Czechoslovakia."

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AMERICAN WARTIME OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

By EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR.

I

SUPERFICIAL observers of relations between the United States and the other American republics customarily deplore the decline of amity which has assertedly taken place since World War II and lay the blame to deficiencies in our diplomacy. Infrequently does one analyze the factors contributing to the high degree of cooperation that existed during the war itself. Only by such an analysis, it is submitted, can present practices of American policy be seen in their proper perspective. Answers in concrete terms should be suggested to the following specific questions: What did the United States seek from the other American republics? What techniques were employed to reach its objectives? To what extent were those objectives attained? Answers to these questions will help to clarify the place of Latin America in postwar United States policy.

Major objectives of American diplomacy regarding Latin America before and during World War II can be divided into four categories. First, the United States wanted to end the profound mistrust and active hostility built up since the turn of the century and which had reached a peak in the mid-'twenties. This rather negative objective gave rise to the Good Neighbor slogan. More positive goals existed, however. A second objective was the acquisition of a variety of strategic raw materials necessary to the defense and war effort of the United States, and the denial of such raw materials to Hitler's war machine. Third, on the level of political defense, the United States was determined not to permit in the Western Hemisphere a repetition of the successful manipulation of Nazi minorities outside the Third Reich, such as had been instrumental in destroying Austria and Czechoslovakia. A fourth objective of American diplomacy was dictated by the military weakness of the Allies and the United States. Aid to the former in stopping Nazi ad-

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vances in North Africa and protection of the latter from direct military attack could be facilitated by the forging of close military ties with Latin America.

Cooperation of the American republics in the attainment of each of the objectives here enumerated required indispensable reciprocal concessions on the part of the United States.

II

Realization of the positive goals of our Latin American policy depended upon the liquidation of the heritage of suspicion incurred by past indiscretions. Substantial progress had been made even before the full worth of Latin American cooperation became clear to policy-makers. The Hoover administration began to remove the vestiges of North American imperialism in the Caribbean area,[1] and this task was actively furthered by its successor. When conditions formerly used to justify forcible action arose, as in Cuba and El Salvador, the Roosevelt administration was able to make clear the fact that no new intervention was contemplated.[2]

So far as policy formulation in the United States was concerned, the memorandum of J. Reuben Clark had stripped the Monroe Doctrine of the encrustations so odious to Latin sensibilities. However, the Latin American countries, both at Montevideo in 1933 and at Buenos Aires in 1936,[3] requested the United States to register before the inter-American assemblage its repudiation of the Roosevelt corollary and its adherence to the formula of nonintervention. The language accepted by the United States was unequivocal in character, declaring inadmissible intervention by any of the contracting states "directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties."[4] Thus both acts and pronouncements of the United States abjured future use of the

[1] In January 1933 United States Marines had left Nicaragua and the evacuation of American troops from Haiti was announced.

[2] Reference is made to the Cuban upheaval against dictator Machado and to recognition of the Martinez régime in El Salvador after Central American repudiation of the treaty governing the establishment of relations with revolutionary régimes.

[3] Seventh Pan-American Conference, Montevideo, December 1933; Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires, December 1936.

[4] Montevideo, 1933, Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Special Protocol Relative to Nonintervention.

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Big Stick as a means of bringing pressure on small American republics without reservation as to international legal rationale.[5]

Pan-Americanism has on numerous occasions carried overtones of aggressive self-consciousness in providing a model of relations which might profitably be copied by other less enlightened areas. By underwriting within the Western Hemisphere concrete application of the Good Neighbor principle, the United States was seeking to win friends abroad by setting a standard of great-power treatment of small, helpless neighbors. Unfortunately, whatever the favorable response in the breasts of statesmen of other weak nations, there is no evidence to suggest that the Nazis were impressed by the inherent righteousness of our cause to the extent that they desired to follow it themselves.

As further contribution to the dissipation of distrust stands the machinery of consultation painfully erected, piece by piece, at Buenos Aires in 1936 and at Lima in 1938.[6] Under the Monroe Doctrine the United States had asserted unilaterally the right to protect the hemisphere from dangers arising outside its confines. By 1939 the American republics were committed to the proposition that they were all concerned by a foreign attack on any one of them. They had agreed to hold a meeting of foreign ministers should the security of the hemisphere be threatened. It is true that the consultation machinery in and of itself did not inter-Americanize the Monroe Doctrine. The United States was still free and presumably would take protective measures without prior collective endorsement by the American republics.

At Havana in 1928 Secretary of State Hughes successfully parried an Argentine attempt to force on the attention of the conference[7] the problem of high trade barriers, *i.e.*, the United States tariff. Two years later President Hoover, who had unsuccessfully requested Congress to enact tariff reform, signed

[5] In little more than a decade an unsuccessful attempt was to be made by Uruguay, with enthusiastic endorsement of the United States, to replace the doctrine of absolute nonintervention with a formula for collective intervention.

[6] The Buenos Aires Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace, 1936, contained as many verbal weakenings of the agreement to consult as could be devised by human ingenuity. The Declaration of Lima adopted at the Eighth International Conference of American States, Lima, 1938, omitted several of these and stated that consultation should be by a meeting of foreign ministers.

[7] Sixth Pan-American Conference, Havana, January-February 1928.

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a bill raising rates even beyond the level of the 'twenties. It then seemed to be the official determination of the United States to guard its vast market—almost half the world's in value—against the intrusion of foreign goods while aggressively asserting its right to subsidize commodity exports in foreign markets. The consequences of such a policy were obvious; they were particularly disastrous to Latin American competitors in the case of products artificially subsidized in the United States.

After March 1933 the new administration took prompt steps to alleviate the resentment caused by the acts of its predecessors. In sharp contrast to Havana, Secretary Hull at Montevideo actively championed his cause of reciprocal trade agreements. It was Mr. Hull's view that the world-wide application of the trade agreements program could successfully remove some of the fundamental causes of international friction. Within the hemisphere, agreements were signed with a majority of the American republics, making it possible to hold down German economic gains in Latin America and to expand somewhat the confines of inter-American trade.

Designed for the dual objective of promoting better understanding between the United States and Latin America and of uniting the hemisphere in opposition to totalitarian concepts was the cultural relations program of the State Department. While based on a convention adopted at the Buenos Aires conference in 1936,[8] the Department's Division of Cultural Relations began operations before the convention itself could be implemented. Exchange of students and professors was only a minor part of the program. In cooperation with private foundations in the United States, the Department took steps to present to Latin America more favorable impressions of this country. Influential representatives of the American republics were given the opportunity to see the United States firsthand. To American libraries in major Latin American cities went books, other printed matter, moving pictures, and transcribed radio broadcasts.

With the advent of war in Europe, Americans were at first, at least publicly, united in their determination to remain neu-

[8] Buenos Aires, 1936, Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations. The idea of cultural exchange between the American republics dates back to the Fourth Conference, Buenos Aires, 1910.

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tral. This strong element of wishful isolation greatly increased preoccupation with Latin America. Interest in all things Latin both spurred and was influenced by governmental appropriations.[9] As Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller used freely the periodically augmented resources at his disposal to arouse Latin American sympathy for the aims of United States policy. Definitive measurement of the success gained by this aspect of the program is impossible, since the correlation between greater knowledge and greater support would seem to be obscure. Much of the outlay could be credited to expenses made in return for Latin American cooperation in the attainment of various objectives sought by the United States.

III

As the United States belatedly began to look to its military defenses, it sought to take advantage of the fact that the hemisphere was a veritable storehouse of many of the raw materials needed by war industries in ever-increasing quantities. The most intensive economic mobilization in its history and the elimination of many normal sources of supply in Europe and Asia, as a result of Axis conquests, forced the United States to take strenuous measures to acquire strategic materials from the other American republics. It became clear that what was required of Latin America in the way of cooperation far transcended the earlier, rather haphazard attempts to increase inter-American trade.

As an aid in the achievement of this objective there existed a multilateral framework within which United States policy could operate. At Panama in 1939[10] the foreign ministers had established in a detailed resolution the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee, delegating to it a large residue of unsolved problems. The list was lengthened at Havana in 1940,[11] and the American republics at Rio in 1942[12] made the Committee responsible for the preparation of a gen-

[9] Witness the many books in a popular vein on Latin America appearing in 1940 and 1941, and North American adoption of Latin American music.

[10] Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, City of Panama, September-October 1939.

[11] Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Havana, July 1940.

[12] Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Rio de Janeiro, January 1942.

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eral economic mobilization plan and the maintenance of a list of strategic raw materials.[13]

At the same time it was apparent that, although the existence of an inter-American agency was useful as evidence of Latin American cooperation, actual purchase of the products needed by the United States would have to be on a bilateral basis. Accordingly, the same resolution of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers which broadened the competence of the Economic Advisory Committee also registered Latin American approval of the negotiation of bilateral or multilateral agreements governing the terms of purchase and sale of strategic materials. Thus, collective sanction was given agreements concluded before January 1942 as well as the many others signed during the war. The general pattern of the agreements called for export control of the products listed, with actual purchase arrangements left to United States private firms or governmental corporations, such as the Metals Reserve or Rubber Reserve Corporations.

The contribution in terms of natural resources made by Latin America to the war effort of the United States was substantial. Of fourteen materials listed as strategic by the Army-Navy Munitions Board in 1940, the American republics supplied twelve, all but coconut shell char, for which it had a substitute, and silk. Of the twelve, Latin America dominated United States imports of four: antimony, mercury, quartz, and tungsten. In addition, half of the chromium imports came from Cuba. In production of abaca, cinchona, rubber, and tin Latin America was in part a substitute source for a normal area of supply cut off by the Axis.[14] To the steel industry alone Western Hemisphere products contributed such important alloys as manganese, vanadium, molybdenum, and chromium.[15]

[13] Panama, 1939, Resolution III; Havana, 1940, Resolution XXV; Rio de Janeiro, 1942, Resolution II.

[14] Antimony, 99% imports from Latin America 1940-44. Mercury, 79% imports from Latin America 1940-44. Quartz, 99+% imports from Latin America 1940-44. Tungsten, 57% imports from Latin America 1940-44. Abaca, almost exclusively from Latin America 1943-45. Cinchona, almost exclusively from Latin America 1943-45. Rubber, of approximately 636,000,000 pounds imported 1942-45, Latin America contributed approximately 204,000,000 pounds. Tin, imports from Bolivia ranged between 38,000 to 42,000 tons 1940-44. Based on figures in Bureau of Mines, *Minerals Yearbook*, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944; and Department of Commerce, *Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the U.S.*, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944.

[15] *Cf.* E. S. Mason, "American Security and Access to Raw Materials," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 2 (January 1949), pp. 147 ff.

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To achieve its economic objectives in Latin America the United States was prepared to pay a price which can be measured partly in the uneconomic subsidies made by this country during the war. Raw materials not actually needed for the war effort, such as wool, rice, cotton, and corn, were purchased. The United States subscribed to the Inter-American Coffee Agreement, under which American coffee drinkers help to promote the stability of the market for this delightful beverage. Moreover, a wide range of programs was undertaken, eminently worthwhile in themselves, yet only indirectly related to the production of raw materials.[16] Agreements were signed with a majority of the American republics to assist them in improving their food supply through diversified agricultural techniques and to raise the standard of health and sanitation in areas burdened with endemic diseases. It should be borne in mind that these agreements provided for increasing Latin American participation, designed ultimately to relieve the United States of all direct financial responsibility. Finally, in this category should be placed direct rehabilitation programs undertaken in Honduras and Ecuador.

In Central America upwards of forty million dollars were spent in an unsuccessful attempt to complete a portion of the Inter-American Highway, which, even if finished, could not have materially altered wartime transportation difficulties. More directly related to the war effort were the various railroad agreements under which the United States assumed responsibility for assisting American republics, notably Mexico, in the rehabilitation of their railroads. With American support, rubber and fiber nurseries were maintained in selected localities in Latin America, although it was recognized that the war would be over before significant production from the nurseries could reach the United States.

In themselves, of course, the millions of dollars spent to purchase raw materials represented a contribution to the economic well-being of Latin American countries such as most had not known before.

[16] These programs were generally under the supervision of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs.

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IV

The technique of Axis conquest in Europe through the use of German minorities in other countries caused the American republics to cast a suspicious eye on the activities of their own German communities. As the United States moved closer to, and finally entered, the war, it was concerned that Axis penetration should not result in sabotage within the hemisphere or in actual subversion of Latin American governments. Because German minorities in Latin America engaged in subversive activities under the express direction of official German representatives, the most effective countermeasure was the breaking of relations with the Axis. At Rio de Janeiro in 1942 the United States sought to gain united agreement on this step. By the time the conference ended, eighteen of the twenty Latin American countries had broken relations or declared war. For them the conference resolutions[17] recommending severance of diplomatic, economic, and telecommunications ties were only ex post facto recognition of action already taken.

Only Argentina and Chile, the latter concerned for its long coastline and governed by a caretaker régime, still maintained relations with the Axis. Chile, under the proddings of the State Department and the Committee for Political Defense, joined with the rest on January 20, 1943. Argentina, however, had made it crystal clear at the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers that it was determined to remain neutral—resolution or no resolution. As spies and agents were interned or driven from the rest of the hemisphere, Buenos Aires became the center of Axis activity condoned and actually supported by the anti-United States Argentine régimes.

Another concern of the United States was for the danger inherent in the vast Latin American network of airlines owned or controlled by German and Italian interests. In the course of operating these lines, German aviators became uncomfortably well acquainted with the continental landscape, reported on Allied shipping, introduced spies from Europe, and ranged entirely too close to the Panama Canal. The Civil Aeronautics Administration and the State Department worked out arrange-

[17] Rio de Janeiro, 1942: Resolution I, Breaking of Diplomatic Relations; Resolution V, Severance of Commercial and Financial Relations; Resolution XL, Telecommunications.

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ments with the countries in which these airlines existed for their nationalization or for the duplication of their routes by Pan American Airways or Panagra. Money, personnel, and equipment were made available for the task, and one by one the Axis lines were forced, through cutting off their fuel supply, to suspend their operations. By 1942 all were gone. This policy, already initiated by the United States, was given multilateral sanction by a resolution adopted at Rio de Janeiro.[18]

In preventing Axis minorities from causing difficulties during the war, the United States was able to work within a framework of multilateral resolutions and an established inter-American agency. Beginning at Lima in 1938, the American republics registered their opposition to political activity by minority groups detrimental to internal stability. Finally, at Rio de Janeiro the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense was created for the purpose of supervising hemisphere security measures.

Montevideo was the seat of the Committee, and Alberto Guani, its chairman, collaborated effectively with United States designate Carl Spaeth. The membership of the Committee was limited, with each member expected to represent not only his designating country but the inter-American community as well. The Committee made recommendations to the American republics, followed them with visits of inspection, and filed reports on the state of political defense in the hemisphere. Through the auspices of the CPD the United States was able to inform Latin America of what it considered an adequate internal security system and to strengthen Latin American national policies to that end. It is possible that the actual danger of sabotage and subversion was exaggerated, but the record of achievement was uniformly good, with the significant exception of Argentina.

The United States attempted to use the Committee for Political Defense to force Argentina to conform with the position of the rest of the continent. On January 4, 1943 the Committee published, with a covering resolution, a detailed report of spies

[18] Rio de Janeiro, 1942, Resolution XXXI, recommending the restriction on the use of civilian and commercial aircraft to citizens and enterprises of the American republics or of those other countries in sympathy with the Declaration of Lima.

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in Argentina compiled by the United States. An earlier exposé concerning Chile had been instrumental in bringing about the belated break between that country and the Axis; but the Argentine government ignored the later report, as it did those brought forth by a committee of its own Chamber of Deputies.

A year later the Committee renewed its efforts. In the convenient absence of the Argentine designate a resolution was passed deploring the anomalous situation whereby one recalcitrant state was represented on a select committee charged with promoting the common safety. The Pan American Union was requested to investigate. Understandably annoyed, Argentina withdrew its designate to the Committee and boldly requested the Union to call a meeting to consider the "Argentine situation." Now on the defensive, the United States succeeded in maneuvering a conference of those countries contributing to the war effort, i.e. all but Argentina. That government replied by ceasing all contact with the Pan American Union, though not actually withdrawing from that body. While the Mexico City Conference, in February 1945,[19] formally healed the breach by inviting the Argentine government to adhere to the Final Act, the war ended without that country making any significant gestures to hemisphere political defense despite its break in relations in 1944 and declaration of war a few short weeks before the final collapse of German resistance.

After the colonels' clique seized power in Argentina in June 1943, the new régime connived with Germans and Bolivians to establish in Bolivia a pro-Axis, pro-Argentine régime.[20] The planned revolt was successful, but the Committee for Political Defense adopted a resolution calling for collective nonrecognition of such forced changes pending investigation of their origins and objectives. President Villaroel, however, was able to hang on until the United States itself initiated steps to legitimatize the government.

The coercive policy against Argentina and the use of collective nonrecognition against Bolivia were both failures, but the

[19] Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February-March 1945.

[20] *Cf.* U.S. Department of State, *Consultation among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation,* U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946.

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cause cannot be imputed to Latin American uncooperativeness with the United States. Both policies were sanctioned by an agency speaking in the name of all the American republics and were followed in the main by those republics, whatever might have been the private predelictions and sympathies of their governments. This fact is highly significant when considered against the background of suspicion and mistrust prevailing only a few short years before.

V

The objectives of United States military policy toward Latin America were threefold: acquisition of bases and installations from which to aid Britain; acquisition of bases and installations to frustrate an invasion of the Western Hemisphere; military and naval assistance by Latin American military establishments.

In a very real sense, resolutions adopted before the war at inter-American conferences provided the indispensable foundation for the attainment of United States military objectives. In addition, the American republics, as in the case of economic cooperation, formally placed a stamp of approval on bilateral negotiations for bases between the United States and individual countries after those negotiations had largely been completed.[21] The Rio meeting of foreign ministers also provided in the Inter-American Defense Board a counterpart in the military field to the Economic Advisory Committee. While the Defense Board performed a useful function in helping to allay suspicion between Latin American countries and in providing symbolic participation in wartime strategy for hemisphere defense, it could not, of course, serve as a substitute for the bilateral arrangements on which the United States depended for the attainment of its military objectives.

A delicate task of American diplomacy before the involvement of the United States in war was the establishment of a supply route for ammunition, aircraft, and parts between this country and British forces in North Africa. The government's

[21] Rio de Janeiro, 1942, Resolution XXXVII. The Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers resolved "to recommend that special facilities be granted to those countries which, in the opinion of each government, contribute to the defense of this hemisphere during this emergency."

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instrument was the Pan American Airways System, which agreed to do the actual negotiating with Latin American countries for permission to improve strategically located airfields and to build others. Under the Airport Development Program the United States was to pay for the work ostensibly undertaken by Pan American. In this intricate fashion, the requirements for neutrality of the American republics were not technically violated. Installations in Brazil so acquired were officially credited[22] with providing the necessary backing for the British counteroffensive launched from El Alamein.

Other airfields developed and improved by Pan American were designed to protect the hemisphere against invasion. Some of these were taken over by United States forces after this country entered the war. Coincident with the operations of Pan American, bilateral diplomatic negotiations with individual Latin American countries made additional facilities available. By 1942, therefore, a screen of air and naval bases open to, or actually occupied by, United States troops covered the continent from Mexico to Uruguay, from Brazil to Ecuador's Galapagos Islands. In Panama alone upwards of one hundred installations were turned over, ranging in size from small anti-aircraft sites to the large Rio Hato airfield.

More active participation by certain Latin American countries was worked out during the period when the Allies were on the defensive. The objective of these arrangements was to relieve the United States Navy of some of its patrol responsibilities. Thus the Mexican Navy assumed a share of the responsibility for convoy and patrol duty along the coasts of Central America, and units of the Cuban Navy assisted in the Caribbean. Operating directly under United States command in the South Atlantic were contingents of the Brazilian Navy, which by the end of the war had taken over defensive operations in that large area. In cooperation with the United States, Chile and Peru performed similar functions for the Pacific Coast of South America. Such naval assistance was made possible by the lease of naval vessels and the equipment and training of naval personnel by the United States.

[22] *Cf.* statements by Cordell Hull, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. IX, No. 234, Dec. 18, 1943; Jefferson Caffery, *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XI, No. 275, Oct. 1, 1944.

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Equipment loaned to Latin American navies during the war or patrol work was directly related to the objectives sought by he United States and was fundamentally distinct from the egular military lend-lease program followed with all the Latin American countries except Argentina and Panama. With the ossible exception of those with Brazil and Mexico, the latter greements, under which upwards of 400 million dollars in nilitary equipment was sold at cut rates, represented the politi-al price the United States paid for Latin American military ooperation. The oft-stated official thesis, expounded in dis-ussions of the Defense Board, was that Latin American armies, ugmented and strengthened by lend-lease supplies, could con-tructively aid in their own defense against external aggression. It is difficult to accept this thesis in application to such coun-ries as Nicaragua, Paraguay, or even, such is the nature of modern war, to such larger states as Chile and Peru. What the United States did get in return for its lend-lease supplies was not greater military security for itself but the cooperation of the particular political regimes which desired this armament. Lend-lease equipment also served as accompaniment to Amer-ican military missions in most Latin American countries. Pre-sumably these missions, in addition to supplanting Axis mili-tary advisors, favorably influenced an element unfortunately of great political importance in many Latin American countries, at the concomitant hazard of seeing the equipment used to strengthen the role of that element.

Another gesture of recognition for military cooperation was authorization for Brazil and Mexico to send contingents over-seas. In neither instance were the national forces designed to relieve the Allies of any military responsibility for the defeat of the Axis. Brazil sent a division and an air unit, which partici-pated in the Italian fighting and mopping-up operations against the Germans, while the Mexican air squadron, through no fault of its own, found itself in the Pacific in the very twilight of Japanese resistance. The military establishments of both coun-tries were greatly strengthened by the training for combat that they received, and the Brazilian Army was provided with a core of battle-experienced veterans. Certainly the price for the

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military cooperation of these good friends of the United State cannot be considered excessive.

VI

An attempt has here been made to set forth the primary ob jectives of United States policy toward Latin America immedi ately before and during World War II. These objectives grew ir scope and became more exact in definition as this country, from the depths of isolation in the mid-'thirties, was inexorably drawn into participation in the world's greatest conflict. The method by which each of the objectives was attained followed the same general pattern. Multilateral, inter-American endorse ment by resolution or by the establishment of a formal agency provided the foundation for Latin American cooperation. En- dorsement of United States policy in some instances followed rather than preceded the attainment of objectives, as in the case of the provision of military bases. In each case, moreover, the resolution or agency could not alone assure the United States of the degree of cooperation desired. Therefore, there was resort to bilateral negotiations with individual American republics defining in exact terms the measures to be taken in each field

It has been made clear that there was a price which the United States was prepared to pay and did pay to attain its specific objectives. "Cooperation" was not intended to be defined as sacrifice solely on the part of Latin America. Sometimes the price was high, as in the case of military lend-lease. Sometimes the price was only part of an enlightened Latin American policy and was designed to continue after the war, as for example, the health and sanitation agreements. In other instances there was only a tenuous connection between United States conces- sion and Latin American cooperation, as with the Inter-Ameri- can Coffee Agreement.

The degree of success attending United States policy would not have been possible without the concrete acts of the Good Neighbor policy initiated by President Roosevelt and carried out by Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles. Formal commitment to the doctrine of nonintervention was followed by the application of its principles to specific situations that arose in the 'thirties. In addition the liquidation of past indis-

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retions in the Caribbean, started before 1933, was completed s part of the Good Neighbor record. At the same time the Jnited States was successful in convincing most of the Ameri- an republics that the negative concept of nonintervention eeded to be supplemented by a positive, collective concern for ıostile acts against the American republics undertaken by a oreign power.

Although, as has been pointed out, some measure of the pre- ⁄ar preoccupation on the part of the United States with all hings Latin American—whether it be tangos or tin, rumbas or ubber—had its origin in the isolationist fear of involvement in :uropean war, that very preoccupation assisted the United ;tates in the attainment of its aims after Pearl Harbor by laying he groundwork for intensive wartime cooperation between this ·ountry and the American republics.

It could not be expected that the many threads of that co- ›peration would continue to bind together the two areas after he war. Two interrelating factors operated to change the rela- ionship profoundly. First, in 1945 the United States was the ›nly nation able and willing to use its resources to assist in the estoration of stable conditions in the world's war-devastated ·egions. Second, the American people and their leaders were ncreasingly concerned to avoid again being caught in the solated, relatively helpless position in which they found them- ;elves in 1940. Such a policy inevitably resulted in a growing ist of commitments in Europe, the Near and Middle East, and he Far East—commitments designed to protect newly formu- ated American interest and recently acquired concepts of the power position of the United States.

Given such a direction of policy, the Latin American area assumed a low rank in the scale of priorities. Indeed it could be argued that a higher priority could only result either from a lack of understanding of the true nature of United States in- terests in other regions or from a failure to develop techniques and power adequate to maintain those interests. It was natural, therefore, that many of the concrete, cooperative programs for reciprocal assistance embarked upon before and during World War II should have been terminated soon after the defeat of Germany and Japan. Perhaps there was not sufficient apprecia-

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tion in Washington of the deterioration in relations which would follow the reorientation of policy. The United States had deliberately set out to induce the other American republics to look northward for assistance in return for such support as it could offer. Although this support was not as important in 1945 as in 1941, the effect of the previous policy remained: the hopes and future of the American republics were still in great measure dependent on continued, enlightened assistance from their North American Good Neighbor.

Looked at from the other point of view, two very important facts should be kept in mind. In the first place, the basic objectives of our Latin American policy have not changed between 1939 and 1949, regardless of our newly acquired world-wide position. The United States still stands to benefit from a favorable orientation on the part of the other American republics quite apart from numerical support on issues coming to a vote in the United Nations. A favorable orientation in the event of international conflict would eliminate the necessity for the assignment of extensive power to secure our position in our own back yard. Many of the strategic resources on which the United States drew in World War II would again become of value if denied to an enemy and sent to this country in vastly expanded quantities. In the military and strategic field it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Latin America would play the some role vis-à-vis Africa and Great Britain as it did in the middle stages of the last war.

Second, the United States is fortunate in being able to build upon the framework of inter-American relations which has been created. Agreed-upon procedures may not completely eliminate conflict between American states, but they do lessen the probability of such conflict and can restrict its intensity, duration, and scope. Moreover, it has now become axiomatic, as was certainly not the case fifteen years ago, that all the American republics, not just the North American member, are concerned with a threat to their security from outside the hemisphere and are obligated to use present machinery to translate that concern into effective, multilateral action. The very existence of this machinery attests to the degree to which the United States has succeeded in convincing Latin America that the old tech-

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niques of the pre-1933 era will not be applied again. Communist cries of renewed imperialism and dollar diplomacy find small echo in the facts and attitudes based upon those facts.

The foregoing suggests as a conclusion that great care must be taken by the United States not to permit the necessary deemphasis on Latin American relations to result in any serious erosion of the gains in mutual trust or in inter-American machinery made since 1933. Without trust, machinery is valueless. Inter-American relations are replete with examples of idealistic resolutions and complex organizations made meaningless by a lack of sufficient mutual trust to put them into operation. Despite the existence of more pressing and momentous problems elsewhere, the United States cannot afford to neglect its Latin American policy in the naïve delusion that the American republics will be unaware of that neglect or will discount it when and if another emergency should lead to demands for increased cooperation on their part.

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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

By DANIEL S. CHEEVER

THERE have been repeated generalizations that support o the United Nations is a cornerstone of United States foreign policy. On February 22, 1950, the President, in a majo address dealing with foreign policy, indicated that the Unitec Nations was the proper forum in which to seek an internationa agreement for the control of atomic weapons. In so doing he reaffirmed a previous statement of policy of "unfaltering support to the United Nations and related agencies," the first o the "four points" of his inaugural address of January 1949. The President in this fashion sought to reassure the public that he had confidence in the United Nations and that he proposed to utilize its machinery to the full in the conduct of United States foreign relations.

Concurrently, however, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was conducting hearings on a number of resolutions which registered in varying degree a lack of confidence in the United Nations in its present form. These resolutions had considerable backing, particularly Senate Concurrent Resolution 56, which favored the development of the U.N. into a "world federation open to all nations, with defined and limited powers adequate to preserve peace and prevent aggression through the enactment and enforcement of world law." This resolution had at one time gained the support of over twenty senators, and as House Concurrent Resolution 64 had the support of over a hundred congressmen.[1]

It is evident that the Chief Executive and certain members of the legislative branch have different concepts of the effec-

[1] This resolution is supported by the United World Federalists. Other resolutions: S.R 133, principally the Culbertson "quota force" plan; S.C.R. 57, principally the Streit "Atlantic Union" plan; S.C.R. 52, sponsored by Senators Douglas and Thomas, to permit action against an aggressor by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly with at least three of the permanent members of the Security Council concurring.

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iveness of the U.N. and of its underlying premises. It is also evident that repeated generalizations in favor of support for he United Nations are not enough to bridge the gap between hese concepts. It is important, therefore, to know as precisely as possible what it is that Congress and the American people are asked to support. This is a relevant question since the United States has played a leading role in all the stages in the life of the young organization—sire, principal midwife, and now that of a somewhat skeptical parent footing nearly forty per cent of the bills. In short, the role of the United Nations in the conduct of American foreign policy must be examined with some care.

A foreign policy of a state is a course of action in relation to the policies of other states. It may seek to change relationships between states, or it may seek to preserve the status quo. The instruments utilized by states to achieve their foreign policy objectives are: first, force or the threat to use force; second, financial and economic measures; and finally, propaganda, or information if one prefers. Doubtless there are other instruments of policy, but surely these three are the major ones. Diplomacy can be described appropriately as a technique for the execution of policy, and the diplomatist has at his disposal the three principal instruments. A study of an international organization such as the United Nations in operation indicates that the member states continue to use these traditional instruments in seeking to implement their policies and that the conduct of relations through international organization is a development of the technique known as "diplomacy by conference." That the United Nations affords its members a means of utilizing propaganda is surely obvious. It also serves as a means of employing the instruments of economic assistance and military force. The establishment of the United Nations, in short, has not drastically altered the ways in which states carry on their business.

Admittedly this is a narrow view or at least a short-range view of international organization which does not take into account the possibility that, in the course of time, there may develop universal symbols of loyalty capable of altering to a

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considerable degree the character of world politics. But this view is precisely the one that statesmen must thoroughly comprehend if they are in some measure to seek national security in the present through international organization. A failure to understand the nature of the basic instruments of foreign policy and their use in the United Nations system can lead to disaster.

A review of some recent United States policies illustrates the use of the principal instruments and their relation to the United Nations system. All three of the basic instruments, for example, have been brought to bear in the Greek civil war. The Security Council, due to Soviet opposition, failed to find a threat to the peace under Article 39 of the Charter in the summer of 1947 that would have permitted sanctions against the Communists. Therefore the United States continued its unilateral application of economic and military measures in accordance with the Truman Doctrine of "containment" enunciated the previous spring. Yet both the Assembly and the Security Council played important roles in United States efforts to mobilize public opinion and governments in support of its action. Discussion and investigation in the Security Council, it can be argued, were helpful in making possible the use of force and economic assistance outside the United Nations system. The notion, therefore, that the organization was by-passed needs at least to be qualified.

Significant examples of the present and projected use of economic assistance by the United States in its efforts to meet the Communist challenge are the European Recovery Program and the Point Four Program. In the implementation of the first, the role of the United Nations is minimal. There are, to be sure, working relationships at the Secretariat level between the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Economic and Social Council's Economic Commission for Europe (ECE); and it is significant that the chief United States representative to the ECE is Averell Harriman who is also United States Special Representative abroad for ECA. Since foreign aid is a major instrument in the cold war, it is understandable that international control through the United Nations system did not seem feasible. Inevitably, in the control

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of a project so vital to its security and so expensive to its taxpayers, the United States preferred to limit cooperation to its friends.

The story of international economic relations from UNRRA to OEEC (or ECE) points up the fact that international economic collaboration is, at best, severely limited without international political cooperation.[2] One might add that a study of lend-lease and the Marshall Plan suggests that economic aid is equally important whether war is hot or cold.

The fact that international cooperation has deteriorated since the establishment of the United Nations does not mean, however, that the organization cannot be used in connection with economic aid programs. The Administration's Point Four Program and the United States endorsement of the technical aid plan in the Economic and Social Council and in the General Assembly indicate that the United Nations will play a somewhat larger role in the development of so-called underdeveloped areas. This seems reasonable since Point Four does not involve a huge financial outlay by the United States[3] and has less immediate security implications than did the Marshall Plan. It is in connection with the utilization of United Nations machinery that the distinction usually drawn between technical assistance and investment is particularly sound since private capital cannot be enticed from the United States to underdeveloped areas without adequate guarantees presumably stipulated in bilateral treaties. Thus the Administration has a twofold approach to Point Four: it has presented Congress with one bill for technical cooperation providing for the participation of the United Nations, the Organization of American States and their related agencies wherever practicable; a separate Administration measure is designed to permit the Export-Import Bank to guarantee private loans abroad.

A practical point, of course, in deciding the role of the United Nations in the implementation of Point Four is that technical and financial aid to underdeveloped areas may not be accept-

[2] For further views on international economic and political relations see Gottfried Haberler, "Economic Aspects of a European Union," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 4 (July 1949), pp. 431-41.

[3] See *New York Times*, Feb. 23, 1950, p. 7, citing a Foreign Policy Association report by Warren Wilhelm on the cost of industrial expansion in backward regions in the U.S.S.R.

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able to the recipients unless it is part of a United Nations scheme. The debates in the Economic and Social Council indicate that there are others besides the satellite states who are suspicious, justifiably or not, of possible American economic imperialism. Such charges cannot be ignored. There is evidence that the Peking Conference of the W.F.T.U. has organized an Eastern Cominform to counter Point Four. The U.S.S.R. with some support from Near and Far Eastern countries has charged that the program is merely another step in American plans for world-wide domination. Consequently the delegates of the Soviet bloc have taken great pains to disassociate the Economic and Social Council's technical assistance program from the American Point Four Program, which, they claim, is a colonial policy of exploitation of the raw materials of backward areas. The containment policy of the United States through economic development will succeed largely to the extent that it does not appear imperialistic; utilization of United Nations machinery may be helpful, if not essential, in this regard.

Another factor is that the United States, pre-eminent though it may be, does not have a monopoly of technical skill or exportable capital, and the success of the program depends in large measure on the cooperation of other states willing to pool their resources in a common cause. An application of know-how in backward areas depends heavily upon a knowledge of local conditions and cultures. Industrialization in the Near and Far East cannot follow the same time schedule or pattern of development as in nineteenth-century Europe. Nor will it necessarily have the same social and political consequences. Seen in this light, a cooperative program through the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the specialized agencies appears particularly important in a United States policy of economic development as a hedge against Communism.

What countries will be included in the program? Will its implementation in part by means of the U.N. system lessen its value for United States security? In answer to the first question the Department of State's White Paper on Point Four indicates that aid will be extended to economically underdeveloped countries which are cooperative and peace-loving. In answer to

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the second question, assistance given multilaterally through the United Nations will depend upon compliance with conditions established by the organization and may include such matters as full publicity, permission for impartial observers, adequate contributions, and supervision of projects and personnel by the appropriate international agency.[4] The majority support in the United Nations normally enjoyed by the United States and the fact that this country is the source of much technical assistance and capital investment suggest that few if any conditions unacceptable to the United States will be attached to assistance administered multilaterally.

The third basic instrument to be considered, the threat of force, is explicit both in the North Atlantic Treaty and its concomitant Military Aid Program and in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). The former is considered by the Senate to be a collective defense arrangement under Article 51 of the Charter and the latter a regional arrangement under Articles 52-54 of the Charter.[5] Both arrangements have been undertaken because international security has not been adequately organized on a universal basis as was the intention and hope of the framers of the Charter. Whatever the cause, a reconsideration of security policy has been made by the United States, and this fact clearly indicates that the establishment of the United Nations has not supplanted the need for wise national policies.

The coming into force of the Charter, in fact, has not lessened the need for sound diplomacy, since the art of the diplomatist involves skillful use of the basic instruments of policy. Secretary-General Trygve Lie has said that the United Nations is not a policeman but a mediator. The traditional techniques of the diplomatist are essential to the procedures of peaceful settlement enumerated in Chapter VI of the Charter. This machinery fosters a basic aim of United States foreign policy—the maintenance of international peace through the equitable settlement

[4] Department of State, "The Point Four Program," Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 14.

[5] R. H. Heindel, T. V. Kalijarvi, and F. O. Wilcox, "The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 1949), p. 633.

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of differences among states. It has been instrumental in ending armed conflict in Palestine, Kashmir, and Indonesia—involving over one-quarter of the total world population.

The role of the United Nations as an aid to the diplomatist was illustrated in the Berlin dispute. When the great powers reached the conclusion that resumption of negotiations on the question was to their mutual advantage, machinery was right at hand for immediate use. It is only necessary to recall that Philip Jessup and Jacob A. Malik, following indications in the Soviet press that negotiations might be in order, met unobtrusively in the corridors at Lake Success and commenced cautiously to explore the possibilities of a settlement. Could not the same result have been obtained without all the apparatus of a formal international organization? Perhaps so. But an apparently accidental meeting in a cloakroom may, at times, be a more successful way to initiate diplomatic negotiations than a formal call by an ambassador at a foreign office. It was not easy for the U.S.S.R. to extricate itself from the Berlin dilemma without a greater loss of face than it was probably willing to sustain.

It is evident then that the traditional instruments of policy are not abandoned in the U.N. system; nor was it intended that they should be. One might add that it is not possible for states to abandon them. The essential point is that fairly well-developed procedures have been established by which the United States may utilize the instruments of force, economic measures, and information on a multilateral basis through the U.N. The present organization is an important means but not the only one by which the United States may seek to achieve the objectives of its policy.

If the establishment of the United Nations has not altered the conduct of diplomacy more than has been suggested above, it is relevant to question the importance of the multilateral approach in international affairs. The first point to consider is whether a strategy of peace, necessarily global in concept, can be properly executed without resort to political and functional organizations universal in scope. The fact that the power of the United States has made it responsible for world leadership

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suggests that the United Nations as a universal system makes this responsibility more manageable.

A second point is that policy is indivisible. No course of action of any significance can be taken in a particular area without reference to its total effect. Policy, therefore, must be coordinated not only in its formulation in a foreign office but also in its implementation on the world scene. It would be presumptuous to suggest that the notion that policy is indivisible is new. Diplomatists have doubtless always understood this. Modern technology, however, has brought about multiple contacts between states which occur with great rapidity, and the multilateral technique is essential to bring about some order in the handling of these contacts. Bilateralism is not ended, but it requires supplementing.

Seen in this light, the United Nations affords a great opportunity for the implementation of wise policies, and it should be regarded in this positive fashion rather than negatively as a complicated bit of machinery limiting the freedom of action of the United States. For it is doubtful that this government is more limited in its freedom of action by membership in the United Nations than would otherwise be the case. Events taking place in the United Nations reflect pretty accurately the true state of affairs, one in which the political organization of the world is very primitive and in which the principle of the balance of power must continue to be an important rule of policy. A foreign policy, it has been noted, must be conceived in the light of the policies and objectives of other states. A policy of any consequence undertaken by a member of the United Nations whether it be "police action" or economic assistance, evokes a quick response from the members of the world community when it is brought before an organ of the United Nations. The total implications and hence the feasibility of a given course of action become evident in short order when exposed to procedures that are always available and always open to public scrutiny. It is important for those responsible for the formulation of national policy to remember the maxim that politics is the art of the possible.

The United Nations or any international organization, there-

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fore, is a major source of intelligence. Its debates must be studied with the greatest care to assess the attitude of states big and little on many issues—colonialism, development of backward areas, and the control of armaments. It may not be the most important source of intelligence, but it helps to achieve stereoscopic vision which is essential if one is to find the range in foreign agairs. Surely it is questionable, therefore, to pursue a course of action in the present state of affairs that might induce the Soviet Union to withdraw from the organization. Those who entertain the notion of altering the U.N. now or of establishing a federal union of democracies or some form of world government should consider whether they are really acting in the interests of national security. For the Soviet Union regards developments in this direction as capitalist aggression and encirclement. In these terms the admission of Communist China into the U.N. by virtue of Trygve Lie's formula which distinguishes between diplomatic recognition and U.N. membership might well serve the interests of the United States. If it is American policy to win China away from the control of Moscow and if it is desirable to test policy in a world forum, it is doubtful whether the continued membership in the United Nations of a government no longer in control of the territory or people of China is to the advantage of the United States.

A partial world "federation," conceding the doubtful point that one could be formed in the near future, would add little to the array of strength already organized against Soviet aggression and might do much to make more difficult a policy of containment in other parts of the world. The supporters of federal union fail to estimate both the importance of areas not yet committed either to the East or the West or the value of the United Nations to this government in challenging Communism by means of economic aid, propaganda, and even the threat of force through collective security arrangements under the terms of the Charter. The proponents of world government or federal union, to the extent that they undermine faith in an organization premised on the possible by dallying with the impossible, do much to jeopardize the peace they are so anxious to achieve.

It is very much to the point to consider whether the United

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States could have handled some of the complex problems that have confronted it all over the world without the United Nations. In Indonesia the United States was faced with the reconciliation of two apparently inconsistent objectives—the restoration of the economy of the Netherlands and Western Europe and the fostering of liberal national movements in South East Asia able to divert the rising tide of national consciousness away from Moscow. In the Security Council the United States sought in some measure to restrain the Dutch, yet it has been possible to help them with economic and military aid through ECA and MAP outside the U.N. Whether it has been possible for the United States to have its cake and eat it too remains to be seen, but such an ambivalent policy would have been even more difficult without an international organization.

Dean Acheson told the last Assembly that the problems confronting the world were too deeply rooted to be solved by "isolated diplomatic gestures" or "by national action alone." They require, he said, "common action in the light of the common public interest." Two conclusions emerge from these thoughts. First, the United Nations and its affiliated agencies offer the most feasible means of discovering whatever "common public interest" there may be in the world of today. Second, the policies of the United States must be increasingly identified with the "public interest" if the world is to be guided along the paths of peace.

Can general rules be formulated to guide statesmen as to the time and circumstances in which to utilize U.N. machinery? The answer appears to be negative. The underlying assumption of the Charter is that the permanent members will or must find a sufficient community of interest so as to take concerted action to preserve peace. This notion is made explicit in the voting provisions of the Security Council and suggests that the organization is effective to the extent that the major powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, are not involved in a specific problem. This situation applies particularly to the Security Council, and it is true that that body was severely limited in what it could do in the Czechoslovak, Berlin, and Greek cases, but was more effective in the Indonesian, Kash-

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mir, and Palestine disputes where the two chief powers were less directly involved and, as a consequence, abstention largely replaced the veto. Yet the mobilization of support for the Western point of view may have been abetted by Security Council discussion in all or many of these cases. The Berlin and Greek cases have already been mentioned. Another point, of course, is that since the United States and the Soviet Union are world powers, a dispute in any area tends to involve them to a considerable extent. Each problem then must be considered on its own merits in the light of circumstances obtaining at the time it arises. If settlement of an issue can be effected outside the United Nations, well and good. By-passing is not necessarily a sin or an unwise policy. The test of a policy is not whether it by-passes the United Nations but whether it contributes to a political settlement. It is pertinent to speculate whether the President on Washington's Birthday, 1950, would have been able to endorse the United Nations had there been no Truman Doctrine and no Marshall Plan.

One other aspect of the United Nations in the conduct of diplomacy must be considered. Is the organization of the United States Government adequate to make proper use of the multilateral technique implicit in the United Nations system?

The primary problem is, of course, coordination, and it occurs at several levels. In both its formulation and implementation, policy must be carefully coordinated by the national government to achieve its objectives. In particular, United States representatives in international organizations must pursue consistent policies. In fact the successful coordination of international action in the United Nations cannot be achieved without prior coordination of national policies by member governments.[6]

In the executive branch the problem is acute since many departments and agencies are involved in the control of the basic instruments and also share responsibility for representing the United States in international organizations. Although the President is responsible for executive coordination, clearly the

[6] See Walter R. Sharp, "National Administration and the United Nations System," *International Commitments and National Administration*, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Virginia, 1949.

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bulk of it must be achieved below the presidential level since only decisions of the utmost importance can or should be made by him. At the cabinet level there are hopeful developments. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board are members of the National Security Council and consider the relation of the three major instruments to grand strategy and domestic policy. At the President's discretion other departments and agencies may be represented on the Council, which has an Executive Secretary and a small staff. The Hoover Commission recommended, of course, further use of cabinet committees with a staff secretary to assist the President in their management, noting that the "staff service" to aid the President in the coordination of foreign affairs activities has been in the past "utterly inadequate."[7]

In addition the Department of State plays a leading role in both the coordination and direction of foreign policy and in the use of the various instruments of action. Its representatives generally head interdepartmental committees dealing with such important matters as economic and military aid. The Secretary of State is now in a position to assist the President effectively in applying the basic instruments of policy in a consistent fashion.

Recent appointments in the Department of State also suggest that the possibilities of the United Nations will be explored to the full. Mr. Acheson had considerable experience in the multilateral technique even before the establishment of the principal United Nations organs, and Dean Rusk, now one of two deputy undersecretaries, was formerly Chief of the Department's Office of United Nations Affairs. The United States mission at the United Nations in New York is now one of the largest maintained by the Department. Although the Department of State is organized primarily on a geographic basis, one of the five "action" or operative bureaus of the Department deals with international organization affairs.

But coordination in the executive branch is not enough. There

[7] *Foreign Affairs Report*, U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Foreign Affairs* (*A Report to the Congress*, No. 6), Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949.

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must be coordination between the two principal branches. Congress under the Constitution inevitably shares in the control of the major instruments of policy, and the role of the House in particular has grown as economic aid has increased in importance. The impulse for the Marshall Plan came from both the legislative and executive branches. The Vandenberg resolution of June 1948 was an important trail blazer for both the Atlantic Pact and the Military Assistance Program. A significant development underscoring the importance of the Senate in foreign affairs occured when Mr. Acheson assured the Committee on Foreign Relations that he would take no measure in regard to the recognition of Communist China without consulting that body. Recognition of governments has traditionally been the prerogative of the executive.

It is clear that little in the way of a positive external policy can be undertaken without a high degree of legislative-executive teamwork. The record on the whole is encouraging. The Senate has ratified important treaties such as the Charter and the Atlantic Pact, and Congress authorized the necessary funds for the Military Assistance Program. Action on Point Four is forthcoming. Signs of discord have been evident in connection with the possible use of economic and military instruments in China, but where discord in the executive branch on a difficult problem is normally concealed, discord between the branches is inevitably obvious to all, but does not mean that United States policy will continue to speak discordantly in Far Eastern affairs.

Various devices have served to bridge the gap. For example, congressional support for the United Nations was sought by the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy under the chairmanship of Cordell Hull, which included members of Congress and the Department of State and made significant contributions to the planning that culminated in the overwhelming ratification of the United Nations Charter. This and other examples of legislative-executive teamwork suggest that a joint executive-legislative committee might be useful in connection with important international issues—perhaps if only on an informal *ad hoc* basis. There was, of

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course, close cooperation between the Department of State and Congress on the planning of the Atlantic Pact and the Military Aid Program. Perhaps institutionalizing this practice is unwise or unnecessary. Second, Congressmen and Senators have served as United States delegates at many international conferences, a practice, however, that is now slackening and may be used only when particular pressure requires the demonstration of a united front. Third, one Assistant Secretary of State devotes full time to the job of maintaining effective relations with Congress. He has much of the responsibility for the presentation of the department's case to Congress. He has the further task of ensuring that department officials at the policy level understand congressional opinion on important matters.

Finally, bipartisan support for foreign policy is another device to insure legislative-executive teamwork on issues of such overriding importance as to require the support of both major parties. This development stems both from the need of obtaining the support of two-thirds of the Senate for the ratification of treaties and from the need for majority support in both houses of Congress for authorization and appropriations necessary for economic and military aid. It is limited, however, to important issues on which there is a general consensus and has dangerous implications to the extent that it shuts off debate and criticism of policy.

In discussing the coordination of the instruments of foreign policy, one is, of course, faced with the admitted cumbersomeness of our Constitutional system. In this respect Britain, with cabinet responsibility and well-developed party discipline, appears to have the edge. On the other hand, debate and scrutiny are essential for the formulation of wise public policy and occur in the United States in large measure because of the competitive situation that exists between the legislative and executive branches. While His Majesty's Loyal Opposition scrutinizes the government's policy generally, foreign policy is less likely to receive criticism and debate in Britain than in the United States. Foreign policy commitments including support of the United Nations are of the utmost importance to all Americans. The United States cannot make good use of the basic instruments

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of policy without public understanding and support which are obtained in part by committee hearings in which the Administration presents its view to Congress and by congressional debate which follows.[8]

Our legacy is a governmental system in which power is checked with power. The dangers, of course, are impotence and indecision when circumstances require positive action in the national interest. In particular, our governmental system of a separation of powers accentuates the problem of coordination in the formulation and implementation of policy. Events since the war, however, suggest that the problem is manageable and that the essentials of our system are worth the price. It is also true that the need for coordination of policy has become more evident with the establishment of the United Nations. That this fact has become evident is fortunate, for coordination of the instruments of foreign policy must be achieved if the United States is to give the United Nations the leadership which the world can expect from no other member.

[8] The House and Senate hearings and debate on the Atlantic Pact are illuminating in this respect.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

THE PROBLEM OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION, 1917: AN HISTORICAL RETROSPECT*

By RICHARD W. LEOPOLD

IT is a truism, long recognized, that every generation writes its own history. It is a fact, widely conceded, that complete historical objectivity will forever remain, in the words of the late Charles A. Beard, "that noble dream." And nowhere is the cycle of changing interpretations better illustrated or the pitfalls of subjectivity better evidenced than in the literature of the wars in which the United States has engaged. Every war President, for example, has been accused at some time of having needlessly led his people to Armageddon. One has only to think of the ink spilled over Madison and the Henry letters, Polk and the despatch of Taylor to the Rio Grande, Lincoln and Fort Sumter, McKinley and the so-called last-minute concessions of Spain, Wilson and the House-Grey Memorandum, or Franklin Roosevelt and the alleged ultimatum of November 26, 1941. So long as men strive to eliminate war, historians will scrutinize its causes and the revisionists will themselves be periodically revised.

Ten years have now passed since the outbreak of the Second World War, and before this guild becomes too absorbed in the origins of that conflict, it is well to glance backward and consider the unfinished business surrounding the problem of American intervention in 1917. For, contrary to popular belief, the torrential writings of the 'thirties by no means exhausted the

* This paper was read, with slight changes, on December 28, 1949, at the Boston meeting of the American Historical Association. In its preparation the author received valuable personal and background material from many individuals. He is particularly indebted to Mrs. Adrienne Turner, B. W. Huebsch, Harry E. Barnes, C. Hartley Grattan, Charles C. Tansill, and the Rev. Robert Lansing Edwards. Sales figures were courteously supplied by Paul C. Brooks of Houghton Mifflin Company and James Henle of Vanguard Press.

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subject or established a framework which all historians accept. The perspective of a second global struggle, the opening of untapped sources, and the utilization of fresh approaches still challenge the profession. New viewpoints are being suggested, but no one since 1938 has attempted a comprehensive narrative or a systematic analysis of the road to war in 1917. Nor has there been in the last decade any attempt to review the trends in historical writing about the neutrality years, to reassess the current value of the more important works, or to indicate some of the neglected areas that may yet be tilled with profit.[1]

In dealing with the problem of American intervention, historians have been greatly affected by their own personal convictions and by the availability of source materials at the time they wrote. Obviously every author has been influenced by his views on war in general, by his estimate of the wisdom of our participation in 1917, and by the course of American foreign policy since that date. Divergent opinions of why we fought date from Wilson's message of April 2. The first accounts by scholars, men like John B. McMaster and John S. Bassett, supported the Presidential contention that war had been forced upon us by Germany.[2] Dissent, however, was instantly voiced by journalists like Randolph Bourne and Scott Nearing or by legislators like George Norris and Robert La Follette. Dissent turned to disillusionment as wartime infringements upon civil rights infuriated liberals everywhere and as the bright hopes for a peace without victory had to be compromised with the realities of world politics at Paris. Disillusionment grew apace during the 'twenties, aided by the *Kriegsschuldfrage*, and reached its peak after 1934 when a new holocaust loomed on the horizon.[3]

[1] Earlier historiographical accounts include Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "American Neutrality, 1914-1917," *Journal of Modern History*, VIII (June 1936), 200-211; Sidney B. Fay, "Recipes for Neutrality," *Saturday Review of Literature*, Nov. 4, 1939; D. F. Fleming, "Our Entry into the World War in 1917: The Revised Version," *Journal of Politics*, II (February 1940), 75-86.

[2] John B. McMaster, *The United States in the World War*, 2 vols., New York, Appleton, 1918-20; John S. Bassett, *Our War with Germany*, New York, Knopf, 1919. Less objective is Christian B. Gauss, *Why We Went to War*, New York, Scribner, 1918. Typical short accounts are Roland G. Usher, *The Story of the Great War*, New York, Macmillan, 1919, and Carleton J. H. Hayes, *A Brief History of the Great War*, New York, Macmillan, 1920.

[3] Randolph S. Bourne, *Untimely Papers*, ed. by James Oppenheim, New York, Huebsch, 1919; Scott Nearing, *The Great Madness: A Victory for the American Plutocracy*, New York, Rand School of Social Science, 1917; *Congressional Record*, 65th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1917, pp. 212-14, 223-34. It is not the purpose of this paper to weigh the influence of this disillusionment upon American diplomacy in the interwar years.

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The inevitably slow opening of vital source materials also shaped historical writing on American intervention. The publication of the *Foreign Relations Supplements* was not completed until 1931, while additional State Department documents were not released until 1936 and 1939. No foreign government has even yet undertaken to provide a similar series of diplomatic correspondence.[4] The private papers of key statesmen have only recently been exploited. Generous portions of the Page and House manuscripts were edited between 1922 and 1928, but much remains unprinted.[5] Robert Lansing's *War Memoirs* was delayed until 1935, seven years after his death. No one seriously used his personal papers until 1938 or those of Bryan until 1931.[6] The vast Wilson storehouse did not yield its first fruits until 1935 and 1937.[7] The secret records of the Morgan firm were not aired until the Nye Committee hearings in 1935-36.[8] The files of several important government agencies are still closed.

Given this belated availability of primary sources, professional historians in the 'twenties tended to avoid the problem of American intervention. The subject provoked no controversy in learned circles comparable to the question of war guilt in 1914.[9] Not until 1933 did the journals carry articles based upon the *Foreign Relations Supplements*.[10] The field was thus left

[4] Department of State, *Foreign Relations: Supplement, the World War, 1914-1917*, 4 vols., Washington, 1928-31; *Foreign Relations: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, 2 vols., Washington, 1939-40; Carlton Savage, ed., *Policy of the United States toward Maritime Commerce in War*, 2 vols., Washington, 1934-36. Some German diplomatic correspondence is in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, *Official German Documents Relating to the World War*, 2 vols., New York, 1923.

[5] Burton J. Hendrick, *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, 3 vols., Garden City, Doubleday, Page, 1922-25; Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, 4 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1926-28.

[6] Charles C. Tansill, *America Goes to War*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1938; Merle Curti, "Bryan and World Peace," *Smith College Studies in History*, XVI (April-July 1931), 111-262.

[7] Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters*, Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, 1935, 1937, Vols. V and VI.

[8] U. S. Senate, Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, *Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 206, 73d Congress*, 40 parts, Washington, 1934-43, and *Reports Pursuant to S. Res. 206, 73d Congress*, 7 parts, Washington, 1935-36.

[9] Selig Adler, "War Guilt and American Disillusionment, 1918-1928," an unpublished paper read on Dec. 28, 1949 at the Boston meeting of the American Historical Association.

[10] Thomas A. Bailey, "World War Analogues of the *Trent* Affair," *American Historical Review*, XXXVIII (January 1933), 286-90; Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Private American Loans to the Allies, 1914-1916," *Pacific Historical Review*, II (June 1933), 180-93. Parts of the *Foreign Relations Supplements* were first used by J. V. Fuller and Julius W. Pratt

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to a small group of so-called revisionists, men who would revise the Wilsonian version of why we fought, men who committed their views to paper even though complete documentation was not at their disposal.

The earliest revisionists were, with one exception, journalists. The first was John Kenneth Turner whose polemical *Shall It Be Again?* appeared from the press of B. W. Huebsch in May 1922. The forty-four-year-old Turner was a veteran Socialist writer who had exposed the Diaz regime in the pages of the muckraking *American Magazine*, who had personally assisted the Mexican rebels, and who had gone on record as a bitter foe of the Versailles Treaty. *Shall It Be Again?* categorically denied that we had intervened in 1917 to protect American commerce and lives or to uphold national honor and international law. Rather it argued through over four hundred pages that we had gone to war at the command of a profit-crazed Wall Street that was aided and abetted by the broken pledges and executive usurpations of the pseudo-liberal in the White House. Despite its vitriolic tone (or because of it) and frequent diversionary attacks upon American imperialism in the Caribbean, the book went through four printings and may have sold as many as eight thousand copies.[11]

The second important revisionist was Professor Harry Elmer Barnes. In a sixty-page chapter in his *Genesis of the World War* (1926) Barnes contended that American intervention had been an unmitigated disaster for the world and for ourselves. It was due, he said, to a cowardly acquiescence in British illegal actions and to a misguided desire to save the Entente from certain defeat.[12] Much the same view was expressed by Frederick

in their excellent sketches of Bryan and Lansing in S. F. Bemis, ed., *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, New York, Knopf, 1929, Vol. X.

[11] B. W. Huebsch to the author, Dec. 2, 1949; Mrs. Adrienne Turner to the author, Sept. 23, 1949. Turner's articles in the *American Magazine* in 1909 formed a part of his *Barbarous Mexico*, Chicago, Kerr, 1911. On his gunrunning activity in 1911, see *Revolutions in Mexico: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, Senate, 62nd Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 193, 202. Opposition to the Versailles Treaty is expressed in articles in the *Nation*, July 5 and Aug. 2, 1919; Oct. 6, 1920.

[12] Some of Barnes's more extreme statements were softened in the third edition of 1929. The main arguments were repeated, however, in *World Politics in Modern Civilization*, New York, Knopf, 1930, pp. 352-63, and, buttressed by selections from later material, in "The World War of 1914-1918," *War in the Twentieth Century*, ed. by Willard Waller, New York, Random House, 1940, pp. 39-99.

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Bausman, a West Coast jurist, who had already contributed an indictment of France to the war guilt question. In *Facing Europe* (1926) Bausman turned his fire on both England and the Wilson administration. Ostensibly a criticism of the British war debt policy, his volume provided the fullest and latest discussion thus far on the infringements of our neutral rights and on the allegedly unpatriotic diplomacy of Page and House. Like Turner and Barnes, Bausman regarded American intervention as a national calamity; like the other revisionists, he succumbed to the German wartime plea that she had been surrounded by hostile states and had resorted to the submarine only to avoid starvation at home. In the retrospect of a quarter-century all three writers seem guilty of considerable naiveté and much oversimplification.[13]

The impact of Turner and Bausman upon historical writing seems to have been very slight. Save for an isolated review, generally condemnatory, their books were ignored by the learned journals and Grace Griffin did not include them in her annual compilation.[14] As for Professor Barnes, his single chapter was lost in the dazzling pyrotechnics that greeted his main thesis. Charles Beard did challenge the Barnes version of why we fought, and his *Rise of American Civilization* a year later would have satisfied most Wilsonians.[15] Textbook writers like Schlesinger, Paxson, or Shippee in the general field and Adams, Latané, or Sears in diplomacy paid scant heed to the trio.

A more scholarly statement of revisionism appeared on Armistice Day, 1929, in C. Hartley Grattan's *Why We Fought*. The twenty-seven-year-old Grattan, a former student of Barnes's at Clark University, had gone beyond his master in probing the origins of our entry and had already produced several articles in addition to his books. *Why We Fought* was, in

[13] For Bausman, see his obituary in the *New York Times*, June 20, 1931, and his *Let France Explain*, London, 1922. An earlier scholarly account of neutral rights is contained in Malbone W. Graham, *The Controversy between the United States and the Allied Governments Respecting Neutral Rights and Commerce during the Period of American Neutrality, 1914-1917*, University of Texas Bulletin, No. 2344, 1923.

[14] See review of *Facing Europe* by A. B. Darling in *Political Science Quarterly*, XLII (September 1927), 436-41.

[15] Charles A. Beard, "Heroes and Villains of the World War," *Current History*, XXIV (August 1926), 730-35; C. A. and M. R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, II, 609-35.

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fact, only one of three books he published in 1929. It was a solid four-hundred-page volume that sought "to get behind the rationalizations . . . and try to discover the real forces" that led to war.[16] Carefully annotated and replete with bibliography, it was soberly written and only occasionally lapsed into sarcasm or half-truths. It was blunt and sincere. Yet nowhere does Grattan explicitly state why we fought. It is apparent that he believed that economic entanglements, propaganda, and inept statesmanship created a bogus neutrality that gave Germany no choice but to counter with the submarine. Two long chapters on propaganda and economic forces, comprising a third of the text, were achievements in their day, but on both topics subsequent scholarship has modified or superseded Grattan's findings. The book ignored strategic considerations and the treatment of Congress was scanty. A creditable performance in 1929, *Why We Fought* is now remembered as the first documented narrative of the road to war and as an early thoughtful analysis of the role of commerce and finance.

The reception of *Why We Fought* must have disappointed the author. Its popular sale probably did not exceed a thousand. It was not reviewed in a single scholarly journal, possibly because no copies were supplied; and it escaped listing by the indefatigable Grace Griffin.[17] Although praised by Harold Lasswell, it was vigorously criticized by Sidney Fay, Jonathan Scott, and Robert Binkley. The last, for example, insisted that Grattan was less eager to discover why we fought than to demonstrate that we should not have fought at all.[18] Grattan's influence, however, can be detected in certain textbooks of the early

[16] C. H. Grattan, *Why We Fought*, New York, Vanguard Press, 1929, p. vii. See his earlier "The Walter Hines Page Legend," *American Mercury*, VI (September 1925), 39-51; "Walter Hines Page—Patriot or Traitor," *Nation*, Nov. 4, 1925; and "The Historians Cut Loose." *American Mercury*, XI (August 1927), 414-30. This last debunking essay has been corrected by William T. Hutchinson, "The American Historian in Wartime," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIX (September 1942), 163-86. In 1929 Grattan also published *Bitter Bierce: A Mystery of American Letters*, Garden City, Doubleday, Doran, and *The Peerless Leader: William Jennings Bryan*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart. The last had been completed to 1904 by Paxton Hibben.

[17] Grattan to the author, Sept. 6, 1949; Vanguard Press to the author, Aug. 29, 1949. B. E. Schmitt in the *Journal of Modern History*, VIII (June 1936), p. 200, n. 4, stated that no review copy had been received by his journal.

[18] Lasswell in the *New Republic*, Mar. 12, 1930; Fay in *New York Herald Tribune Books*, Jan. 12, 1930; Scott in *Current History*, XXXI (March 1930), 1056-57; Binkley in *Saturday Review of Literature*, Sept. 20, 1930.

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hirties, notably the Hacker and Kendrick. The author himself continued to develop his ideas, though with increasing bitterness and less restraint, in subsequent books, articles, and eviews.[19]

The first historian's history of intervention was Charles Seynour's *American Diplomacy during the World War* (1934). Seymour seemed the logical man for the task. An early student of European diplomacy, he had served under Wilson, had contributed a volume on the era to the *Chronicles of America* eries, had edited *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* and had in numerous articles and reviews explored and assessed the literature of the subject. Now, working from a thorough knowledge of the sources, with access to unprinted House material, and aided by comments from surviving participants, Seymour fashioned a first-rate account that bore all the hallmarks of ripe scholarship. His main thesis was, of course, that Germany's use of the submarine was the primary cause of our intervention, that we fought for sentimental reasons, not political or economic ones.[20] Seymour exploded the idea that the U-boat campaign was simply retaliation, and he argued persuasively that no neutral plans or pleas for a peace without victory ever had a chance of success. Within the limits Seymour set for himself, it was an excellent job. As such, it was loudly hailed in the historical journals, and its immediate influence upon subsequent writing was marked.[21]

Time, however, has dimmed some of the luster of Seymour's achievement. For one thing, the limits he set for himself were

[19] "Wilson Was for War in March, 1916," *Nation,* July 27, 1932; "Colonel House's Self-Defense," *Nation,* Dec. 14, 1932; *Preface to Chaos: War in the Making,* New York, Dodge, 1936; *The Deadly Parallel,* New York, Stackpole Sons, 1939. See particularly the reviews of Baker, *Woodrow Wilson,* Vol. V, in *New Republic,* Jan. 22, 1936, and of Seymour, *American Neutrality* in *New Republic,* Mar. 11, 1936.

[20] Seymour, *American Diplomacy during the World War,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1934, pp. 24, 209-10.

[21] See, for example, Bemis in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* CLXXIV (July 1934), 201-2; Binkley in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review,* XXI (December 1934), 441-42; Baxter in *Yale Review,* XXV (Winter 1936), 393-96; and Fay in *New Republic,* Aug. 15, 1934. The last-named periodical dissented editorially from Fay's review. Approval mixed with disagreement was voiced by Schmitt in *American Historical Review,* XL (April 1935), 537-39, and by Van Alstyne in *Journal of Modern History,* VII (March 1935), 89-91. More severe criticism was expressed by Buell in *American Political Science Review,* XXIX (April 1935), 310-12, and by Commager in *New York Herald Tribune,* Book Review section, Oct. 14, 1934.

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too narrow. By rigidly excluding propaganda and public opinion, preparedness and the peace movement, by concentrating on the White House and ignoring Congress, he betrayed the venerable fault of discussing diplomacy in a vacuum. In the second place, a vast array of new sources was made available soon after Seymour wrote. Some of these indicated that economic considerations were more in the mind of Wilson and his advisers than Seymour would concede. Seymour's later writings reveal no essential modification of the views expressed in 1934.[22] It is fair to say that few historians today accept *American Diplomacy during the World War* as a complete explanation of why we fought.

The next full-length account was the fascinating *Road to War: America, 1914-1917* by Walter Millis. Son of an army officer, a Yale graduate and editorial writer for the *New York Herald Tribune,* Millis had already produced *The Martial Spirit,* a satirical narrative of the war with Spain that emphasized the ludicrous. Millis presumably spent the better part of four years, aided by his English-born wife, in reading the more obvious printed sources of the neutrality years. Published in May 1935, the *Road to War* was quickly chosen as a Book-of-the-Month Club selection and has since sold over twenty thousand copies.[23]

Although often regarded as a popularization of Grattan, the *Road to War* was an independent study. There is a difference in emphasis, purpose, and proportion. But whatever its historical merit may have been, and it was considerable, the book alienated the professionals by its proclivity for debunking and by a lack of sustained analysis. Like Grattan, Millis nowhere clearly stated why we fought. He implied that we stumbled and blundered into war unwittingly, aided by an unneutrality (that is never defined), by propaganda, and by a quest for lucrative trade. At times the reader is made to feel that involvement was avoidable; at other times he receives the impression that in-

[22] In a second printing in 1942 Seymour left the text unchanged, brought the bibliography up to date, and appended a preface that in no way modified his earlier views. See also *American Neutrality, 1914-1917,* New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1935, and various articles and reviews.

[23] Houghton Mifflin Company to the author, Sept. 13, 1949. *Reader's Digest,* XXVII (September 1935), 128, gives a short sketch of the author and the preparation of the book.

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volvement was inevitable. Thus we are told that by 1917 Americans had become the prisoners of their own policies, of fate, and of human limitations.[24] An absorbing tale, grounded on the conviction that force accomplishes nothing, the *Road to War* suffered from excessive sarcasm and the author's reluctance to say just what he meant.

Actually Millis was perfectly competent to analyze the causes of our intervention. In a forgotten article in July 1935, he brilliantly dissected the exact nature of the economic pressures for war, examined the problem of multiple causation, and sagely noted that the issue of the future was not how to stay out of war but rather should we stay out of war. This and other soberly written essays, however, passed unnoticed by the profession.[25] Generally speaking, Millis received rough going from his reviewers, especially Charles Seymour, although a few scholars had some words of praise.[26] For the specialist who can discount the debunking and dismiss the sarcasm, the *Road to War* is still of value today. Its chronological approach points up better than any other treatment the interrelationship of the various crises at home and abroad. It is full of shrewd, if fleeting, remarks on psychological forces. The description of the preparedness movement has not yet been improved upon. And the space allotted to Congress and to the two months after the rupture of relations with Germany is more generous, and properly so, than in any other account.

The *Road to War,* anticipating by a few months the most sensational publicity of the Nye Committee and the enactment of the first Neutrality Law, let loose during 1935-39 a flood of writings. Most, being polemical or specialized in nature, can be ignored here or disposed of briefly.[27] Robert Lansing's posthu-

[24] Millis, *Road to War: America, 1914-1917,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1935, pp. 405, 431, 460.

[25] "How We Entered the Last One," *New Republic,* July 31, 1935. See also, "The Last War and the Next: Morgan, Money, and War; What Does Neutrality Mean?" *Nation,* Jan. 22 and 29, 1936; and "1939 Is Not 1914," *Life,* Nov. 6, 1939.

[26] Seymour in *Yale Review,* XXIV (Summer 1935), 833-36. Both Sontag in *American Historical Review,* XLI (January 1936), 361-63, and Van Alstyne in *Journal of Modern History,* VIII (March 1936), 118-20, while critical, did note several valuable features.

[27] It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate the literature produced by the debate over the Neutrality Laws, although much of it deals incidentally with the problem of intervention. Nor will attention be paid to writings concerned primarily with drawing lessons from the experience of 1914-17, such as John B. Moore, "Appeal to Reason,"

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mous *War Memoirs* (1935), anonymously edited from a longer manuscript, seemed to confirm the suspicions of his worst enemies; but several scholars have questioned the representative character of the document.[28] Newton D. Baker, another ex-cabinet member, eloquently restated the Wilsonian argument in *Why We Went to War* (1936), but he said nothing historians did not already know. Charles Seymour, aroused by the antics of Senators Nye and Clark, countered dogmatically in *American Neutrality* (1935), a group of essays that destroyed Congressional straw men rather than satisfied specialists. As one authority observed, the chapter "American Opinion on the Eve of War" was based largely on German sources.[29] Grattan replied for the revisionists in a scathing review, and in his *Preface to Chaos* (1936) he tried to fit American intervention into this rigid formula:

> Economic entanglements with the Allied powers in the First World War made the participation of the United States in it on the side of the Allies possible, logical, and in the end necessary for the health of private capitalism; the wartime policies of the United States Government made participation inevitable.[30]

Less contentious were the many useful articles and monographs of the five years 1935-39. To their pioneer efforts of 1933, Thomas A. Bailey and Richard W. Van Alstyne added discussions of the blacklist, the Declaration of London, and the sinking of the *Lusitania*.[31] Ralph Lutz and Schuyler Foster

Foreign Affairs, XI (July 1933), 547-88; Charles Warren, "Troubles of a Neutral," *Foreign Affairs*, XII (April 1934), 377-95; or Allen W. Dulles and Hamilton F. Armstrong, *Can We Be Neutral?*, New York, Harper, 1936.

[28] Bemis in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CLXXXIII (January 1936), 294-95, and in *American Historical Review*, XLVI (January 1941), 438-41; Seymour in *American Historical Review*, XLI (April 1936), 561-63; Woolsey in *American Journal of International Law*, XXX (January 1936), 167-69. See also Richard W. Van Alstyne, *American Diplomacy in Action*, rev. ed., Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1947, p. 266, n. 5, and Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 3d ed., New York, Crofts, 1946, p. 647. No historian has yet collated the text of the *War Memoirs* with Lansing's "The Difficulties of Neutrality," *Saturday Evening Post*, Apr. 18, 1931. There are some interesting differences. The author has been informed that Allen W. and Foster R. Dulles probably edited the *War Memoirs*.

[29] Tansill in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIII (June 1936), 119-21.

[30] Grattan in *New Republic*, Mar. 11, 1936; *Preface to Chaos*, p. 66.

[31] Cf. above, note 10. Bailey, "The United States and the Blacklist during the Great War," *Journal of Modern History*, VI (March 1934), 14-35; "The Sinking of the *Lusitania*," *American Historical Review*, XLI (October 1935), 54-73; Van Alstyne, "The Policy of the United States Regarding the Declaration of London at the Outbreak of the Great War," *Journal of Modern History*, VII (December 1935), 434-47.

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tackled the problems of propaganda and news dissemination, while J. V. Fuller and Clifton Child emphasized the munitions traffic and attempts to check it.[32] Paul Birdsall's stimulating essay on economic pressures is still the best short discussion of the subject.[33] At book length, James D. Squires's *British Propaganda at Home and in the United States* (1935) was a model of restrained scholarship; H. C. Peterson, spreading his net more widely in *Propaganda for War* (1939) seemed unduly influenced by the Nye Committee disclosures. A chapter in Merle Curti's *Peace or War* (1936) skillfully outlined the pacifist dilemma, while one phase was pursued in Marie L. Degen's *History of the Woman's Peace Party* (1939). Carl Wittke broke new ground with his *German-Americans and the World War* (1935); equally competent was Clifton J. Child's *German-Americans in Politics, 1914-1917* (1939). Harley Notter carried *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (1937) down to 1917; and Alice M. Morrissey produced a concise, unpretentious, but legalistic summary of *The American Defense of Neutral Rights* (1939). Alex M. Arnett's *Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies* (1937) underscored the significance of Congressional leaders, but he claimed too much for his hero. Samuel F. Bemis's *Diplomatic History of the United States* (1936) contained a masterly summary of recent literature, marred only, in the opinion of some, by two unscholarly speculations on the torpedoing of the *Lusitania* and the *Sussex*.

Two other special works must be mentioned before examining the longer general accounts. One is Charles A. Beard's *The Devil Theory of War* (1936), an expansion of three articles that had been prompted by the Nye Committee hearings. Beard's slender volume did two things. First, it flatly rejected both the narrow economic determinism of Gerald Nye and the

[32] Ralph H. Lutz, "Studies of World War Propaganda, 1914-1933," *Journal of Modern History*, V (December 1933), 496-516; H. Schuyler Foster, Jr., "How America Became a Belligerent: A Quantitative Study of War News, 1914-1917," *American Journal of Sociology*, XL (January 1935), 464-75. Joseph V. Fuller, "The Genesis of the Munitions Traffic," *Journal of Modern History*, VI (September 1934), 280-93; Clifton J. Child, "German-American Attempts to Prevent the Exportation of Munitions of War, 1914-1915," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXV (December 1938), 351-68.

[33] Paul Birdsall, "Neutrality and Economic Pressures, 1914-1917," *Science and Society*, III (Spring 1939), 217-28.

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single cause argument of Charles Seymour. Beard expounded lucidly the virtues of multiple causation, and he contributed the analogy of a chemist mixing reagents in a test tube, a figure popularized in the Bemis textbook. Secondly, Beard spelled out for the first time, though with melodramatic overtones, Wilson's changing policy on loans and credits. He intimated that Bryan's ban on loans of August 1914 was circumvented behind his back by a Wall Street-minded, if not dominated, Lansing.[34] Then within three months Beard took it all back. New evidence satisfied him that Bryan not only consented to the reversal of his own policy before Lansing acted but also pursued a disingenuous and hypocritical course in demanding that his inconsistency be kept secret. Somewhat chastened, Beard confessed that the Great Commoner, the hero of the revisionists, also had feet of clay. Wryly he concluded: "Verily, writing history is a dangerous trade."[35]

A second special study to influence future authors was the crisply written, cogently argued *Neutrality for the United States* (1937) by Edwin Borchard and W. P. Lage. Borchard, a disciple of John Bassett Moore, had long been critical of our wartime diplomacy.[36] Now with Lage he attributed our involvement primarily to the blundering failure of Wilson and his advisers to follow recognized rules of neutrality. The two men stressed particularly the novel claim of immunity for American citizens who traveled on armed belligerent merchantmen as a factor in our intervention. They found the acme of ineptitude in the "strict accountability" note of February 10, 1915 and in the State Department memorandum of March 4, 1916, justifying the withdrawal of the Lansing compromise. Few reviewers have dared to challenge this legal brief, although several have insisted that it did not tell the whole story. Dissenters from—or, better, qualifiers of—the Borchard thesis deplored the cavalier dismissal of economic and emotional forces. They argued that we cannot prove that acceptance of the Lansing formula would have ended the sinking of unarmed ships, belligerent or neutral; they rejected the book's assumption that

[34] Beard, *The Devil Theory of War*, New York, Vanguard Press, 1936, pp. 41-44.

[35] Beard, "New Light on Bryan and War Policies," *New Republic*, June 17, 1936.

[36] See his review of James W. Garner, *International Law and the World War*, 2 vols., New York, Longmans, Green, 1920, in *Nation*, July 20, 1921.

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an embargo by the United States or the closing of our ports to armed ships would have solved all difficulties.[37] Nevertheless, the Borchard influence can be detected in the later works of Tansill, Morrissey, and Bailey.

Of the three general accounts published after Millis from 1935 to 1939, the first to appear was Frederic L. Paxson's *Pre-War Years, 1914-1917* (1936). Like Seymour, Paxson had long specialized in the period; but his volume was unenthusiastically received by the profession, perhaps because it offered no novel interpretation, perhaps because it lacked documentation, perhaps because its jerky style and kaleidoscopic presentation recalled McMaster. Yet Paxson's skillful mingling of domestic and foreign affairs was just what most revisionists had failed to achieve. The tone of the book, moreover, was excellent and the objectivity commendable. Paxson avoided sarcasm, innuendo, second-guessing and devil-hunting. He did not demolish straw men to prove his erudition. He was especially good at saying a lot in a few words, at stripping complex matters to essentials. Very praiseworthy were his summaries of pressure groups, of the debates in Congress and of the election of 1916. He was the first to expose the revisionist distortion of the "He Kept Us Out of War" campaign. Paxson also suggested, but did not develop, the global implications of the First World War. In short, his is a difficult but perceptive book, one that merits rereading, one that the specialist can best appreciate.

A second general account can be pieced together from the fifth and sixth volumes of Ray Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters* (1935, 1937). Baker, too, was fitted by past experience to undertake the task. Although not a trained historian and too dependent on research assistants, he did attempt a scholarly work. He was the first to use the Wilson Papers. Baker was the authorized biographer but not an hagiographer. He retained his dignity and that of his subject throughout. He did not ridicule or impugn motives. He agreed with Seymour that the resumption of submarine warfare was the

[37] See Paxson in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXIV (September 1937), 277-78, and anonymous reviewer in *Journal of Modern History*, IX (December 1937), 567. See also, comment of Birdsall in "Neutrality and Economic Pressures, 1914-1917," *loc. cit.*, p. 226, and of Edward M. Earle, "A Half-Century of American Foreign Policy: Our Stake in Europe, 1898-1948," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXIV (June 1949), 182.

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occasion of our intervention, but he recognized that economic considerations governed several momentous White House decisions. Baker paid close attention to related domestic problems He frequently insisted that political isolation was impossible in a world of economic unity. Since the Wilson story contains elements of Greek tragedy, his volumes possess a dramatic quality.

But the Baker biography also has its defects. The Wilson manuscripts seemed to reveal surprisingly little that was new, and some suspect there is more to be found. The remaining research was narrow. No other personal papers were examined and only one newspaper was consulted. Wilson's untenable position on armed merchantmen was not emphasized. The treatment of House was unsatisfactory and unfair; echoes of Paris in 1919 could still be heard. Lastly, the portrait of Wilson was blurred. At times he was depicted as a strong, confident executive; at others, he appeared dependent upon and misled by his advisers. The author did not enhance the President's prestige by attributing his mistakes to House or Lansing. All in all, the Baker version is adequate, but there is every reason to anticipate a decided improvement from Arthur Link.

The last general account of these years was Charles C. Tansill's *America Goes to War* (1938). In some ways any discussion of intervention in 1917 should begin and end with Professor Tansill, for it is against his volume that all future work will be judged. Tansill devoted ten years to the enterprise and even resigned his teaching position so he could finish the task.[38] No other writer has even come close to matching his extensive research. Tansill was the first to exploit the Lansing manuscripts, the minutes of the Neutrality Board, and selected data from the archives of the German Foreign Office and Admiralty. He squeezed more out of the Bryan Papers than did Curti, more out of the Kitchin Papers than did Arnett. Only the Wilson Collection was closed to him, and Baker's sixth volume appeared too late to use. Tansill was a multiple causationist; he

[38] Charles C. Tansill to the author, Nov. 20, 1949. In 1925 Tansill collated evidence on the war guilt question for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in a manuscript that has never been published. His *Purchase of the Danish West Indies*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1932, had scattered references to the neutrality years, but Tansill printed little before 1938 on the problem of intervention except reviews.

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offered no single, simple explanation of why we fought. He insisted in his preface that he had no thesis to prove or crusades to win. On subjects he chose to discuss, his treatment was exhaustive and his facts accurate. Allan Nevins declared that "at many points [it] approaches finality." Henry Commager called it "one of the notable achievements of historical scholarship of this generation." The total sale must have been about five thousand copies.[39]

Yet, as some dissenting reviewers observed, it may be doubted that even for this generation Tansill's is the last word.[40] For one thing, it was traditional diplomatic history with little attention to public opinion, pressure groups, Congress, or strategic factors. Tansill did allot one chapter to American sentiment in August 1914, but he did not carry the topic onward. He was disappointingly brief on preparedness, pacifism, and propaganda. He was not interested in popular writings about the war or about America's role in world affairs. He ignored the issue of American security. There was not a word on the global aspects of the war: our fears in the Caribbean and South America, the question of independence for the Philippines or the Japanese advance in China and the western Pacific. Tansill did almost nothing, save for the Gore-McLemore resolutions, with Congressional debates and alignments; and the election of 1916 was barely mentioned. The twelve pages devoted to the critical weeks after February 4, 1917 are wholly inadequate. The account of economic entanglements is very detailed but, as Paul Birdsall has said, "almost totally lacking in interpretative treatment and completely lacking in synthesis."[41] In short, one can, in retrospect, doubt that Tansill considered the problem of American intervention in its broadest terms.

In the second place, the volume was predicated on an assumption which many historians do not now share. Professor Tansill regarded our entry into the war as a mistake. He be-

[39] Tansill to the author, Nov. 20, 1949. Nevins in *Atlantic Monthly*, CLXII (August 1938); Commager in *Yale Review*, XXVII (Summer 1938), 857. See also, Borchard in *American Journal of International Law*, XXXIII (January 1939), 229-31, and John Chamberlain in *New York Herald Tribune Books*, Apr. 10, 1938.

[40] See critical comments of Baxter in *American Historical Review*, XLV (October 1939), 183-84; Schmitt in *Journal of Modern History*, X (December 1938), 569-73; and Sontag in *Saturday Review of Literature*, Apr. 16, 1938.

[41] Birdsall, "Neutrality and Economic Pressures, 1914-1917," *loc. cit.*, p. 227.

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lieved that a German victory would have been a lesser evil than our participation. We shall never know; but we ought to recognize that his conviction, right or wrong, colored the book. One senses that the German case is treated more sympathetically than the Allied. German newspapers were read but not the British. The harsh Allied peace terms of January 10, 1917 were mentioned in the text, but the equally severe German ones escaped in a footnote.[42] Tansill was hostile to, not just critical of, all who sincerely believed we must fight. He made no attempt to understand Roosevelt or Lodge. His handling of House and Lansing was devil-hunting of the grossest sort. He impugned motives without proof, such as Lansing's zeal for promotion.[43] He indulged in sarcasm and insinuation that do not belong in a scholarly work. Even the portrait of Wilson, ostensibly friendly, recalls Henry Adams' depiction of Jefferson. Adams repeatedly asserted that Jefferson was a great man and then took four volumes to show that he was not.

A third criticism of *America Goes to War* has to do with organization. Can a topical presentation, such as Tansill employs, properly convey the intricate connections, diplomatic and domestic, of the neutrality years? When Tansill describes American yielding to British illegalities in 1914-15, the reader is still unaware of the simultaneous disputes with Germany over the submarine. By the time the author gets around to the House mission of 1915, the events that called it forth are three hundred pages back.

Finally, Tansill occasionally seemed to strain the evidence to fit his ideas. Bryan is a hero. The Nye documents revealed a flattering pattern of consistency on loans and credits. But when Beard offered new data to destroy the picture, Tansill cited the article but minimized the conclusion. The basic portrait of Bryan was left unchanged.[44] House is an evil genius. The thesis of an entire chapter, "Colonel House Blocks a Path to Peace," rested on a single cablegram of February 14, 1916. Certainly the German declaration of February 8, and the mounting Republican protest (as manifested by the Sterling resolution and

[42] Tansill, *America Goes to War*, pp. 629-30 and notes 164, 165.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 162, 426.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

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speeches by Root and Lodge—none of which Tansill mentioned) must share with that sole cablegram the explanation of the Wilson-Lansing retreat from the proposal of January 18.[45] And certainly there is slight evidence for the frequent speculations and numerous "might have beens" that dot the pages and inevitably lead the reader where he should not be led.

America Goes to War remains today the point of departure for any future study of our intervention in 1917. But with the perspective of another decade some may dissent from its basic assumption, disapprove of its conventional approach, and disagree with many of its interpretations.[46] And while continuing to applaud its extensive research, we must remember that new sources are coming and will constantly come to light.

In the ten years since 1939 historians have written relatively little on the problem of intervention. There have been three monographs on public opinion in single states, Ruhl Bartlett's excellent *League to Enforce Peace* (1944), Outten Clinard's suggestive but inconclusive study on Japan, and a few articles on the newspaper press.[47] But no full-length story has been attempted, and the best-rounded recent accounts must be sought in our textbooks in diplomatic history.[48] These texts have shown a tendency to soften certain criticisms prominent in the late

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 426-27, 429, 460. For a different handling of the German note of Feb. 8, 1916, see Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, VI, 162; Seymour, *American Diplomacy during the World War*, pp. 114-16. The political and Congressional pressures are summarized in Henry C. Lodge to George O. Trevelyan, Mar. 7, 1916, Lodge Papers. Reprints of the two speeches are in Lodge, *War Addresses, 1915-1917*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1917, pp. 85-114; Elihu Root, *Addresses on International Subjects*, Robert Bacon and J. B. Scott, eds., Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1916, pp. 427-47.

[46] In a letter to the author, Nov. 20, 1949, Tansill stated that he had not changed any of the conclusions expressed in his book.

[47] Edwin Costrell, *How Maine Viewed the War, 1914-1917* ("University of Maine Studies," 2d Ser., No. 49), Orono, 1940; Cedric C. Cummins, *Indiana Public Opinion and the World War, 1914-1917* ("Indiana Historical Collections," Vol. XXVIII), Indianapolis, 1945; John C. Crighton, *Missouri and the World War, 1914-1917* ("University of Missouri Studies," Vol. XXI, No. 3), Columbia, 1947. Outten J. Clinard, *Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917* ("University of California Publications in History," Vol. XXXVI), Berkeley, 1947. Russell Buchanan, "American Editors Examine American War Aims and Plans in April, 1917," *Pacific Historical Review*, IX (September 1940), 253-66; Harold C. Syrett, "The Business Press and American Neutrality, 1914-1917," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXII (September 1945), 215-30.

[48] Van Alstyne, *American Diplomacy in Action*, rev. ed., Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press, 1946, pp. 254-90, 753-67; Bailey, *Diplomatic History of the American People*, 3d ed., New York, Crofts, 1946, pp. 610-47; Bemis, *Diplomatic History of the United States*, rev. ed., New York, Holt, 1942, pp. 590-616.

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'thirties, as a comparison of the three editions of Bailey's work will show. In general, the submarine is still regarded as the immediate cause of our intervention. Since Borchard wrote, more attention has been paid to the armed merchantmen issue. Less emphasis is now placed on the persuasiveness of British propaganda. Walter Millis has called for a fresh study of the whole problem, while between 1940 and 1942 Bailey markedly modified his position.[49] Few today would deny the importance of trade and finance in making our participation more likely; but it is now agreed that the entire nation, not a selfish few, benefited from wartime commerce and that Wilson's final casting of the die was not governed by material considerations. The economic motive was not uppermost in the American decision for war, but it was a decisive factor in Germany's renewal of the U-boat campaign.[50]

The one new interpretation stressed since 1939 is that the United States intervened in 1917 to safeguard its security. A more restricted version is that we sought to maintain Anglo-American control of the Atlantic. This security idea naturally appealed to many when Nazi legions bestrode the Continent and threatened England and the Royal Navy. It is not surprising that it was popularized by two newspapermen, Walter Lippmann and Forrest Davis, in the year of decision, 1941.[51] Very few specialists have wholly accepted the Lippmann-Davis thesis, but all agree that strategic concepts merit closer scrutiny. Van Alstyne has asserted that though some Americans in 1917 thought in terms of security "at no time during the First World War was the United States conscious of fighting a war for survival." Edward M. Earle has said that our motive in 1917 should have been to redress the European balance of power; "but no evidence, conclusive beyond reasonable doubt, has been brought to light to show that Wilson . . . was consciously influenced by such considerations or by fear that a German victory

[49] Walter Millis, "Propaganda for War," *Southern Review*, V (Autumn 1939), 201-10. Cf. Bailey, *Diplomatic History*, 2d ed., New York, Crofts, 1942, pp. 613-14, with the same pages of the first edition, published in January 1940.

[50] Birdsall, "Neutrality and Economic Pressures, 1914-1917," *loc. cit.*, pp. 223-26.

[51] Walter Lippmann, "The Atlantic and America," *Life*, Apr. 7, 1941; Forrest Davis, *The Atlantic System: The Story of Anglo-American Control of the Seas*, New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941, pp. 201-46. Lippmann restated his views in *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1943, pp. 33-39.

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might jeopardize American security."[52] Bailey has insisted that security became the objective of our intervention but that it was never the cause. John Hicks has quoted Davis approvingly; while Dexter Perkins, after manifesting some hesitation, has urged further study of the problem.[53]

Looking to the future, then, one line of profitable investigation would be this question of security. Examination of American reaction, official and popular, to events in Mexico, the Caribbean, and the Pacific should be encouraged. It would be helpful if historians could see the files of the General Board of the Navy or the War Plans Division of the Army General Staff. Direct effect of strategic planning on the White House and Capitol would, of course, have to be weighed; but certainly the time has come to include the global implications of the First World War in any account of 1914-17.

A second untilled area is the nebulous but challenging one of public opinion. We could use more monographs dealing with state and sectional sentiment. Further inquiry should be made into the influence of farm and labor organizations, of hyphenate blocs, especially the Irish-Americans, and of the vast array of pressure groups. The advocates of preparedness and the champions of world peace offer attractive opportunities for research. So also does a vast body of contemporary writings on America's role in world affairs. There are books by men like Roland G. Usher, John C. O'Laughlin, and H. H. Powers, journals of opinion like *The New Republic* and the *Outlook,* and articles and editorials in a wide range of magazines.[54]

A third somewhat neglected aspect of the problem of intervention is the Congress. No one has really read the *Congressional Record* for 1914-17 in the same way that other histo-

[52] Van Alstyne, *American Diplomacy in Action,* p. 289; Earle, "A Half-Century of American Foreign Policy," *loc. cit.,* p. 179. A member of my graduate seminar at Harvard in 1947, Robert E. Osgood, was unable to discover in a semester's search any substantial amount of contemporary evidence to support the Lippmann thesis.

[53] Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace,* New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. 15-17, 330-31; John D. Hicks, *The American Nation,* 2d ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1949, pp. 485-86; Dexter Perkins, *America and Two Wars,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1944, pp. 46-51. Cf. Perkins, *The Evolution of American Foreign Policy,* New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1948, p. 101.

[54] The opportunities along these lines, with reference to a single section, were discussed by the author at the Madison meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Apr. 14, 1949, in a still unpublished paper entitled, "The Mississippi Valley in Recent American Diplomatic History: A Neglected Field of Study."

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rians have perused the *Annals of Congress* for 1809-12 or the *Congressional Globe* for 1843-46. There is a crying need for scholarly biographies of such legislative titans as Lodge, La Follette, Norris, and Borah as well as less full sketches of men who held key posts during the neutrality years. Champ Clark, William J. Stone, Henry D. Flood, and John W. Kern are just a few names that readily occur.

A fourth and harder task is to seek new data for certain crucial events still shrouded in uncertainty. The "strict accountability" note of February 10, 1915 and the retreat on armed merchantmen from the Lansing memorandum of January 18, 1916 are simply two cases in point. Apparently the hitherto unused Tumulty Papers will not throw any light on these questions; perhaps the records of other diplomats may be more helpful, records of men like Frank Polk, Counsellor of the State Department after September, 1915, William Phillips, Third Assistant Secretary of State, or Joseph C. Grew, secretary of the Berlin embassy.[55]

Finally, certain generally accepted views should be reconsidered. Were most British seizures of eastbound American cargoes illegal even by the standards of 1914-15? There is some evidence that the concept of English highhandedness has been greatly exaggerated.[56] How sincere was the demand for an embargo on the export of munitions? Van Alstyne has called the German proposal "an extraordinarily successful red herring."[57] How complete was the blackout of news from German sources after September 1914? Did we really watch the war through British spectacles? Or again, is it not time to appraise more objectively men like Roosevelt, Lodge, Lansing, and House rather than branding them as warmongers? Howard Beale should reassess the role of Roosevelt; but it must not be forgotten that the Lodge Papers are now open, that the House Collection has not been fully tapped and that new Lansing material became available in 1949. Lansing presents a special challenge because of the disputed character of his *War Memoirs*

[55] John M. Blum, who is completing a biography of Tumulty, has informed the author that the Tumulty Papers do not cast much new light on the problem of intervention.

[56] Van Alstyne, *American Diplomacy in Action*, pp. 761-62; Bailey, *Diplomatic History*, 3d ed., p. 647; *Foreign Relations: 1926*, Washington, 1941, II, 214-308.

[57] Van Alstyne, *American Diplomacy in Action*, p. 268.

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and because of the diametrically opposed treatments of Tansill and Van Alstyne. Nor should it be assumed that the last word has been said on Bryan. One may properly ask why Bryan was willing to be absent from Washington at so many critical times in 1914-15 unless he did share the views of subordinates like Lansing. The Beard article suggests that the pendulum may now have swung too favorably in the direction of the Great Commoner.

It is to be hoped that future studies will take a broader view of the neutrality years. It is imperative that future historians treat American intervention in 1917 as but a single step, albeit an important one, in the transition of the United States from a role of relative indifference to world affairs to one of active participation. Perhaps when that point is grasped, they will be more tolerant than their predecessors of the hesitations, inconsistencies, and even mistakes of those who steered the ship of state in 1914. They may even come to concede that Wilson and his advisers were men genuinely puzzled and perplexed by a changing world order—the outlines of which a few but dimly glimpsed—rather than clumsy bunglers, exponents of double talk, or traitorous tools of the Allies. The witch-hunting tactics of the early revisionists and their followers should be avoided. Not until then shall we possess, with the perspective of another global upheaval, a more rounded and more realistic understanding of the problem of American intervention in 1917.

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ARMY AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM 1933-1945: THE RESPONSIBILTY OF THE GENERALS

By GORDON A. CRAIG

Friedrich Hossbach, *Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934-1938,* Wolfenbüttel and Hannover, 1949.
Franz Halder, *Hitler als Feldherr,* Munich, 1949.

IT has taken them a little longer this time than it did after the First World War, but the German soldiers are once more writing books. There is, of course, nothing intrinsically reprehensible about this. It may even be useful, for there are many things about the war, and about the Nazi regime as a whole, that the soldiers can tell us. But perhaps inevitably, the majority of the products of this literary activity tend to be querulous attempts to free the German Army from any major responsibility for what has happened to Germany as a result of Hitler's reign; and the two books under consideration here are no exception to that tendency. Colonel Hossbach, who is concerned only with the prewar period, admits that many deplorable things went on between 1933 and 1939 but seems rather irritated because it is not generally realized that the army, as a nonpolitical organization, had neither the power nor the responsibility to control events. General Halder's indignation is reserved for those who criticize the army leaders for having lost the war; and the apparent purpose of his book is to prove that it was all Hitler's fault and that things would have turned out differently if the Fuehrer had left his generals alone.

I

In 1934 Friedrich Hossbach was an officer on the General Staff of the German Army, occupying himself with personnel administration. Shortly after Hindenburg's death, he was informed—to his surprise—that he had been appointed as adjutant for the *Wehrmacht* in Hitler's headquarters, a position

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which involved serving as liaison officer between the Fuehrer and the heads of the three armed forces. Hossbach took up his duties immediately and held his new post until February 1938, when he was involved in the notorious Blomberg-Fritsch affair and dismissed by Hitler.

At the time of his appointment, Hossbach had no strong political views. He was not a National Socialist, but he had no anti-Nazi convictions either. He writes:

> I admit frankly that I belong to those Germans who, after the disintegration of the political and economic situation around 1930, placed their hopes for an improvement and consolidation of our condition on the change of government effected on January 30, 1933 under the protectorate of Hindenburg; and I am not one of those who, as early as 1933 or even before, foresaw the trend of events to 1945. [Page 9.]

He seems to have entered upon his new work with an open mind and with a keen interest in observing Hitler and his associates at close range.

Because he was permitted to gratify that interest for more than three years, Hossbach's memoirs will have a certain interest for specialists on the history of the Nazi period. In a somewhat discursive and disorganized fashion, he has faithfully recorded his impressions of the trivial as well as the important events he witnessed. What he has to say will at times cause the reader to doubt the author's power of discernment. It is clear, for instance, that Hossbach never understood Hitler. His own soldierly character was repelled by the Fuehrer's indifference to nature and his absorption in the world of technics. "The noblest of animals, the horse," he writes ruefully, "was for Hitler an alien creature." He was perplexed by Hitler's sudden changes of mood—his alternation between extreme lassitude and demoniac energy. He was perpetually baffled by Hitler's ability to talk enthusiastically of constitutional reform while tightening the screws of absolutism and to dream of living out his days as an honored sage in some melancholy castle while drawing up plans for world conquest. The extent of Hossbach's bewilderment is reflected in his cautious judgment of the Fuehrer as a man in whose breast Good and Evil struggled for mastery—a judgment which will strike some readers as unnecessarily charitable.

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Hossbach, however, was not the first, nor the last, person to be puzzled by Hitler, and this aspect of his work need not be overemphasized. His memoirs of the actual events of his term of office are of considerable interest, and they contribute some new details to our knowledge of this period. The author's account of the repudiation of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty on March 16, 1935 reveals that Hitler made no attempt to consult the military until two days before the action was taken; that War Minister Blomberg was opposed to the plan because he was sure it would bring foreign retaliation; and that an informal council, held on the evening of March 15, was the scene of a bitter wrangle between the pessimistic Blomberg and Joachim von Ribbentrop, who then, as later, was always the complete optimist in matters of foreign policy.[1] The hesitation of the army chiefs to concur in Hitler's plan to reoccupy the Rhineland in 1936 is well known; but Hossbach adds at least one piquant detail in writing that Blomberg, terrified by reports from the military attaché in London, was urging the evacuation of Aachen, Trier, and Saarbrücken some days after the entry had been effected.

Other pages of this book will interest the historian also: Hossbach's description of the army's difficulty in preventing a full-scale intervention in the Spanish War; his record of the famous conference of November 5, 1937, in which Hitler outlined his future objectives in foreign policy and his intention of liquidating the Austrian and Czechoslovakian problems—a conference at which Hossbach was the official *rapporteur*;[2] and, finally, his account of the successful intrigue against Fritsch in 1938, which—because of Hossbach's close relationship with Fritsch—is more circumstantial and more satisfying than some of the highly colored accounts which have appeared previously.

Hossbach's purpose in writing this book is not, however,

[1] On Ribbentrop's optimism in foreign affairs, as compared with the doubts and hesitations of the professional diplomats, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949, Series D, Vol. II, pp. 420, 593.

[2] The record of this conference—the so-called Hossbach Minutes—was first printed in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946, III, 295 ff. In improved translation, it will be found in *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, Vol. I, pp. 29 ff.

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merely to record his memoirs. As he states in his introduction, he has set out to defend the German soldiers from unjust criticisms now being leveled against them. Thanks to the "passionate one-sidedness of the Germans," he writes, the soldiers—that is, the professional officer class as a whole—are now being blamed for the loss of the recent war; "and the accusations and charges go far beyond the specifically military sphere. The soldier is being made primarily responsible for the whole political development [of Germany] in domestic and foreign affairs, at least since January 30, 1933, without being given an opportunity to present a clarification and a justification in his own cause." (Page 7.) Hossbach's chief purpose, then, is to write a defense of the professional soldiers, at least for the period 1934-38.

It is a painfully logical but scarcely persuasive defense, and the method of argument employed by the author is questionable, to say the least. For Hossbach sets out to absolve the generals as a class from any culpability for the crimes of Hitler's regime by the simple expedient of selecting individual scapegoats and making them solely and fully responsible. Thus, of the period 1934-38, the author writes:

> There was *de jure* and *de facto* only one responsible individual at the head of the *Wehrmacht,* and that was Blomberg, notwithstanding the co-responsibility which every officer has for things done and not done by him according to his official prerogatives and his conscience. Blomberg's closest advisers were Reichenau and Keitel; they share Blomberg's responsibility before the bar of history. These three men shaped the policy of the *Wehrmacht.* All of the other generals held military positions, the powers, rights, and duties of which were firmly defined by ordinance and regulation. Their sphere of responsibility toward their superiors and toward their inferiors was delineated by definite boundaries. . . . It is not "the generals," and even less "the officer corps" who bear the responsibility [but the War Minister and his aides]. [Page 183.]

To reach this conclusion, Hossbach uses a purely legalistic argument, based upon the centralization of military administration after Hitler's accession to power in 1933. When Hitler became chancellor, he appointed General von Blomberg as *Reichswehrminister* (later *Reichskriegsminister*). Blomberg's authority was, from the beginning, of a much wider nature

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than that of the *Reichswehrministers* of the Weimar period. In contrast to early *Reichswehrministers*, who had relatively small ministerial staffs, he was encouraged to build a bureaucratic empire of his own and, after the spring of 1935, to subordinate to it the staffs of the three separate branches of the armed services. No minister or soldier in previous German history had ever, Hossbach contends, exercised as much power over the combined armed forces of the nation as did Blomberg. And in the exercise of this power he was responsible, not to the national parliament, as in the period of the Weimar Republic, but only to Hitler and "to his own conscience."

Blomberg and his closest associates were convinced National Socialists from 1933 on. They not only encouraged the growth of party influence within the army but tended, as far as possible, to usurp legitimate army functions, so that, for instance, Reichenau's *Ministeramt* tended to replace the Army General Staff in the preparation of defense and war plans. But, most important, Blomberg and his advisers defeated all attempts made by the professional soldiers in the Army High Command to influence and moderate domestic and foreign policies which they considered to be dangerous.

In the sphere of foreign policy, Hossbach argues, the Chief of the Army Command, General von Fritsch, and his Chief of Staff, General von Beck, were consistently opposed to the type of risky gamble in which Hitler indulged. Both men approved the repudiation of the Versailles military restrictions and also the military occupation of the Rhineland; thereafter, however, they were desperately apprehensive lest some new Hitlerian provocation involve the country in war. For war of any kind they felt that Germany would not be prepared in the foreseeable future. In a conflict fought on many fronts, her geographical position would be dangerous; the army did not possess, and would not possess for some years, the trained reserve necessary to support protracted operations; and Germany's allies, Italy and Japan, were not in their eyes reliable or effective partners. Germany needed peace; and to secure it she required a sane and cautious foreign policy.

Late in 1935, the author writes, Fritsch and Beck, in an attempt to guard against unwise political adventures, sought to

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ncrease the influence of the army in policy determination and, ›pecifically, to secure for the Chief of the Army Command the ·ight to be consulted on all matters affecting the defense of the :ountry and on all preparations for military action of any kind. These efforts were consistently blocked by Blomberg, who saw in them an attempt to weaken his own authority and a threat to the unity of the *Wehrmacht* as a whole. In an ordinance of April 20, 1936, Fritsch and Raeder, Chief of the Naval Command, were given the privilege of attending meetings of the *Reichskabinett* when invited by the Fuehrer or by Blomberg. But the subordination of both commanders to Blomberg remained unchanged, and it was clear that their influence could be exerted only with his approval and support.

This fact is enough for the author; and on the basis of it he absolves the professional army leaders from all responsibility for what followed. He does not even seek to demonstrate that Fritsch ever tried very hard again to assert himself in political matters. Despite Hossbach's admiration for the general, the impression of Fritsch that emerges from these pages is that of a man who was essentially defeatist, who believed that "Hitler is Germany's destiny for good or evil," and who faithfully carried out all the orders that were given him. But, as far as the author is concerned, Fritsch was legally forbidden to do anything else. After the ordinance of April 20, 1936, political responsibility devolved solely upon Blomberg.

In his indictment of Blomberg, however, the author is not content to stop here. Blomberg's responsibility is, he insists, more than a legal one.

> The fund of trust which the German people, since earliest times and also since and despite the loss of the war in 1918, placed in the soldier, involved for Blomberg the moral obligation of being the attorney of reason and of forming a barrier against excessive totalitarian claims on the part of the State. It is the tragedy of modern German history that Blomberg was, neither as a soldier nor as a statesman, a strong personality, forceful and creative, guiding and leading. His intelligence lacked the foundation of a firm character. [Page 76.]

This passage is perhaps the most revealing in Hossbach's book. He seems to be uncomfortably aware that his lawyer's argument is inconclusive and that there is a deeper moral issue

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involved. He seeks to meet it by saying in effect that legal responsibility implies moral responsibility and that without legal power there is no real moral obligation. From this standpoint, his reservation with regard to the individual conscience, cited earlier, becomes meaningless, for it applies apparently only to the very highest level of the military chain of command. Thus, for the period 1934-38, Blomberg alone is held to be morally responsible for the army's failure to restrain Hitler's aggressive tendencies. And for the period which followed the dismissal of Blomberg and Fritsch and the resignation of Beck, Hossbach singles out Brauchitsch and Halder, the new *Oberbefehlshaber* of the army and his Chief of Staff, as the moral culprits. They, like Blomberg before them, "placed the reputation of the High Command at the disposal of an immoral political leadership and weakly gambled it away . . . in respect to the security of the nation they failed to exert their political, military, and moral responsibility." (Page 202.)

But surely there were other generals, and if it is true that the German people looked to their soldiers for wise leadership, surely those others had some moral obligation also. Were they not called upon to protest against a foreign policy which they regarded as dangerous and against a domestic policy which (although Hossbach avoids stressing this) was characterized by growing totalitarianism, by persecution of racial minorities, by attacks upon organized religion, and by political murder? This is an embarrassing question, and before it Hossbach retreats in some confusion to the safe ground of legal obligation and military law. It is not for subordinate officers, he argues, to make judgments on the politics of the day. The officer corps is a nonpolitical body, and rightly so; military regulations and the oath to the Fuehrer alike forbid a political activity which could only be destructive of discipline. Thus, the moral issue is dismissed with what can only be described as a reaffirmation of the principle of *Kadavergehorsam*.

II

If Hossbach's attempt to absolve the generals as a body from any real responsibility by a judicious selection of whipping boys is unconvincing, General Halder's attempt to make Hitler the

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sole author of Germany's downfall is even more so. By any standard this is a curious book. Like Hossbach's it is intended as a defense of the professional soldiers, in this case against the charge that by their failure to execute Hitler's plans they prevented him from winning the war. But at no place in this book will the reader find the argument that Hitler's war was from the beginning unjust and doomed to failure. One rather gains the impression that Halder's point is that if only Hitler had remained in Berlin or Berchtesgaden during the war years, the generals would have won his war quite handily. This is certainly the effect of Halder's account of Dunkirk where—in words which still echo the disappointment and frustration of 1940—he argues that the British Army could have been totally destroyed if Hitler had not withdrawn the armored divisions and entrusted the final phase of the attack to the *Luftwaffe*.

This, however, is not the most disturbing feature of Halder's book. As he writes his enthusiastic and devastating attack upon Hitler the soldier—castigating his refusal to be guided by the High Command in the period of rearmament, his disastrous intervention in operational matters during the war, his deliberate atomization of all command relationships, his sublime indifference to logistical realities, his willingness to bleed divisions to death in the pursuit of unattainable objectives, and much else—one is constantly reminded that for four long years Halder did his duty as Chief of Staff and carried out the commands of this same Hitler.

In a preface to this work, the publishers assert, in rather awkward prose, that:

> . . . with high moral discipline [Halder] has avoided everything that could have been interpreted as a justification of "the generals." He has also resisted the obvious temptation to bring into his account of the events of the war, in a confusing fashion, the question which rises from the moral and political responsibility of the individual in regard to the significance and scope of the military duty of obedience. [Page 5.]

The logic of this passage is as obscure as the style. Halder does indeed seek to avoid the question of responsibility; but, as we have seen, even Hossbach was forced to admit that that question must be the salient point of any discussion of the relations of Hitler and his generals. It is doubtful whether it

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is legitimate to avoid answering it in a book which, despite the publisher's disclaimer, seeks to rehabilitate the reputation of the generals by tearing Hitler's down. As one German critic has written: "Despite all the personal respect which one may have for Halder, the question arises as to how it was possible for a man who was religious in the deepest sense to serve one who so openly violated the most elementary laws of divine and human justice."[3]

Halder never answers that argument in his book. It was answered, though not entirely satisfactorily, by Halder's counsel in his denazification trial at Neustadt in 1948. Why, asked the attorney for the defense, did not Halder, and others, throw their swords at Hitler's feet with the words: "Machen Sie ihren Dreck allein!"? They did not do so because such a gesture would have been senseless and without productive result. Halder felt that it was better to remain at his post in the hope of being able to make Hitler see reason rather than to give way to some incompetent party general who would blindly support every scheme dreamed up by the Fuehrer, no matter how patently insane it might be.[4]

Halder doubtless did feel this, and the pages of his still unpublished diary show that he opposed Hitler's wilder operational fantasies. They do not, however, record that he won many outstanding victories; and the present state of Germany is the best commentary on these tactics of opposition. The fact that the generals in the vast majority went with Hitler to the bitter end, albeit with doubts and reservations, leaves them sharing the responsibility for the debacle.

It leaves them also sharing responsibility for something else, for the needless sacrifice of thousands of German troops in operations which their reason told them were suicidal but which nevertheless they carried out. From this last responsibility belated demonstrations of Hitler's military incapacity cannot free them; nor can arguments based on the sanctity of the oath[5] nor

[3] Otto Stolz, "Teufelsaustreibung mit Beelzebub," *Die Neue Zeitung*, Nord-West Ausgabe, May 20, 1949.

[4] Martin Horn, *Halder: Schuld oder Tragik?*, Munich, 1948, pp. 34, 37.

[5] On the oath to Hitler, used by so many soldiers as an excuse for their continued obedience to Hitler, see the important article by Bernhard Schwertfeger, "Hindenburgs Tod und der Eid auf den Führer," *Die Wandlung*, III (1948), 563-77. Of interest also is O Taube, "Über den Diensteid," *Deutsche Rundschau*, June 1946.

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finespun theories of legal limitation like those employed by Colonel Hossbach. As a recent German writer has said:[6]

> It is astonishing that the generals always speak only of their military duty toward their superiors but not of their duty to the soldiers entrusted to them, most of whom were the flower of their people. One can certainly not require anyone to kill the tyrant, if his conscience forbids him to do so. But must not one require of these same men that they expend the same care and scrupulousness on the life of every single man among their subordinates? The reproach of not having prevented the slaughter of many hundreds of thousands of German soldiers must weigh heavily on the conscience of every single German general.

III

It is perhaps more important today than ever before for Americans to realize the part that the German military played in Hitler's assault upon the structure of world order. For the rehabilitation of the reputation of the German generals is already under way and is being viewed sympathetically by many in the democratic countries. It may be said to have begun with the publication of Liddell Hart's *The Other Side of the Hill*,[7] an attempt to prove that the German generals were rather good chaps despite their long association with evil companions; and it has been encouraged by our growing antagonism to Russia and by the tempting but dangerous thought that German soldiers might be useful allies in a future war. The report that a group of eighteen German generals called the *Brüderschaft* is currently advising Chancellor Adenauer on military matters[8] is evidence of the progress that the generals have already made on the road back to official recognition and influence. It may be true that the historical memory of Americans is short; but surely it should not be as short as that.

Certainly we should not forget that Hitler became chancellor in 1933 in part at least because the army showed a sympathetic neutrality toward his acquisition of full powers. Hossbach is frank enough to admit this in describing his own reaction to the events of January 1933, and what he says of himself may be

[6] Helmut Lindemann, "Die Schuld der Generale," *Deutsche Rundschau*, January 1949.
[7] B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill*, London, 1948.
[8] *New York Times*, Jan. 14, Feb. 22, 1950. See also Walter Lippmann, "Germany's Policy and Our Own," *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 19, 1950.

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applied to the bulk of the officer corps. Within eighteen months of Hitler's elevation, the *Militärwochenblatt* was writing:

> In the new state of Adolf Hitler, the *Wehrmacht* is no foreign body as it was after the November revolt of 1918. Today it is a part of the organic community and shares in the common distribution of the nation's task; and it follows Adolf Hitler as the Fuehrer of the people with full confidence and with devotion to its great national task.[9]

The army's acceptance of Hitler was made possible by the complete political naïveté of the officer corps. Meinecke has pointed out that in the prewar army we can find the exaltation of the technical to the exclusion of all other values;[10] and certainly, in the 1920's, Seeckt's emphasis upon technical training at the expense of political education heightened the tendency of officers to think almost solely in terms of military expediency.[11] The generals were intelligent and gifted men, but as a recent German writer has said, their understanding was limited to military-technical tasks of organization and planning. "This kind of *fabrizierenden* intellect they used with a true virtuosity; with it they operated in the void to the point of unreason; and they were, regarded politically, the purest of sectarians."[12]

Liddell Hart has sought to excuse this dangerous intellectual one-sidedness by saying that "if [the generals] had become philosophers they would have ceased to be soldiers."[13] But the greatest of German soldiers had always been philosophers of a kind; Scharnhorst and Boyen, Clausewitz and Moltke realized that even the soldier—or perhaps especially the soldier—must have a clear understanding of the political realities of his day. Their twentieth-century successors were so ungifted in the political sense that they did not even realize that Hitler threatened their own authority and position in the state. Seduced by Hitler's promises of a restored and expanded army in which speedy promotion and military preferment would be the lot of

[9] *Militärwochenblatt*, CXIX, Number 8 (Aug. 25, 1934).

[10] Friedrich Meinecke, *Die deutsche Katastrophe: Betrachtungen und Erinnerungen*, Wiesbaden, 1947, chap. vi.

[11] Herbert Rosinski, *The German Army*, Washington, Infantry Journal, 1944, p. 112. See also the comments in Hans Speidel, *Invasion 1944: ein Beitrag zu Rommels und des Reiches Schicksal*, Tübingen and Stuttgart, 1949, p. 31.

[12] Ignaz Pollmüller, "Die Rolle der Reichswehr von 1918 bis 1933," *Frankfurter Hefte*, 1. Jahrg., Heft 9 (December 1946), p. 838.

[13] Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 311.

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all professionals, they turned a deaf ear to warning voices in their own midst and drove from office the one man who sought to check Hitler's rise to power—Wilhelm Groener, who dared in 1932 to disband Hitler's storm troops and who fell because of the army's objection to his action.[14] After that event, the most ambitious officers—the Blombergs, the Keitels, and the Reichenaus—set their sails to Hitler's course; and the great majority of the others, for reasons of military expediency, followed blindly in their wake.

After the war was over, General Günther Blumentritt, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief West, said, in a pathetic attempt to justify himself and his kind: "We are often *pure fools* in political and legal affairs. But we are what we are as a result of our upbringing and education and we shall do well not to try to be any different."[15] This stubborn insistence that the soldier was a nonpolitical animal helps to explain why Hitler was able to come to power in 1933 and why, in subsequent years, he was able to bend the army to his will.

For the officer corps, the period which began in 1933 was marked by a long series of humiliations, beginning with the murder of Schleicher and Bredow in 1934,[16] made evident to the whole world in the disgraceful dismissal of Fritsch in 1938, and ending with the cavalier treatment accorded to the professional officers during the campaigns of the war.[17] For Germany as a whole, the same years were marked by an unprecedented record of domestic and international crime in which the professional officers must be considered as accomplices. It is true that, when they realized at last the nature of the regime which they had elected to support, the most honorable representatives

[14] See Gordon A. Craig, "Reichswehr and National Socialism: The Policy of Wilhelm Groener, 1928-1932," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXIII (June 1948), 194-229.

[15] U. S. Department of the Army, Historical Division, *OB West* (*Atlantic Wall to Siegfried Line*): *A Study in Command* (German Report Series), II, 73.

[16] Writing in 1939 of the "fatal and irreparable mistakes" made by the army leaders, Hermann Rauschning said: "One of the most fundamental, whatever may have been the practical reasons for it, was the moral capitulation in face of the murder of Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow. It was a moral capitulation which has continued to breed capitulation." *The Revolution of Nihilism: Warning to the West*, New York, Longmans, Green, 1939, p. 157.

[17] On this see, among others, Milton Shulman, *Defeat in the West*, New York, Dutton, 1949, p. 7 *et passim*; and *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-43*, ed. by Louis P. Lochner, New York, Doubleday, 1948, p. 288 *et passim*.

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of the officer corps risked their lives in an attempt to overthrow Hitler; and this courageous action must not be forgotten. But the others—and they were the great majority—went on with Hitler, seeking, like the central figure of Zuckmayer's powerful drama *Des Teufels General*, to escape from the political guilt of their generation by complete absorption in their military tasks —technicians operating in the void—Hitler's *Landsknechte*.[18] Of them, Ulrich von Hassell wrote in 1943:

> The longer the war lasts the less I think of the generals. They undoubtedly have technical ability and physical courage, but little moral courage, absolutely no broad world vision, no inner spiritual independence or that strength of resistance which rests on a genuine cultural basis. For this reason Hitler was able to make them subservient and bind them hand and foot.[19]

It was perhaps inevitable that, after the debacle, German soldiers should begin to write justifications of their actions. There is no reason, however, for us to be convinced by these attempts to portray the professional soldier as the tragic hero of modern German history, filled with good intentions but betrayed by Hitler or by Blomberg or by someone else. It would certainly be dangerous if—moved by some misguided sense of sympathy or by a desire to win allies against Russia—we should feel inclined to put the generals back in business. From the standpoint either of professional or of political intelligence, they have little to commend them. In the words of Helmut Lindemann: "As a profession the German generals dug their own grave. They themselves betrayed their great tradition. They deserve as a profession neither sympathy nor justification. Who wishes to be merciful should keep silence."[20]

[18] See Gerhard Ritter's remarks on Zuckmayer's play in *Die Neue Zeitung*, Nord-West Ausgabe, May 20, 1949.

[19] Ulrich von Hassell, *The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1947, p. 297.

[20] "Die Schuld der Generale," *Deutsche Rundschau*, January 1949, p. 26.

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RESEARCH NOTES

STANDARDIZED ERROR AND JAPANESE CHARACTER: A NOTE ON POLITICAL INTERPRETATION

By JOHN F. EMBREE

BACK in 1927 Vilhjalmur Stefansson wrote a little book entitled *The Standardization of Error*. In this essay he shows first of all that errors which fill social needs become standardized and, he suggests, it might be construed as antisocial to try to destroy them by raising points of fact. To this end, there is an advantage to knowledge by definition in contrast to knowledge by observation. This, as the writer points out, gives to arithmetic its finality. Two and two is by definition four. In the social sciences also, we have many "facts" that are so by definition and so become immutable.

In the nineteenth century national characteristics tended to be interpreted as matters of innate temperament. This semiracial interpretation of culture fell before the onslaught of Boasian and other attacks but still left us with different cultures and nations and the need to "characterize" them. Beginning with Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* in 1934, and the work of Gorer and others during the war, a new set of generalizations concerned with national character structure came into being. Judging from the avidity with which the new characterizations of culture have been seized upon, especially by non-anthropologists, they must fill a real social need—a need for some easy phrases to describe foreign cultures and to justify our behavior toward them.

In the specific field of Japanese "national character" a whole body of lore has grown up, mushrooming from an initial essay by Geoffrey Gorer. This paper and the way its points have been adhered to, despite questions of observed phenomena to the contrary, illustrates very well Stefansson's point of the social

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advantage of knowledge by definition over knowledge by observation.

The Japanese have been *defined* as having a tough time of it as children and as growing up with compulsions which in turn produce national aggression. Any data of observation which may counteract this definition are dismissed as irrelevant or not basic to Japanese culture. Nonetheless there are one or two standard errors in this interpretation which have received wide acceptance and upon which the writer would like to comment. One of these is the idea that the Japanese home is a dangerous place.

Gorer writes:

> The Japanese house is dangerous for a baby, and is conceptualized as even more dangerous than it is; a baby can break the paper walls or burn itself on the open charcoal burner; and it is believed that even the weight of a baby may be too heavy for the raised joists which support the house. These joists follow the shape of the white mats; and as soon as a baby can walk he has to learn to avoid stepping on the joints between the mats. One of the greatest crimes that a child can commit is to step on the sill, for that, it is said, would risk having . . . the cautery, *moxa,* burned on its back. The Japanese child has to "learn" its home completely, until, even when burdened, there is no risk of stepping where he should not; a mistake involves not only the possible incidental pain of falling or being burned, but also severe punishments from the parents.[1]

Benedict remarks:

> The Japanese even exaggerate the dangers of the house. It is "dangerous" and completely taboo to step on the threshold. The Japanese house has, of course, no cellar and is raised off the ground on joists. It is seriously felt that the whole house can be thrown out of shape even by a child's step upon the threshold. Not only that, but the child must learn not to step or to sit where the floor mats join one another. Floor mats are of standard size and rooms are known as "three-mat rooms" or "twelve-mat rooms." Where these mats join, children are often told, the samurai of old times used to thrust their swords up from below the house and pierce the occupants of the room. Only the thick soft floor mats provide safety; even the cracks where they meet are dangerous. The mother puts feelings of this sort into the constant admonitions she uses to the baby: "Dangerous" and "Bad."[2]

[1] Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences,* 1943, V, 110.

[2] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* Cambridge, Houghton Mifflin, 1946, p. 260.

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Carrying this view to the ultimate extreme we find Leites nterpreting as follows:

> According to Geoffrey Gorer and Ruth Benedict Japanese adults issue complicated and heavily sanctioned prescriptions to the child as to how and where he may or may not move around the house (in American terms, they behave as if most of the house were composed of radiators and as if they were set upon punishing the child for having touched hot radiators).[3]

Now, coming back to the prosaic matter of what life is like in a Japanese home, what do we find *by observation*? None of the three theorizers on Japanese character cited above complicated their theoretical structures by observational checks. Since most Japanese are farmers or urban workers, it is from this milieu that the data should be drawn.

The ordinary Japanese home is a place of familiarity, a place of safety, and a place where one is protected and fed. In it also are to be found supernatural protectors; the ancestral spirits by the Butsudan, regional spirits by the Kamidana, various spirits of good fortune such as Ebisu and Daikoku in the kitchen. The house, even when empty of adults, is still a familiar and relatively safe place because of these spiritual presences. This is not to say that a Japanese mother would leave an infant alone. There are hazards such as falling off the front step or into the fire pit. But it is safe enough for the children, and even babies may be left in the care of ten- or twelve-year-olds in the home.

Most of a small child's satisfactions come in the environment of home; song and story from grandparents, food from mother, games with siblings and age-mates.

As to the matter of running about the house and stepping on sills or mat cracks, the average child *as observed*, suffers from no restrictions in this regard. He *is* kept out of the ritual tokonoma alcove and away from the fire pit, just as in an American home a child is kept from a valuable flower vase or the kitchen stove; but there is no careful stepping for fear that the house will fall down or that a samurai will stick one from below. It is possible that in certain districts of Japan or in certain upper

[3] Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 1 (October 1948), p. 107.

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social classes some etiquette in regard to sills and cracks exists and with it a folk rationalization, but such is not the general practice in Japan. (Similarly in certain upper-class urban American homes a young child must step with extra circumspection to avoid damage to furniture or art objects.)

Home is also where one may relax. Tears which may not be shed in public before strangers may find vent at home. In hot weather one may shed clothing and lounge about freely (and over cracks!) on the floor.

In much of the character structure writing about the Japanese there is an ethnocentrism which fitted in well with the social needs of the war period during which the "scientific" conclusions as to their character were made. Racist interpretations were socially as well as scientifically unacceptable at this time but "character structure" interpretations were all right and served just as well in the literate world to "explain" the international and domestic behavior of Japan.

Margaret Mead, for example, refers to Japanese culture as one that functions but is "not pleasant."[4] Geoffrey Gorer speaks of the career of Japan as one of "almost continuous" aggressive warfare and explains this allegation by a peculiar Japanese need to make the world safe for the Emperor. Reversing the argument, he explains the remarkably long Japanese period of isolation and peace, 1600-1863, as due to a withdrawal reaction. (This is a fine example of Stefansson's knowledge by definition.)

In regard to Dr. Mead's reference to Japanese culture as unpleasant the question immediately arises as to unpleasant from whose point of view? The average Japanese regards American culture as unsettling and therefore as unpleasant. Japanese culture is an old one with well-grooved patterns of behavior to which the child is trained. He knows what is expected of him. Situations which can be met by conventional behavior are usually easier and less unpleasant for anyone than situations in which one does not know what is the right response. Too many uncertain situations may lead to a nervous breakdown, in rats,

[4] Margaret Mead, "The Implications of Culture Change for Personality Development," *The American Journal of OrthoPsychiatry*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1947).

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n Japanese, and in Americans. From this point of view the Japanese would be justified in referring to American culture as one that functions but in which it is "not pleasant" to live.

All of this is not to deny that different social groups are characterized by particular culture patterns or that there are culturally determined ways of inculcating these patterns of behavior and associated values in the growing child. But more attention should be given to objective fact when making generalizations about such culture patterns, especially when we are involved in descriptions of whole nations. One should also question the validity of using culture patterns which determine individual behavior within a social group as an "explanation" for national and international socio-economic-political developments. As I have noted before,[5] a summary (even when accurate) of a nation's citizens' behavior traits, while of some value in predicting individual behavior of members of the society, does not provide a magic explanation for a nation's aggressive warfare whether it be Japanese, British, American, or Russian.

[5] John F. Embree, *The Japanese Nation*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1945, pp. 235-36.

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